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Abstract
Essays into Firms, Innovation and Productivity
Myun Gun Kim
This empirical research aims to understand firm-level innovation and productivity in the
context of firm’s innovative activities or international activities such as offshoring and ex-
porting. The PhD dissertation consists of three chapters that use the Survery of Business
Activities annually provided by the Statistics Korea to gain insights into the link between
such activities and firm performances such as markup or productivity.
Chapter 1 investigates the link between R&D and firm-level markups. A detailed data on
R&D expenditures is used to examine whether a firm’s innovation activities have any impact
on its markups rather than productivity, whose relationship is already well-established in
the literature. R&D is likely to help to differentiate a firm’s products from those of other
competitors, thus boosting its demand. However, this demand-enhancing aspect of R&D has
not been thoroughly examined in the literature. With the consistent estimation of firm-level
markups using a dataset of the Korean manufacturing firms, it is found that R&D increases
firm-level markups, despite its size being small. To account for the fact that R&D is simply
a measure of the innovation input, patent counts have been used as an alternative measure
of innovation, but no evidence of positive effect was found. This may indicate that demand-
enhancing innovations are not necessarily all patented, which may be due to various reasons.
Chapter 2 investigates the learning-by-exporting hypothesis. This has been widely researched
in the current literature. However, this chapter places more focus on the estimation of pro-
ductivity, which has been given little attention. In the learning-by-exporting hypothesis,
it is theoretically suggested that productivity increases as a result of increase in efficiency.
However, the conventional total factor productivity (TFP) measure contains information not
only on efficiency but also on measurement errors and temporary shocks, the latter of which
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is hardly related to the theoretical link between exports and productivity. In this chapter, a
real total factor productivity that is derived as part of the semi-parametric estimation (de-
noted RTFP) is suggested as an alternative measure in which the latter elements above can
be minimised. The findings show that, when RTFP is employed, the-learning-by-exporting
effect is not only positive but also significant and long-lasting. However, this effect becomes
short-lived and insignificant when the TFP is used. This does not necessarily suggest that
the learning-by-exporting effect is better captured with the RTFP, but a certain measure,
despite being not so relevant for productivity, can end up providing a misleading result.
Moreover, the markups measure obtained from the first chapter are used to reconcile the
fact that the productivity measure is measured by revenue data rather than quantity.
Chapter 3 examines the firm-level productivity, with much focus on offshoring. This chapter
suggests modification to the Levinsohn-Petrin (LP) method to ensure alignment with the
context of offshoring. This chapter suggests that value-added be used in place of gross sales
when estimating a production function using the LP method to avoid inconsistent estimation
in the second stage. The results show that offshoring has a positive impact on productivity,
but the effect is not long-lasting. This suggests that offshoring can enhance productivity
in the short-term by a composition effect in which resources are reallocated towards more
productive activities or departments, whilst offshoring less productive ones to foreign ven-
dors. The results also show that the modifications generate a significant difference in the
estimators, suggesting the possibility of misleading results if no modification is made. RTFP,
introduced in the second chapter, is also employed as a dependent variable and the results
again display a highly significant effect of offshoring on productivity. As will be explained in
the second chapter, RTFP is more fitting in measuring the trend of productivity, as it is de-
signed to be less influenced by transitory shocks or measurement errors. Thus, the change in
results indicates that the productivity-enhancing effect is clearer when using RTFP, however
becomes less so when the conventional measure is employed. Moreover, the same estimates
of markups from the first chapter are employed again to mitigate any bias arising from the
demand-side.
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Chapter 1
R&D and Markups
1.1 Introduction
Returns to R&D have been a subject of considerable interest to academics, firm managers
and policy makers alike, not least because the investment in R&D is expensive (Hall et al.,
2010). Given the importance of innovation in the long-run economic growth, it is important
to understand the returns to investments in R&D to provide them with reasons to consider
undertaking such expensive investments.
The most widely-used method to measure the R&D returns is the framework developed by
Griliches (1979). In his framework, the knowledge capital from R&D along with the phys-
ical capital is included in the production function after which it is then estimated. Under
this production function framework, Hall and Mairesse (1995) displayed a positive link be-
tween R&D and productivity using the dataset of French manufacturing firms for the 1980s.
Guellec and van Pottelsberghe (2002) also showed a positive impact of R&D investment on
productivity growth based on a panel of 16 OECD countries.
However, in the literature, it is largely overlooked that output used in the estimation of
productivity is sales or value-added. This implies that the returns to R&D come not only
from a change in quantity but also from prices through innovation-driven demand. Process
innovations from R&D are expected to enhance a firm’s productivity by enabling larger quan-
tities for each set of inputs12. Product innovation and qualitative improvements may affect
1According to the Oslo manual (OECD, 2005), a process innovation is defined to be the implementation of
a new or significantly improved production or delivery method, including significant changes in techniques,
equipment or software.
2The word “expected” implies that an investment in R&D does not necessarily translate into higher pro-
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quantity3, but are more concerned with price through the creation of demand (Mairesse and
Mohnen, 2005). Differentiated goods will lower the elasticity of demand and, sequentially,
the firm’s market power resulting in the setting of higher price over marginal costs. This
highlights the importance of investigating the effect of R&D on firm-level markups in order
to examine the important, but largely overlooked, markup-enhancing aspect of R&D4.
Successful R&D leads to the increase of markups either through prices or marginal costs5.
While it is not possible to isolate the direct effect of R&D on prices due to data availabil-
ity, a substantial impact is presumed to reflect onto the prices through demand creation for
the discussion below. It is well known that firms tend to rely on R&D to differentiate their
goods and services. Porter (1980) points out that firms adopting a differentiation strategy,
compared to those pursuing cost leadership, are characteristic of high level of investment
in R&D. Moreover, recent empirical finding from Jaumandreu and Mairesse (2017) shows
that not only product but also process innovations are relevant for a shift in firm’s demand,
whereas process innovation does not always reduce marginal costs. This duly necessitates
the need to examine the hypothesis that R&D enhances markups through differentiation.
In section 1.7.4, any possible effect of R&D on markups through marginal costs will be con-
trolled for as a part of robustness check.
This chapter contributes to the existing literature by adding to the scanty research on the
markup-enhancing aspect of R&D. One of the reasons for the scantiness has stemmed from
the fact that there is a lack of reliable data of firm-level prices or quantities. Geroski et al.
(1993) investigated the effect of innovation on corporate profitability, however, Fisher and
McGowan (1983) and many other scholars have already discussed the misuse of accounting
profitability to infer economic profits6. In this regard, De Loecker and Warzynski (2012)
ductivity, but the positive link between process innovation and productivity is empirically supported by many
studies (e.g. Crepon et al., 1998; Mairesse and Mohnen, 2005).
3New products can contribute to productivity-enhancing increased variety of intermediate inputs (Aghion
et al., 1998).
4Cassiman and Vanormelingen (2014) focused on the link between innovation and firm-level markups. They
use the information on innovation by directly asking yes/no type of questions to firms whether they have
introduced any new or improved products or processes. The problem with this measure is that the answers
to the question can be subjective, because the definition of innovation can be understood differently amongst
the interviewees (Hall, 2011). Moreover, there is little or no screening undertaken by the database operators
themselves, unlike with patents (Hagedoorn and Cloodt, 2003). This makes cross-firm comparisons extremely
difficult.
5R&D may result in either product or process innovation. Product innovation is associated with a change in
demand whereas process innovation is with a decrease in marginal cost.
6Schmalensee (1989) observed that large U.S. firms are more likely than small ones to adopt the accounting
practices such as accelerated depreciation by which current profits become lower, troublingly without any
consideration of the underlying economic phenomena. This is problematic because unobserved errors in the
accounting data are likely to be correlated with regressors such as firm sizes, resulting in biased coefficients.
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offered a method to directly estimate firm-level markups from the data. This chapter ex-
amines the link using a large dataset of Korean manufacturing firms, first by estimating
firm-level markups and then by regressing them on the measure of R&D.
By focusing on the link between R&D and markups, this chapter will, as a corollary, con-
tribute to shedding new light on the existing literature on R&D and productivity (e.g. Hall
and Mairesse, 1995; Guellec and van Pottelsberghe, 2002). Due to the lack of data on firm-
level prices and output quantities, revenue total factor productivity (TFPR) is often used
in place of quantity total factor productivity (TFPQ)7. These two measures are correlated
to a certain degree, but a high level of TFPR can be driven by high firm-specific demand
rather than technical efficiency (Foster et al., 2008). Therefore, the link between R&D and
markups, if established, will help to better understand the, almost unanimously positive,
relationship between R&D and productivity established in the literature8.
Furthermore, this chapter contributes to the literature by dividing R&D into in-house and
offshore R&D. Outsourcing of R&D to low-cost countries is a relatively recent phenomenon,
compared with that of tangible commodities (Lewin et al., 2009). Hence, little is known
about the possible effects of offshoring R&D activities on firm performance, especially in
terms of firm markups. Whilst R&D offshoring may help to boost markups by tapping into
the technological capabilities of host countries, there is also a possibility of the loss of the
offshoring firm’s ability to keep pace with the rapidly evolving demand and preference of
consumers when it becomes too reliant on foreign R&D suppliers.
The results in this chapter find that R&D significantly increases firm-level markups. In
addition, R&D is found to significantly affect firm-level markups only when performed in-
house. In the context of offshoring, however, it does not deliver the same effects, possibly
due to increased costs of managing far-flung operations and added complexity. Furthermore,
despite R&D being shown to be markup-enhancing, it is found that the effect does not uni-
formly apply across all industries, showing striking variations in the degree of effect from
one industry to another.
The chapter is organised as follows. In section 1.2, the theoretical link between R&D and
demand creation is described. Section 1.3 presents a brief description of the data used in this
7The use of TFPR as a proxy for TFPQ in the estimation is problematic. The related issues are examined in
the following studies. See Klette and Griliches (1996) or Katayama et al. (2003).
8Foster et al. (2008) provided an important insight in this regard by using an unique data on producer-level
prices and quantities. They differentiate TFPQ from TFPR and find that the latter is positively correlated with
prices, whereas the former is inversely related with prices. This implies that TFPR, a oft-used measure in the
literature, is more likely to be affected by a change in demand than productivity.
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chapter. In section 1.4, the main empirical method to derive firm-level markups is described
and its results are presented in section 1.5. In section 1.6, the regression of main interest
is conducted to examine the link between firm-level markups and R&D. In section 1.7, a
couple of extensions are made to the main regression introduced in section 1.6. The last
section concludes the chapter.
1.2 R&D, Differentiation and Demand Elasticity
Unlike its appearance in the digitised dataset, R&D is a multi-faceted procedure. When
a firm is said to have undertaken R&D, this entails the firm having engaged in basic or
applied research to discover new knowledge, extend existing knowledge or produce specific
inventions or modifications to existing techniques. It also includes the development of pro-
totype designs and testing (OECD, 2005). Such diverse procedures help the firm to enhance
its performances in two aspects.
Firstly, successful R&D activities enable a firm to produce greater volumes of output with
the same set of inputs. As the stock of knowledge accumulates from R&D investments, this
results in a greater level of output through the productivity enhancement. For this reason,
in most empirical research, TFPQ is assumed to depend on the stock of R&D expenditure.
As an increase in productivity indicates the use of fewer inputs in the production of each
unit, this function of R&D is associated with a cost reduction.
Secondly, R&D allows a firm to produce a qualitatively differentiated output. To pull ahead
of competitors, a firm is constantly motivated to differentiate its products from others by
developing new products or services as well as adding improved features to existing ones.
The unique selling points, thus created, will boost firm-specific demand and furnish the
firm with a higher market power, despite still having little bearing on the improvement of
technical efficiency. This effect is not captured in the conventional production function where
quantities of physical inputs are related to quantities of output.
This second aspect of R&D is clearly distinguished from cost reduction that may arise from
R&D. The firm-specific demand from a product differentiation results in a lower demand
elasticity of a firm’s products, hence higher markups (Appendix A.2). Taking an example of
one imaginary beverage manufacturer; CamLiq, a local brewery, is imagined to manufacture
beer for a long time. However, with many competing breweries in its vicinity, the resulting
intense competition does not allow the brewery to increase its prices without fear of losing
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customers to its competitors. To escape competition, CamLiq invests a certain proportion of
its profits into research in brewing chemistry. They resultantly find that adding hops at a
later stage during brewing protects their aromatic oil and adds deep flavour to its finished
beer. This new discovery helped to confer qualities on the brewery’s existing portfolio that
could not be rivalled by others, therefore enhancing CamLiq’s markups.
Another such example can be seen through CamAuto, a Cambridge car manufacturer. It is
reported to produce approximately 150,000 cars per year. Faced with competition from across
the UK and abroad, the manufacturer takes the initiative to enhance its cars with a small
gadget to monitor the driving decisions of drivers. Based on real time monitoring, the gadget
advises those behind the wheel on optimal speeds or routes that produce the lowest fuel costs
or driving time in real time. This technology-laden gadget brought additional features to the
inherent value of cars by providing additional services to the existing products and, despite
being a small addition, consequently, drew in a wider range of customers9.
From the above examples, obvious technological changes were brought about in the prod-
ucts, which are not readily captured by the metrics of productivity such as TFPQ. This is
because, even though a specific innovation was introduced, it comes with no overall change
in the efficiency with which the inputs are used in production. In the first example, the beer
is still produced using the same technique and ingredients with the only alteration being
the timing at which the hops are added. Likewise in the latter instance, the cars are man-
ufactured almost as efficiently as they were before servitisation is implemented. In both
cases, monopoly rents are created in both products through differentiating them from other
competing products in the market.
Schumpeter (1942) maintained that entrepreneurs, in the perennial gale of destruction, are
constantly driven to capture monopoly rents by making qualitatively different products or
services. This differentiation is especially important when competition is highly intense,
as it allows a firm to pull ahead of a, possibly neck-and-neck, competition. The monopoly
rents are earned by firms that are able to exercise market power. This market power is
achieved by many factors such as government grants of exclusive rights (e.g. patent, trade-
mark or copyright), control over the main distribution channels or a reputation or iden-
tity built through an advertising campaign (Kamien and Schwartz, 1982). However, when
Schumpeter stressed the importance of entrepreneurship and a gale of creative destruction,
9R&D can accelerate servitisation by developing manufacturing-friendly technology such as artificial intel-
ligence which can be bundled up with the existing products as part of enhanced services as described in the
example.
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he had the idea of adding value to products or services or the new combinations of resources.
It is this very aspect of market power to which R&D can contribute.
In the economics literature, R&D is, more often than not, associated with the benefits of cost
reduction. This can be partly due to the inclination to view the subject of technical change as
the sole contributor to cost reductions. Rosenberg (1982) maintains that such a view is due
to the tendency to accommodate a quantitative approach. As briefly mentioned above, a lack
of data on firm-level prices or marginal costs prevents an estimation of the exact demand-
enhancing aspect of R&D. The use of markups is only an indirect way to measure its impact
on demand creation.
However, many studies have shown that R&D is associated more with price changes than
with cost reductions. In the management literature, it is well established that a firm in-
vests in R&D activities as a means of its differentiation strategy to develop unique products
or services (Porter, 1980). Moreover, based on the data from 121 strategic business units,
Govindarajan (1989) observed that R&D was positively associated with the implementation
of a firm’s differentiation strategy rather than a low-cost strategy.
1.3 Data
1.3.1 Survey of Business Activities
This chapter focuses on pooled cross-section samples of Korean manufacturing firms based
on the Survey of Business Activities (SBA) that has been running from 2006 until 2015. The
survey is annually conducted by the Statistics Korea (KOSTAT) and covers all enterprises
with at least 50 employees or 300 million won capital. This chapter deals with only those
within the manufacturing sector. The dataset is unbalanced due to the entering and exiting
of businesses and contains information on approximately 5,700 firms per year on average in
the manufacturing sector.
The SBA provides a wide range of financial statement-related data such as sales, wages,
material costs, R&D, investments or tangible/intangible assets. The main variables which
will be used in this chapter are briefly defined in Table 1.1. EMP is defined as the number
of employees, whereas the remaining variables that are usually used in the estimation of
production functions, such as RS,CAP or INT, are recorded in nominal values. Thus, they
are deflated using the relevant price indices. RS refers to revenue, which is used as a proxy
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Table 1.1: Variables and Definition
Variables Definition
RS The revenue deflated by price index
EMP The number of employees
CAP The capital deflated by relevant index
INT The intermediate goods deflated by relevant index
RD The R&D expenditure deflated by relevant index
RDSELF The R&D expenditure performed in-house deflated by relevant index
RDOFF The R&D expenditure performed offshore deflated by relevant index
GPC The total number of patents granted and held
NPC The total number of patents which are in actual use out of GPC
EXP The dummy variable (1 = exporter, 0 = otherwise)
FOR The dummy variable (1 = foreign-owned, 0 = otherwise)
Table 1.2: Summary Statistics of the Korean manufacturing firms during 2007-2015 : usual
variables in the production function estimation
Year RS EMP CAP INT Obs
2007 10.41 277 9.18 9.72 4,677
2008 10.60 292 9.36 9.90 3,602
2009 10.52 290 9.27 9.81 4,429
2010 10.71 288 9.42 10.00 4,238
2011 10.86 351 9.56 10.12 3,822
2012 10.81 327 9.57 10.06 4,303
2013 10.82 321 9.57 10.04 4,663
2014 10.84 329 9.66 10.07 4,509
2015 10.89 329 9.68 10.11 4,708
Note: All the values are expressed in logs with the exception of EMP.
for output and is deflated using the sector-level Producer Price Index (PPI) provided by the
Bank of Korea. CAP and INT as well as the variables for R&D are deflated with the
domestic PPI for capital goods and intermediate inputs that are also available from the
same source.
Along with these standard variables, the SBA is especially rich in information on the mea-
sures of innovation activities: the innovation input or output. The information on the inno-
vation input is presented in the form of the total amount of R&D spending. This information,
in addition, divides the total spending into in-house (RDSELF) and offshore R&D spending
(RDOFF). Moreover, the SBA provides information on the number of patents, an usual mea-
sure for the innovation output. Unlike the usual data on patent counts, that counts the
number of patents granted to firms (GPC) regardless of their practicality or marketability
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Table 1.3: Summary Statistics of the Innovation ariables
RD RDSELF RDOFF GPC NPC
Total 6.21 6.20 5.27 1.58 1.49
Large 7.27 7.25 6.06 2.46 2.30
Small 5.76 5.76 4.62 1.25 1.18
Note: Large firms are defined to be the ones with employees over 200. On the other hand, small firms are the
ones with 50 to 200 employees. All the values are expressed in logs. When taking logarithms of patents, the
value of one is added to the number of patents because of the zeros in patents (Bloom et al., 2016).
Table 1.4: R&D Investing Firms’ Share between 2007-2015 (%)
Year (1) (2) (3)
2007 61.6 1.1 9.3
2008 63.5 1.1 9.9
2009 66.2 0.9 10.5
2010 62.6 1.1 7.7
2011 63.5 1.1 6.5
2012 67.6 0.9 5.7
2013 68.9 1.0 5.6
2014 71.3 0.9 5.9
2015 71.5 0.8 4.4
Note: (1) : The ratio of the number of firms investing only in in-house R&D to that of manufacturing firms (2)
:The ratio of the number of firms investing only in offshore R&D to that of manufacturing firms (3) : The ratio
of the number of firms investing both in in-house and offshore R&D to that of manufacturing firms
(e.g. Bloom et al., 2016), the SBA provides information on the number of patents that are in
actual use (NPC)10.
The summary statistics of firm-level variables used in the production function estimation are
presented in Table 1.211. The average values of real revenue, capital and intermediate inputs
have all shown a broadly increasing trend over the sample periods, bar a temporary drop in
the wake of the 2008 financial crisis. The increasing trend is also found in the employment
variable, peaking at 351 in the year of 2011. The number has marginally dropped since
then, however, it is difficult to infer the impact of any trend such as automation or offshoring
purely from these readings. This is due to the constant exits and entries of firms over the
10All granted patents are no more than an indicator of the successful realisation of the technical require-
ments. According to the survey conducted by the Japan Patent Office (JPO), more than 60% of patents are
not considered for internal use or license-out (Nagaoka et al., 2010). Not all patents are in actual use and, if
they are not in use, it is hard to argue that they are, or at least have the potential of, contributing to firm’s
performances, albeit by varying degrees.
11The summary statistics start from 2007 instead of 2006, because the markups cannot be estimated for the
very first year of the dataset. The information on the first year has been excluded in the estimation.
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sample periods as shown from the number of firms.
Table 1.3 also reports the summary statistics of innovation variables such as R&D and
patent counts. The often-used threshold of 200 employees is used to distinguish between
large and small firms. By dividing the sample firms in this manner, it is observed that in-
novative activities - whether it be the input or output - are more active in larger firms than
small. This is consistent with the Schumpeterian hypothesis that there is a positive link
between firm size and innovation.
Table 1.4 shows the percentage share of firms investing in R&D between the period of 2007
and 2015. The first column shows the share of firms investing only in in-house R&D. Rang-
ing from 61.6% in 2007 to 71.5% in 2015, a gradual increase is evident in the share. On the
contrary, the share of firms investing solely in offshore R&D without investment in in-house
R&D is as little as 1% and has not shown any significant change throughout the sample pe-
riod. This indicates that very few firms opt to rely merely on offshored innovation activities,
which is consistent with the empirical finding that complete reliance on the knowledge from
external sources is unusual (Tether and Tajar, 2008) . The share of firms investing in both
in-house and offshore R&D amounted to 9.3% in 2007, but has gradually decreased to 4.4%
in 2015.
1.3.2 R&D Capital Stock
As Hall et al. (2010) noted, the underlying assumption behind the estimation of the effects
of R&D is that R&D creates a firm-level stock of knowledge that creates demand into the
future. The stock of knowledge created by R&D is computed by a simple perpetual inventory
method (PIM). The PIM has been widely used in the literature due to its account for the
depreciation of knowledge as in the case of physical capital (e.g. Coe and Helpman, 1995;
Parisi et al., 2006). Denoting the stock arising from R&D investments as RDS, the formula
for RDS is given as follows
RDSit = γ0RD it+γ1RD it−1+·· ·+γTRD it−T (1.1)
where γ denotes the share of knowledge which is still in use. However, its exact share is
not known and the assumption needs to be made that γ0 = 1,γ1 = (1−δ), · · · ,γT = (1−δ)T ,
in which the depreciation rate, δ, is constant in every period t. Under this assumption,
equation (1.1) can be transformed into the following equation
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RDSit = (1−δ)RDSit−1+RD it (1.2)
Many studies have assumed the depreciation rate, δ, for accumulated knowledge to be 15%,
which is higher than the usual capital depreciation rate of 6%. This reflects the fact that
technological obsolescence is significantly faster than capital depreciation (Ortega-Argilés
et al., 2015). However, in this section, different depreciation rates are used depending on the
technology intensity of sectors. This is based on the observation that more technologically
intensive sectors are subject to faster technological progress than their less intensive coun-
terparts, which in turn induces the faster obsolescence of the knowledge capital. In light of
this, depreciations rates are assumed to be 15% for the low-medium tech industries and 18%
for the high-tech sectors as suggested by Ortega-Argilés et al. (2015).
1.3.3 Measure of Market Structure
Among the control variables, which will be included in the regression, it is worth briefly
commenting on the variable related to market structure. Markups can be assumed to be
higher in a market with imperfect competition than the one close to perfect competition.
The degree of competition is difficult to measure, but the Herfindahl index is often used (e.g.
Aghion et al., 2005).
The Herfindahl index, denoted as HFI jt, represents the degree of competition as measured
by the market structure of industry j at time t. The index has long been used as a measure
of concentration. It is calculated by the sum of squares of all firms’ market shares in an
industry as below
HFI jt =
n∑
i=1
(si jt)2 (1.3)
where si jt denotes the market share at firm i of industry j at time t. The lower the value of
the index, the higher competition it implies amongst them. Squaring gives more weight to
firms with a large market share than to those with a small share. Following Aghion et al.
(2005), both the linear and quadratic terms of HFI jt will be included.
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1.4 Empirical Strategy
1.4.1 Markups
This section closely follows De Loecker and Warzynski (2012), which builds on the seminar
work by Hall (1988), whose main argument is that the input’s revenue share and cost share
are the same under perfect competition12, with the wedge between the two can being in-
terpreted as the firm-level markups. However, neither the firm’s total costs nor its returns
to scale are easily measured or observed. De Loecker and Warzynski (2012) circumvented
these issues by simply imposing a cost-minimising behaviour, resulting in the economisation
of the required data. Firm-level markups are then obtained from the firm’s cost minimising
conditions for variable inputs which are free of adjustment costs. The output elasticity of a
variable input is equal to that factor’s expenditure share in total revenue only when P =MC.
Any deviation from this should be regarded as a measure of the relevant markups. Consider
a general production function of the form
Q it =Q it(L it, Mit,K it,ωit) (1.4)
where Q it,L it, Mit and K it denote output, labour, intermediate inputs and capital stock of
a firm i at time t. Q it(·) is a general production function whose only restrictions are to be
continuous and twice differentiable with respect to its arguments. The first-order condition
for a variable input Mit is
∂Q it(·)
∂Mit
Mit
Q it
= 1
λit
PMit Mit
Q it
(1.5)
where PMit denote a firm i’s price for a variable input M at time t. λit denote the Lagrangian
multiplier which is the marginal cost of production at a given level of output. Equation
(1.5) shows that cost-minimising behaviour of a firm leads to the equality of the output
elasticity of any variable input Mit to 1λit
PMit Mit
Q it
. Subsequently, by defining the markup as µit
as µit ≡ Pitλit ., equation (1.5) can be re-written as below
12The markup is defined to be the revenue (PitQ it) divided by the total costs (Q it ACit). This is based on the
fact that, under constant returns to scale, marginal costs are equal to average costs (ACit = MCit). Alterna-
tively, this can also be expressed as the ratio of the input’s cost share (witL it/TCit) to the input’s revenue share
(witL it/PitQ it), where the input is labour and TC denotes the total costs. Theoretically, they measure the same
values.
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θMit =µit
PMit Mit
PitQ it
(1.6)
where θMit denotes the output elasticity of an input M. The data on total sales (PitQ it) and
the expenditure on intermediate inputs (PMit Mit) can be easily obtained from the dataset,
whereas the output elasticity θMit is not. Its consistent estimation is the main concern in the
next section.
1.4.2 Output Elasticities
Output elasticities are estimated from the semi-parametric production function estimation
methods such as Olley and Pakes (1996) (OP) or Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) (LP). To apply
these methods, two additional assumptions need to be imposed on the production function.
First, productivity is assumed to be Hicks-neutral. Second, production function parameters
are assumed identical across all firms. With these assumptions, a log version of equation
(1.4) can be expressed as
qit = f (l it,mit,kit;β)+ωit+²it (1.7)
where qit = lnQ it and l it,mit and kit denote logged labour, intermediate inputs and capital
of firm i and time t respectively. ²it implies that the measurement error in output and
unanticipated shocks are implicitly allowed for, whereas ωit denote the level of productivity
observable to the firm, but not to the econometrician, when making a decision on the level
of inputs. Departing from the Cobb-Douglas functional form, the production function f (·) is
approximated by translog specification. This enables the obtainment of different markups
across firms within one industry and to avoid a situation in which any variation in markup
is attributed to the change in the input’s revenue shares.
As the decision on variable inputs is determined after observing ωit, there is a possibility of
simultaneity bias. The simultaneity bias can be circumvented by employing the idea that the
optimal choice of variable inputs depends on the level of productivity. As in LP, the demand
function for intermediate inputs, mit = mt(kit,ωit,zit), is used to control for unobservable
productivity ωit. This can be done by inverting out the demand function and replacing ωit
with the inverted demand function. Consequently, equation (1.7) can be re-expressed as
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below13
qit = f (l it,mit,kit;β)+ht(kit,mit,zit)+²it (1.8)
where ht(·) = m−1t (·) = ωit. zit denote additional variables which could potentially affect
optimal input demand across and within firms over time. De Loecker and Warzynski (2012)
indicated that the inclusion of these additional variables in the estimation routine obviates
the need for taking a stand on the exact model of competition. The usual OP or LP proceeds
in two stages, recovering the coefficients of variable inputs and that of capital in the first
and second stages respectively.
However, this section takes heed of the critique of Ackerberg et al. (2006) and identifies no
parameters in the first stage. According to the critique (see Appendix A.1), the collinearity
problem that l it does not vary independently of the non-parametric function makes identifi-
cation of the coefficient βl not plausible in the first stage. In the first stage, the regression
equation is
qit =φt(l it,kit,mit,zit)+²it (1.9)
where φit =βl l it+βmmit+βkkit+βll l2it+βmmm2it+βkkk2it+βlkl itkit+βlml itmit+βmkmitkit+
ht(kit,mit,zit). In the first stage, estimates of φit and ²it, that is, φˆit and ²ˆit respectively, are
obtained. In the second stage, all the coefficients are recovered by relying on the following
first-order Markov process of ωit
ωit = gt(ωit−1)+ζit (1.10)
where gt(·) is an unknown function and ζit the innovation to productivity. An estimate for
ζit(β) is retrieved by non-parametrically regressing ωit(β)= φˆit−βl l it−βmmit−βkkit−βll l2it−
βmmm2it−βkkk2it−βlkl itkit−βlml itmit−βmkmitkit on ωit−1(β), given β14. The retrieved esti-
mate for ζit is then used to construct the sample analogue of the following moment conditions
E[ζit(β)hit]= 0 (1.11)
13If the demand for intermediate inputs strictly increases in productivity conditional on other state variables,
the invertibility of intermediate inputs function is ensured.
14A vector of input coefficients β is obtained from the OLS estimation of the equation (1.8).
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where hit = {l it−1,mit−1,kit, l2it−1,m2it−1,k2it, l it−1kit, l it−1mit−1,mit−1kit} is the set of instru-
ments with the assumption that capital is quasi-fixed. The estimated output elasticities are
then obtained by
θˆMit = βˆm+2βˆmmmit+ βˆlml it+ βˆmkkit (1.12)
This shows the strength of trans-log production function as output elasticities can vary
across firms depending on the level of their other input use, despite production function
coefficients being assumed to be equal across firms.
Before proceeding further into the results, it needs to be reminded that a measure of output
is not quantity but sales deflated using industry-level price index. This can result in omit-
ted price variable bias as discussed in (Klette and Griliches, 1996; Katayama et al., 2003).
This is a common occurrence as the data on physical quantities and prices are seldom avail-
able. A few comments could be made regarding this potential omitted price variable bias.
First, the use of proxy for productivity in the estimation of production function helps against
unobserved prices (De Loecker and Warzynski, 2012). The proxy will control for any price
variation correlated with the variation of productivity, removing its impact on the estima-
tion of the production function. Second, the previous point will not be valid should any price
variation be correlated with demand shocks that are not correlated with productivity. Then,
unobserved prices will bias the level of the markup, possibly downwardly. However, even
this will not affect the estimates in this chapter if such bias is not systematically related to
the firm’s R&D activities subsequent to controlling for differences in input use (De Loecker
and Warzynski, 2012). Lastly, there are a few empirical findings that there is less impact
from unobserved prices than the omitted price variable bias predicts. Mairesse and Mohnen
(2005) found that moving from industry-level price deflator to firm-level deflator does not
alter the estimated output elasticities. De Loecker and Warzynski (2012) also empirically
confirmed that their main estimates are not affected by unobserved prices.
1.5 Results
1.5.1 Output Elasticities
From the estimation procedure described above, the output elasticities are recovered from
the gross output trans-log production function. The production function is estimated sep-
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Table 1.5: Average Output Elasticities, By Industry
Industry Labour Materials Capital No. of Obs.
13 0.28 0.53 0.07 1874
17 0.20 0.67 0.10 1105
20 0.15 0.67 0.11 2881
22 0.26 0.59 0.07 3118
23 0.23 0.53 0.17 1522
24 0.15 0.67 0.08 2711
25 0.30 0.52 0.16 2714
26 0.30 0.56 0.07 5891
27 0.31 0.52 0.12 1538
28 0.20 0.68 0.05 2753
29 0.32 0.49 0.11 5264
30 0.22 0.59 0.10 5771
31 0.23 0.41 0.20 928
32 0.19 0.73 0.16 418
33 0.21 0.59 0.13 463
arately for each industry. As briefly mentioned above, the use of the translog production
function allows output elasticities to vary across firms. Table 1.5 reports the average output
elasticities across the industries.
The Korean manufacturing sector is divided into 15 different industries. There are wide
differences in the output elasticities not only across firms but also across industries. It is
indicated that the output elasticities of labour range from 0.15 to 0.32 and those of capital
from 0.07 to 0.20, with materials contributing the largest role in production, ranging from
0.41 to 0.7315.
As the mean statistic is likely to be affected by outliers in each industry, Table 1.6 addition-
ally reports the median output elasticities in its comparison. This indicates that there are
differences between the mean and median elasticities, which shows the possibility that the
average output elasticities are influenced by outliers. However, the difference between the
values is not wide.
Table 1.7 shows that industry-average returns to scale amount to 0.93 and the median is
0.92. This is in line with the findings of De Loecker et al. (2016). Since the returns to scale
are allowed to vary across firms, a proportion of them can still exhibit increasing returns to
scale. It is found that the proportion amounts to 68 % in the Indian firm-level production
15In Table 1.5, the wearing apparel industry (14) was excluded because nonsensical negative output elastic-
ities were reported. However, the exclusion has not changed the overall result probably because of its small
sample size.
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Table 1.6: Median Output Elasticities, By Industry
Industry Labour Materials Capital
13 0.27 0.53 0.08
17 0.19 0.68 0.11
20 0.14 0.65 0.11
22 0.25 0.58 0.08
23 0.22 0.53 0.17
24 0.15 0.66 0.08
25 0.29 0.52 0.16
26 0.29 0.55 0.08
27 0.30 0.52 0.13
28 0.19 0.67 0.05
29 0.31 0.49 0.11
30 0.21 0.57 0.10
31 0.24 0.39 0.18
32 0.17 0.72 0.16
33 0.18 0.59 0.16
data. However, in Korean manufacturing, only 27.6 % of the sample exhibits increasing
returns to scale. This pales in comparison to the finding of De Loecker et al. (2016).
Table 1.7: Returns to Scale, Mean and Median
Returns to Scale Mean Median
De Loecker et al. (2016) 0.95 -
All 0.93 0.92
Large Firms 1.09 1.07
Small Firms 0.88 0.88
* Large firms are defined to be the ones which employ more than 200 employees whereas small firms are the
ones with less than 200 employees. Returns to scale are the sum of output elasticities of labour, materials and
capital.
If the data is divided into two groups - large and small firms - depending on the number of
employees, it is clear that there is a large difference in the returns to scale between them.
The average returns to scale for large firms amount to 1.09, whereas those for small firms
are only 0.88. This is in line with empirical findings in which small firms operate under
decreasing returns to scale (e.g. Halpern and Korösi, 2001).
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Table 1.8: Estimate of Markups, Whole Industry
Mean Median.
1.34 1.17
South Korea* 1.48 -
Asia* 1.45 -
Global* 1.59 -
Large Firms 1.51 1.26
Small Firms 1.27 1.10
* These estimates are from De Loecker and Eeckhout (2018). They are calculated based on the Worldscope
dataset which contains financial statements for over 70,000 companies worldwide. The values are the average
markup in 2016.
1.5.2 Markups
In Table 1.8, the first row reports the estimates of industry-mean and -median markups. The
mean markup is seen to equal to 1.34 and the median amounting to 1.17. The mean value is
marginally lower than the Korean industry-average markup of 1.48 reported in De Loecker
and Eeckhout (2018). The mean value is also smaller in comparison to the Asian and Global
average markups in the third and fourth rows respectively. However, it should only be noted
that the latter values are the average value of the markups only in 2016 whereas the mean
value in the first row is the average of the markups between 2007 and 2015. De Loecker and
Eeckhout (2018) indicated that the global markup has increased from 1.1 in 1980 to around
1.6 in 201616.
Figure 1.1 displays the mean and median of markups across industries are reported in navy
and pale blue bars respectively. It is evident that there is no marked difference seen between
the mean and median markups in almost every industry. However, the median values are
generally lower than the mean values, notably in furniture (31) and basic metals (24). This
indicates the possibility that the average markups are likely to be driven by outliers to a
certain degree.
Markups can be seen to be greater than unity in all the industries, ranging from 1.18 to 1.49.
The industries with the highest markups are computer, electronic and optical products (26)
and electrical equipment (27), whereas those with the lowest markups are machinery and
equipment (28) and other transport equipment (30).
The time-trend of the mean and median markups is plotted in Figure 1.2 (a) and (b) respec-
16According to De Loecker and Eeckhout (2018), the mean markup of 1.34 is in line with those of Finland
(1.36), Austria (1.34), Germany (1.35), India (1.32), Japan (1.33) or New Zealand (1.35).
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Figure 1.1: Mean and Median Markups Across Industries
tively. Cassiman and Vanormelingen (2014) pointed out that markups are empirically found
to be strongly pro-cyclical, with the evolution of both markups being consistent with this ob-
servation. The markups were seen to be high before the crisis, but dramatically declined in
the run up to the financial crisis. This decreasing trend was reversed shortly after the crisis
according to Figure 1.2 (a), whereas the markups almost continuously decreased until 2011
according to Figure 1.2 (b). This difference may suggest that firms with significantly large
markups are generally more resilient to the external shocks such as financial crises, boost-
ing the average markups. In both cases, the time-trend of markups has shown an U-shaped
evolution, implying that they are on the recovery since the financial crisis.
1.6 Markups and R&D
In this section, the regression of the firm-level markups on R&D is estimated, with the
following regression equation being considered,
logµit =β0+β1RDSI it+Xitγ+δj+δt+²it (1.13)
where µit denotes firm-level markups of firm i at time t and RDSI denote (logged) R&D
intensity calculated as the ratio of the R&D capital stock to the firm’s sales. There are a
few identification issues that need to be discussed to identify the relationship between firm-
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Figure 1.2: Evolution of Mean and Median Markups
(a) Mean Markups (b) Median Markups
level market power and the innovation input. Firstly, there can be macroeconomic factors
that affect both innovation and firm-level market power which change over time. If these
are not controlled for, there is a possibility that the resulting significant coefficient can be
spurious. Therefore, time-specific fixed effects (δt) are included. Secondly, there may be
industry-specific factors. These industry-level differences may account for discrepancies in
innovative activities which cannot be explained by firm-level markups. Therefore, in order
to control for industry-level heterogenity, industry-level fixed effects (δ j) are also included.
X it denotes a vector of control variables such as firm’s exporting (De Loecker and Warzynski,
2012) or offshoring status. In addition, the variables such as market structure and firm size
are also included.
Results from Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) can be seen in Table 1.9. The specification in
column (1) indicates that there is, on average, a 0.59% increase in markup if R&D intensity
increases by 10%. The coefficient is highly significant even under 1% level of significance,
but is difficult to be described as sizeable. The specifications in columns (2) and (3) include
a dummy indicating whether the firm is an exporter or offshorer and other control variables
respectively. However, there is no noticeable change in the coefficient on R&D capital stock.
The results therefore show that R&D is likely to have a positive association with firm-level
markups.
The coefficients on the control variables in Table 1.9 display the expected signs, with a firm’s
size and its markups having a significant and positive association. Furthermore, the market
concentration, as measured by the Herfindahl index, shows a positive effect on firm-level
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Table 1.9: Regression of Markups on R&D : Ordinary Least Squares (OLS)
(1) (2) (3)
RDSI 0.059∗∗∗ 0.055∗∗∗ 0.055∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
SIZE 0.115∗∗∗ 0.127∗∗∗ 0.127∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
HFI 0.428∗∗∗ 0.419∗∗∗ 1.245∗∗∗
(0.036) (0.036) (0.122)
HFISQ −1.926∗∗∗
(0.272)
EX P −0.114∗∗∗ −0.114∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.004)
OFF 0.098∗∗∗ 0.097∗∗∗
(0.009) (0.002)
Industry Yes Yes Yes
Year Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.125 0.142 0.143
Observation 34,145 34,145 34,145
Note: Standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***,** and * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10%
respectively.
markups. The Herfindahl indices measure the concentration of an industry, where a high
level of concentration indicates that there are only a few large firms that hold a large per-
centage of the market. Interestingly, the inclusion of a squared Herfindahl index in column
(3) shows that there is an inverted-U relationship between firm-level markups and market
concentration.
Dummies included in specification (2) indicate that there is no premia for exporters. Rather,
it can be seen that exporters tend to have, on average, 11.4% lower markups than those
with no exporting. This is not consistent with the findings of De Loecker and Warzynski
(2012). This lower makrup may be explained by the fact that exporters tend to face more
competition than those only operating in the domestic market. On the other hand, offshorers
tend to have on average 9.8% higher markups than those with no offshoring. Although
there is no empirical research on the link between offshoring and markups, the positive
association is consistent with the fact that offshoring is fundamentally the substitution of
in-house activities for those provided by outside contractors, often at cheaper prices. The
inclusion of these dummy variables, however, does not affect the size or significance of the
coefficient on R&D.
Table 1.10 includes R&D intensity variables with various lag structures. Thus, in columns
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Table 1.10: Regression of Markups on R&D : Different Lag Structures
(1) (2) (3)
L1.RDSI 0.053∗∗∗ 0.049∗∗∗ 0.049∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
L2.RDSI 0.049∗∗∗ 0.046∗∗∗ 0.046∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
L3.RDSI 0.047∗∗∗ 0.043∗∗∗ 0.043∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Note: Standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***,** and * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10%
respectively.
(1) - (3) of Table 1.9, the R&D intensity variable is lagged by one to three years respectively
(denoted by L followed by the number of lags). Despite the coefficient showing marginal
decreases as further lags are considered, they are seen to be largely constant and all highly
consistent under 1% level. This indicates that the use of R&D capital stock results in the
consideration of the lag structure more ore less redundant as the past values of R&D in-
vestments have already been incorporated into the R&D stock variable. The effects from
R&D do not solely result from current or lagged flows of R&D but from accumulated stock of
knowledge from a series of R&D investments.
However, the OLS can be a naive approach as it is likely that there are unobservable fac-
tors (e.g. the presence of innovative managers in a firm) which can affect both firm-level
makrkups and R&D intensity, leading to biased coefficients. Similarly, there may be a re-
verse causality running from firm-level markups to R&D intensity. To overcome the possible
endogeneity, fixed-effects regression has been employed by assuming that such unobservable
firm-level characteristics are time-invariant. The results in column (1) of Table 1.11 indicate
that the effect of R&D on firm-level markups remains positive and significant under 1% level
of significance.
To further control for endogeneity, the system-GMM method has been used to estimate the
dynamic equation (1.14) as below.
logµit =β0+β1 logµit−1+β2RDSI it+Xitγ+δi+δt+²it (1.14)
where µit−1 is the lagged dependant variable. In this case, applying OLS to (1.14) will lead
to inconsistent estimation of the coefficients as δi is correlated with the lagged dependent
variable. Although the usual fixed-effects estimator eliminates δi, the lagged dependent
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Table 1.11: Regression of Markups on R&D : Fixed Effects (FE) and Generalised Method of
Moments (GMM)
(1) (2) (3)
FE FE GMM-SYS
L. logµ 0.330∗∗∗ 0.559∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.113)
RDSI 0.024∗∗∗ 0.029∗∗∗ 0.086∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.028)
Industry Yes Yes Yes
Year Yes Yes Yes
Controls Yes Yes Yes
Observation 34,145 27,218 27,218
AR(1) 0.000
AR(2) 0.386
Hansen 0.379
Note: Standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***,** and * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10%
respectively. The Hansen test is used to test the null hypothesis that the instruments are valid. The AR test
is used to find the evidence of autocorrelation in the errors. The same control variables are included as in
Table 1.9.
variable is still correlated with the error term (²it− ²¯i).
Inconsistency can only be ameliorated if long panels induce ²¯i to shrink. Nickell (1981)
demonstrated that the inconsistency is sizeable in short panels as it is of order T−1 as n→∞
(when T denotes time periods and n the number of observations). As the data in this chapter
is essentially short panels, inconsistency is inevitable if fixed effects estimation is employed.
To overcome this, Arellano and Bond (1991), Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and
Bond (2000) have suggested instrument variables method designed for situations with few
time periods and many panels.
Arellano and Bond (1991) proposed using lagged levels as the instruments for differenced
variables, hence the name difference GMM (DGMM). Subsequently, Arellano and Bover
(1995) and Blundell and Bond (2000) had noted that the lagged levels may serve as poor
instruments for first differenced variables, especially if the variables are close to a random
walk. Hence, this led them to modify DGMM and introduce the original equation back to
the differenced equation and build a system of equations. Hence, the name system GMM
(SGMM) (Appendix A.3 for more detail), proposing to use both lagged levels and lagged
differences as the instruments. The latter method circumvents the dilemma of weak instru-
ments in DGMM by combining the moments conditions for the levels equation and those for
the first differenced equation. Thus, these newly added moments can increase efficiency.
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In the estimation of equation (1.14) using SGMM, the second and earlier lags were used
as instruments for the differenced equation, whereas lagged first-differences were used as
instruments for the level equation. The results are reported in the third column of Table
1.11, as the current instrumentation passed the necessary tests.
Column (2) of Table 1.11 reports the results of equation (1.14) using fixed effects estimator.
The coefficient on R&D intensity can be seen to have increased to 0.029 and remains con-
sistent with the previous results in that it is positive and highly significant even under 1%
level. Column (3) reports the results from SGMM using the lagged difference in markups
and R&D as well as the lagged levels as instruments. The coefficient on R&D intensity has
increased to 0.086 and remained significant at the 1% level. This suggests that there is a
strong evidence of markup-enhancing effects of R&D and the overall results do not depend
substantially on the estimation techniques, despite marginally varying in magnitude.
1.7 Extensions
1.7.1 R&D Offshoring
In the previous regression, the R&D capital stock relative to real sales was used as a regres-
sor. However, this can be divided into two types of R&D capital stock; R&D capital stock from
R&D performed in-house (RDSELF) and R&D capital stock from R&D performed offshored
(RDOFF). R&D is usually recognised as firm-level activities centralised in the home coun-
try, but there has been a trend towards offshoring R&D activities either to foreign affiliates
or third parties in the foreign country (Castellani and Pieri, 2013).
Picci (2010) noted that globalisation has made inroads into as far as the firm’s innovative
activities such as R&D. Guellec and van Pottelsberghe (2001) documented the cases where
the inventor and the applicant of a patent do not reside in the same country to show increas-
ing trends in the internationalisation of R&D17. It is not only tangible commodities, but also
research activities that have been outsourced to low-income countries (Lewin et al., 2009).
The macro-level research on the effects of foreign R&D on the home country such as domes-
tic productivity is not new. Coe and Helpman (1995) found that foreign R&D has a positive
impact on domestic productivity. Van Pottelsberghe De La Potterie and Lichtenberg (2001)
17Guellec and van Pottelsberghe (2001) argue that these patents, in a majority of cases, reflect the fact that
R&D is being performed in a research facility abroad of a firm.
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Table 1.12: Regression of Markups on R&D Offshoring : OLS, FE and GMM
(1) (2) (3) (4)
OLS FE FE GMM-SYS
L. logµ 0.330∗∗∗ 0.452∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.040)
RDSELF 0.053∗∗∗ 0.023∗∗∗ 0.028∗∗∗ 0.077∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.016)
RDOFF 0.023∗∗∗ 0.010∗∗∗ 0.008∗∗∗ 0.016∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.009)
Industry Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observation 34,145 34,145 27,218 27,218
AR(1) 0.00
AR(2) 0.13
Hansen 0.19
Note: Standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***,** and * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10%
respectively. The Hansen test is used to test the null hypothesis that the instruments are valid. The AR test
is used to find the evidence of autocorrelation in the errors.
also showed that foreign R&D affects domestic performance through trade flows or outward
foreign direct investment (FDI). In this line of literature, the transfer of knowledge gener-
ated in the foreign R&D is assumed to indirectly take place through either FDI or trade
flows. Such transfer processes would be more direct in the case of firm-level R&D offshoring
as it is intended to generate knowledge which will be directly used by the offshoring firm.
There are various motivations behind R&D offshoring such as the need to implement a faster
and cheaper innovative process (Castellani and Pieri, 2013). This especially applies to those
firms whose comparative advantages do not lie in innovative activities and, therefore, which
offshore R&D to external arm’s length contractors. R&D offshoring, in this context, refers
to “the contractually agreed, non-gratuitous and temporary performance of R&D tasks for
a client” (Grimpe and Kaiser, 2010, p.1484). It can also be offshored to foreign affiliates
with a view to modifying its products or processes to render them more appropriate to local
conditions as well as sourcing technologies of other firms either through spillovers or R&D
alliances (Criscuolo et al., 2005)18. These two types of R&D offshoring may have varying
18Criscuolo et al. (2005) denoted R&D with the former motivation as asset-exploiting R&D and that with the
latter motivation as asset-augmenting R&D. The latter type of R&D is especially relevant when the knowledge
in point is geographically ‘sticky’ (Criscuolo et al., 2005). This becomes all the more relevant for the case of
tacit knowledge. Polanyi (1966), the founding father of the concept of tacit knowledge, defined it as “an actual
knowledge that is indeterminate, in the sense that its content cannot be explicitly stated (p.4).” Stored in
human beings in the form of of know-how, expertise, experience or insight, it is not easily transferred because
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effects on firm performance, but unfortunately the current dataset do not have relevant
information.
On the other hand, there has been a discussion on the negative sides R&D offshoring may
bring on a firm’s productivity or employment (e.g. Pisano and Shih, 2009). As the inter-
nalisation of R&D increased, it was even suggested that the relocation of R&D abroad may
weaken the innovative capabilities as well as the national innovation system ultimately
(Criscuolo, 2009). However, the related literature generally confirms the positive impact of
R&D offshoring on the home country innovation or productivity (e.g. Criscuolo et al., 2005;
Criscuolo, 2009; Castellani and Pieri, 2013) 19.
This chapter looked at the issue from a different perspective by focusing on the effect of
R&D offshoring on firm-level markups. This investigation attempts to find out which stocks
of knowledge - generated from in-house R&D expenditures or offshore R&D expenditures -
are more effective at enhancing a firm’s markups. The regression equations (1.13) and (1.14)
are estimated with two different types of R&D capital stock, that is, RDSELF and RDOFF.
The results are presented in Table 1.12.
Results from OLS reported in column (1) indicate that both in-house and offshore R&D
significantly increase firm-level markups. The coefficients are significant under 1% level
of significance, with the coefficient on RDSELF being more than twice as large than that
on RDOFF. Column (2) reports results using the fixed effects estimator. The coefficients
on both variables have more than halved, but still remain highly significant under 1% level.
These findings suggest that the stocks of knowledge from R&D, whether they be accumulated
from in-house or offshore R&D, positively contribute to firm-level markups.
Column (3) estimates the dynamic regression using fixed effects, yielding the results similar
to the previous ones. However, these results are likely to be biased. Column (4) reports the
results from SGMM using the lagged difference in markups and R&D as well as the lagged
levels as instruments. The coefficient on RDSELF is seen to have increased to 0.77 and
remained significant at the 1% level. However, the coefficient on RDOFF shows to only
be marginally significant under 10% level, despite still remaining positive. These findings
it cannot be explicitly documented or articulated. Thus, its effective transmission is highly reliant on spatial
proximity (Gertler, 2003). The former type of R&D has some direct relevance for demand-side considerations
and the latter type will also indirectly have impact on demand creation.
19Criscuolo et al. (2005) and Criscuolo (2009) confirmed the existence of a reverse knowledge flow from a
multinational enterprise (MNE)’s foreign based R&D facilities to its home country firms, based on their patent
citation analysis. Moreover, Castellani and Pieri (2013) found evidence for positive link between R&D off-
shoring and the home region productivity growth.
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suggest that R&D significantly increases firm-level markups when conducted in-house, but
has only marginally positive effect on markups when offshored.
In terms of how the results can be interpreted, the data availability makes it difficult to
provide a complete answer. For example, the effects could differ depending on the types of
offshoring - whether R&D is offshored to the firm’s own foreign affiliates or to arm’s length
suppliers. Unfortunately, the current dataset does not provide such detailed information.
Given that there is only a handful of MNEs in the Korean manufacturing sector, the follow-
ing candidate explanations are presented with the assumption that R&D was offshored to
arm’s length contractors in the majority of cases.
Firstly, it is likely that R&D, when offshored, results in the loss of the offshoring firm’s ability
to keep abreast of technologies used for design and manufacturing (Kotabe, 1998). This may
be due to the dilution of firm-specific resources in the process of R&D offshoring and reliance
on rather generic external knowledge to which potential competitors may also have access
to (Grimpe and Kaiser, 2010). This will limit the firm’s capacity to differentiate its products
from its competitors’ and eventually weaken the link between R&D and demand creation.
Secondly, the stock of knowledge generated abroad cannot even be utilised if R&D offshoring
renders the deterioration of a firm’s capability to tailor external knowledge resources to
firm-specific needs (Grimpe and Kaiser, 2010). The knowledge generated from R&D has the
characteristic of being tacit, but the loss of proximity due to offshoring can affect the ability
to transfer this tacit knowledge between the firm and the R&D contractor.
Finally, there is a possibility that costs from R&D offshoring could outweigh its benefits. ?
maintained that the process of fragmentation involves more complexity and costs in terms
of added efforts of management and communication, as well as search and transaction costs.
Given these factors, there is a possibility that offshoring R&D does not contribute as much
to firm-level markups as that performed in-house.
1.7.2 Technology Intensity and the Effects of R&D
OECD suggests classifying industries into “high”, “medium-high” and “low technology” de-
pending on R&D intensity (see Appendix A.4). Based on this classification, the entirety of
Korean manufacturing can be classified into three different groups based on R&D relative
to revenue statistics. It does not require much exaggeration to hypothesise that technology-
intensive industries have more room for improvement in terms of productivity or markups
39
Table 1.13: R&D and Markups : Technology Intensities
(1) (2) (3)
Low Medium-High High
RDIS 0.012∗∗ 0.007∗∗∗ 0.035∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.002) (0.003)
Industry Yes Yes Yes
Year Yes Yes Yes
Controls Yes Yes Yes
Observations 3,988 8,631 18,825
Notes : Standard errors are reported in parentheses. * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1% level of significance.
when an equal level of resources are allocated to R&D, compared to low-technology indus-
tries.
The regression of firm-level markups on R&D intensity can be estimated using fixed-effects
for each group separately and the results can be seen in Table 1.13. As in the previous
regressions, the same control variables and both year and industry dummies have been
included.
The coefficients on RDIS are shown to be positive and significant in every group, being
highest in high technology industries. These findings have implications suggesting that,
despite R&D having markup-enhancing effects, the degree of effects can vary depending on
the industries. It is expected that markup-enhancing effects will be largest, if there are more
rooms for upgrading designs or technologies. As expected, such effects are seen to be highest
in industries with high technology relative to the low-technology industries.
Table 1.14 reports industry-by-industry regression of markups on R&D. The results confirm
the hypothesis that R&D has varying effects on firm-level markups depending on the indus-
tries. The markup-enhancing effects are shown to be highest in industries such as Computer
and Electronic Products or Electrical Equipment, both of which belong to high-tech indus-
tries. However, the effects are significantly low in Textiles or Rubber and Plastic Products
and even non-significant in industries such as Paper and Paper Products or Other Non-
Metallic Mineral Products. These results are somewhat expected as it is likely that tech
industries have more allowance for implementing a differentiation strategy in electronic
products or electrical equipment as opposed to textiles or paper products.
These findings affirm the fact that the effect of R&D intensity is far from uniform across in-
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Table 1.14: R&D and Markups : Industry-by-Industry Regression
RDIS
13 Textiles 0.012∗∗
(0.005)
17 Paper and Paper Products −0.001
(0.003)
20 Chemicals and Chemical Products 0.024∗∗∗
(0.003)
22 Rubber and Plastics Products 0.013∗∗∗
(0.004)
23 Other Non-Metallic Mineral Products 0.006
(0.006)
24 Basic Metals 0.005∗∗
(0.002)
25 Fabricated Metal Products 0.022∗∗∗
(0.006)
26 Computer, Electronic and Optical Products 0.116∗∗∗
(0.008)
27 Electrical Equipment 0.051∗∗∗
(0.012)
28 Machinery and Equipment 0.024∗∗∗
(0.004)
29 Motor Vehicles 0.029∗∗∗
(0.005)
30 Other Transport Equipment 0.025∗∗∗
(0.005)
31 Furniture 0.038∗∗
(0.018)
32 Other Manufacturing 0.001
(0.010)
33 Repair and Installation of Machinery 0.007
(0.018)
Notes : Standard errors are reported in parentheses. * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1% level of significance.
dustries and, to make the most of R&D, it should first be examined whether there is enough
capacity for increasing market power.
1.7.3 Innovation Inputs v. Innovation Outputs
It should be emphasised that the effect of R&D on markups is conditional on the assumption
that R&D generates successful innovations that help make the firm’s products differenti-
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ated from others. R&D expenditure or stock is a good measure of a firm’s innovation activi-
ties20. However, many authors have argued that R&D is simply an innovation input (Nelson
and Rosenberg, 1993), indicating that it is unclear whether investments in innovation ac-
tually lead to innovation outputs that can eventually contribute to the change in firm-level
markups.
Before introducing the possible measure of the innovation output, it should first be argued
that not every invention or improvement made from the R&D investments can be simply
classified as innovation solely due to being different from the existing products or processes.
Being ‘different’ is, according to the Oslo manual, the minimum requirement to be innova-
tive. To qualify as innovation, it should have an additional marketability as well as practi-
cability. These aspects have been absent in many early attempts at defining innovation. For
example, Nelson and Winter (1977) defined innovation as “the wide range of variegated pro-
cesses by which man’s technologies evolve over time (p.37).” In addition, Schmookler (1966)
had defined innovation as the action of making a technical change by which an enterprise
produces new outputs or uses new inputs. In this regard, an interpretation of the term ‘inno-
vation’ has long been restricted to the sole generation of new ideas. However, this overlooks
the possible link between innovation and firm performances such as markups discussed in
this chapter.
In this context, measuring the innovation output has proved to be more challenging than in
the case of the input. The shortage of complete measures is usually prevalent in economics,
but is particularly acute when it comes to the measurement of the innovation output. This
may be attributable to its opacity (e.g. how do you define new? how do you measure its mar-
ketability or practicability?) and the lack of relevant firm-level data. There have been early
attempts to measure the innovation output, which were based on the surveys of experts or
trade journals to identify significant technical innovations that were commercialised (e.g.
Acs and Audretsch, 1988; Freeman and Soete, 1997). This is a direct measure of the innova-
tion output, as those listed on journals are more likely to be with significant commercial val-
20The idea of using R&D expenditure to measure innovation can be traced as far back as to the early 1930s.
Godin (2002) documented that the research of M. Holland and W. Spraragen from the US National Research
Council in 1933 introduced the first measure of innovation based on the amounts spent for research. However,
only after the standardised definitions were established in the Frascati manual in 1963, R&D expenditure
has been popularly chosen as a proxy for the innovation input. The Frascati manual is a document detail-
ing the methodology regarding the collection of statistics about research and development, before which no
standardised definition on R&D existed. It was published by the OECD first in 1963 after the meeting of the
OECD experts with the NESTI (National Experts on Science and Technology Indicators) group in Frascati,
Italy, hence the name of the manual. In the same year, the country-level R&D survey was conducted for the
first time, with 16 participating countries (Gault, 2013)
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ues. Acs and Audretsch (1988) constructed their database by screening over 100 technology,
engineering and trade journals. However, this method is also not free from shortcomings.
Firstly, it can be said that the number of innovations increases with the number of journals
screened. Therefore, if the entirety of available journals are not screened, there is a likeli-
hood of sample bias. Secondly, small firms are likely to be underrepresented due to potential
difficulties in sustaining an appropriate journal, adding to the problem of the sample bias.
In their substitute, patent counts have often been used to proxy the innovation output (e.g.
Bloom et al., 2016). This has clear merits when compared to the survey-based proxies as they
are not subject to imprecise definitions of innovation. Hence, they do not suffer from the lack
of comparability between firms (Ernst, 2001). However, this should still be regarded with
caution. The literature has relied on the total number of patents held by firms, regardless of
their practicality or marketability (e.g. Bloom et al., 2016). These patent counts, which will
be denoted as the gross patent counts (GPC), point to the regions A and B combined in the
Venn Diagram in Figure 1.3.
Figure 1.3: Venn Diagram Representing the Relationship Between Patents and Innovations
Region A, however, is associated with patents whose underlying technology is inventive, but
not necessarily innovative. This invention is associated with the successful realisation of
the technical requirements of an idea (Ernst, 2001), however, it does not guarantee its mar-
ketability or practicability. As regards this, Griliches (1990) noted that
“After all, a patent does represent a minimal quantum of invention that has passed both
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the scrutiny of the patent office as to its novelty and the test of the investment of effort and
resources by the inventor and his organization into the development of this product or idea,
indicating thereby the presence of a non-negligible expectation as to its ultimate utility and
marketability (p.296).” [Italics added]
There is a marked difference between patented invention (region A) and patented innovation
(region B), and such a difference is clearly manifested in the survey of the Japan Patent
Office (JPO), indicating that more than 60% of patents are not considered for internal use or
license-out (Nagaoka et al., 2010). If patents are not in use, it is hard to argue that they are,
or at least have the potential of, contributing to firm’s performances.
As briefly mentioned above, in the literature patent counts often refer to the regions A and
B combined, as they are defined as the number of patents held by firms. For example, as a
proxy for innovation, Bloom et al. (2016) counted only the number of patents held by firms
from patents data in the electronic files of the European Patent Office (EPO). However, all
patents held by firms are no more than an indicator of the successful realisation of the
technical requirements, which is only a small part of innovation. Using GPC as a proxy
for innovation is thus problematic, especially when innovation is defined as the successful
introduction of new products into the market or new processes into actual use.
The SBA provides detailed information on patents especially. The dataset in this chapter
is sufficiently rich, providing information not only on the number of patents held by a firm
(GPC), but also those in actual use, denoted as the net patent counts (NPC). This is more
representative of the region B in Figure 1.3.
Table 1.15 reports the results of the regression of markups on GPC. The variable RDIS is
also included because not all the demand-creating innovations from R&D are necessarily
patented. Column (1), showing the result from FE, indicates that the coefficient on RDIS
remains positive and significant under 1% level. The magnitude of the coefficient also more
or less remains equal despite the inclusion of GPC, displaying the R&D’s clear role in con-
tributing to markups. However, the coefficient on GPC is negative, despite its magnitude
being negligible. The coefficient on GPC from GMM-SYS in column (2) also remains nega-
tive, however, becomes insignificant even under 10% level.
Table 1.16 presents the results from the same regressions, but with the patent variable
replaced by NPC. There is no significant change seen in the coefficient on RDIS, whilst a
change is made to the signs of the coefficients on the patent counts, as they become positive.
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Table 1.15: Regression of Markups on GPC : FE and GMM
(1) (2)
FE GMM-SYS
L. logµ 0.452∗∗∗
(0.040)
GPC −0.004∗∗ −0.053
(0.001) (0.016)
RDIS 0.024∗∗∗ 0.044∗
(0.002) (0.023)
Industry Yes Yes
Year Yes Yes
Controls Yes Yes
Observation 30,552 23,880
AR(1) 0.00
AR(2) 0.26
Hansen 0.11
Note: Standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***,** and * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10%
respectively. The Hansen test is used to test the null hypothesis that the instruments are valid. The AR test
is used to find the evidence of autocorrelation in the errors.
However, they are still statistically insignificant even under 10% level. The results from
Table 1.15 and 1.16 indicate that patents do not necessarily reflect the demand-enhancing
innovations which are most relevant for linking innovations to firm-performances, such as
profitability or markups. In this regard, NPC can be regarded as the most relevant measure
in that it only counts patents actively in use. The coefficient on NPC is positive, but its
magnitude is negligible and, moreover, it is not statistically significant at all.
The aforementioned results highlight the fact that not all innovations - either demand-
enhancing or cost-reducing - are patented for various reasons. Although innovations are
patentable and worthy of patenting, not all firms want to patent innovations with equal
vigour. Many innovations made in small firms usually go unpatented due to the expense
and effort which will incur over the course of an application (Romijn and Albaladejo, 2002).
Also, firms may have regarded taking out a patent as inefficient as they have other means of
protecting their invention, such as trade secrecy, or the pace of their technological progress
may be rapid (Romijn and Albaladejo, 2002). These may explain why there are insignificant
coefficients in both regressions.
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Table 1.16: Regression of Markups on NPC : FE and GMM
(1) (2)
FE GMM-SYS
L. logµ 0.581∗∗∗
(0.040)
NPC 0.001 0.011
(0.001) (0.011)
RDIS 0.024∗∗∗ 0.051∗∗
(0.002) (0.020)
Industry Yes Yes
Year Yes Yes
Controls Yes Yes
Observation 24,452 18,088
AR(1) 0.00
AR(2) 0.13
Hansen 0.20
Note: Standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***,** and * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10%
respectively. The Hansen test is used to test the null hypothesis that the instruments are valid. The AR test
is used to find the evidence of autocorrelation in the errors.
1.7.4 R&D’s Effects on Marginal Costs
As briefly mentioned above, successful R&D can operate in two ways. First, it can increase
prices that a firm charges by lowering price elasticity through differentiation. Second, it
can reduce marginal costs by improving productivity through process innovation or better-
quality intermediate inputs. It is difficult to distinguish one effect from the other, unless
there is sufficient data on prices or marginal costs. This chapter assumes that successful
R&D is more likely to be reflected onto price levels via lower price elasticity through differ-
entiation.
Given the fact that a markup is the ratio of price to marginal costs and that R&D can affect
marginal costs through productivity, this section attempts to control for any probable effect
of R&D on markups through marginal costs by including productivity as a control variable.
Therefore, the regression equation (1.13) can be re-written as follows
logPit− log MC it =β0+β1 logRDSI it+Xitγ+β2ωit+δj+δt+²it (1.15)
where Pit and MCit denote prices and marginal costs of firm i at time t respectively. Also, ωit
denotes productivity of firm i at time t. If the inclusion of productivity is assumed to control
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Table 1.17: Regression of Markups on RDIS with Productivity as Control Variable
(1) (2)
OLS FE
RDIS 0.047∗∗∗ 0.023∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002)
Industry Yes Yes
Year Yes Yes
Controls (incd. ωit) Yes Yes
Observation 34,074 34,074
Note: Standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***,** and * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10%
respectively.
for any change in marginal costs, the coefficient β1 can be seen to capture the R&D’s effect
on price changes better. Much of the discussion will be devoted to a more fitting estimation
of productivity in later chapters, but, for the current purpose, it is worth mentioning that
ωit is measured using the coefficient estimates for labour, capital and intermediate inputs,
which were obtained in section 1.4.221.
Table 1.17 provides results from the regression of (1.15), with column (1) showing the results
from OLS. The results show that the coefficient on RDIS stands at 0.047, still statistically
significant under 1% level of significance. The coefficient in the column (2) still stands at
0.023 and also remains statistically significant. The corresponding coefficients from the
regressions without the productivity term have stood at 0.055 and 0.024 respectively. Subse-
quent to the inclusion of productivity as a control variable, these coefficients have marginally
decreased to 0.047 and 0.023. This may suggest that some of the positive effects of R&D can
be attributable to its effect on marginal costs through productivity, but the magnitude of
such effect is not significantly large.
The results suggests that, even accounting for productivity differences, R&D plays its role
in increasing firm-level markups. If productivity is assumed to control for differences in
marginal costs, then the positive coefficients from Table 1.17 serve as an evidence that a
firm’s R&D decision is fundamentally concerned with differentiation strategy than with low
cost strategy. The successful differentiation helps firms to set higher prices by lowering price
elasticity of demand.
21Given the trans-log function is used in this chapter, ωit is defined as ωˆit = qit−βˆl l it−βˆmmit−βˆkkit−βˆll l2it−
βˆmmm2it− βˆkkk2it− βˆlk l itkit− βˆlml itmit− βˆmkmitkit, where βˆ denotes the estimates for each coefficient.
47
1.8 Conclusion
This chapter examines the hypothesis that there is a positive association between R&D
and firm-level markups. The firm-level markups are derived from the method suggested by
De Loecker and Warzynski (2012), which in turn owed its insight to Hall (1988), who for
the first time relied on production data in his estimation of markups. The variation in the
makrups was then traced to the change in R&D and other factors such as market structure
or firm size. The estimation results using fixed effcts or GMM suggest that R&D intensity
significantly increases firm-level markups.
In addition, many other aspects of the R&D-markups link have been closely examined. It
has been documented that there has been an increasing trend towards offshoring R&D in
search of differentiated sources of knowledge and cheaper costs. The empirical results in this
chapter find that the capital stock accumulated from R&D performed in-house and offhosre
both significantly affects firm-level markups, however, at a varying degree. In the case of
offshoring, R&D does not deliver the similarly compelling effects, possibly due to increased
costs of managing far-flung operations and added complexity. In addition, the result may
indicate that there is a loss in the ability to make differentiating innovations if the firm’s
core innovation activities, such as R&D, are offshored and the firm relies on foreign supply
of technologies. This may be all the more relevant in the age of rapidly evolving consumer
preferences in domestic markets. Also, even though R&D is shown to be markup-enhancing,
it has been found that the effect does not uniformly apply across all industries. The results
show that there are striking variations in the degree of effect from one industry to another.
As part of a robustness check, patent counts have also been included to account for the fact
that R&D investments are merely innovation inputs rather than outputs. Despite the inclu-
sion of the patent counts, there were no changes in the effect of R&D intensity on markups
and, moreover, there were no significant effects found from the patent counts variable. This
provides a couple of implications. Firstly, patents are not likely to be the best measure for
the innovation output. Secondly, not all innovations related to demand-enhancement are
likely to be patented for the various reasons mentioned above.
The main conclusion in this chapter is that the positive link between R&D and productiv-
ity, that has been established in the related literature, can be partially attributable to the
change in markups rather than efficiency as the term ‘productivity’ is often understood in
the literature. In this regard, these findings highlight the largely overlooked functions of
R&D, not only as a contributor to technology and productivity growth, but also as a booster
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of demand through identifying and materialising unique selling points that will differentiate
their products from others.
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Chapter 2
Trade and Real Productivity :
Evidence from Korean Manufacturing
Industry
2.1 Introduction
One of the established empirical facts in the literature is that exporting firms are noticeably
different from firms that only serve the domestic market. Beginning with Bernard et al.
(1995), a large volume of literature has documented that exporting firms are likely to be
more productive than non-exporting ones (e.g. Baldwin and Gu, 2003; Wagner, 2007).
Two possible mechanisms have been suggested in a number of recent studies to explain these
differences between exporting and non-exporting firms. Firstly, it has been suggested that
there is a self-selection of high productive firms into export markets (self-selection hypoth-
esis). Participation in the export markets usually involves a range of fixed costs that low
productivity firms cannot afford (Melitz, 2003). Secondly, exporters become more productive
after exporting through various channels (learning-by-exporting hypothesis)1.
1There are many theoretical models which have outlined a variety of mechanisms through which exporters
become more productive after exporting. They mainly focus on technology spillovers from leading countries to
countries with lower productivity (e.g. Grossman and Elhanan, 1991; Ben-David, 2000). This hypothesis is, to
a certain degree, supported by the absence of learning-by-exporting effects in advanced countries such as the
United States or the United Kingdom (e.g. Bernard and Jensen, 1999; Greenaway and Kneller, 2004) and its
presence in developing countries such as China or Vietnam (e.g. Kraay, 1999; Newman et al., 2017). However,
Fryges and Wagner (2008) also found evidence for learning-by-exporting with the German data. Feeney (1999)
opened a possibility that even firms in advanced countries can benefit from exporting experience because it
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Many researchers have attempted to answer ‘the chicken or the egg’ causality question. As
Table 2.1 indicates, many different datasets have been examined using various econometric
techniques. All the authors listed in Table 2.1 found that there is evidence for self-selection
into export markets. However, relatively more recent researches by Baldwin and Gu (2003),
Yasar and Rejesus (2005), De Loecker (2007), Fryges and Wagner (2008) and Newman et al.
(2017) found evidence for learning-by-exporting, which had been considered insignificant in
the early literatures (Wagner, 2007).
This chapter attempts to answer the perpetual ‘chicken or egg’ question by using a firm-level
data on Korean manufacturing that covers the period between 2006 and 2015. Korea is an
interesting country not only due to its high dependency on exports as a result of its relatively
small domestic market, but also due to its high level of absorptive capacity in exploiting
learning-by-doing opportunities. The data shows that each year, on average, 64% of the
manufacturing firms are exporters and approximately 4.5% of them decide to implement
exporting.
Rather than being a mere addition to the existing literature with the Korean dataset, this
chapter contributes to the long-running debate on ‘the chicken or the egg’ causality dilemma
by providing a new perspective. This difference in perspective is brought about by placing
more emphasis on the better measurement of productivity. This can be seen as a natural
question to start with, but has been given little attention in the relevant literature.
Table 2.2 shows the productivity measures that have been used in the current existing lit-
erature. Clerides et al. (1998) used the average variable costs and their reduction as an
indication of an increase in productivity. Rich in information, the databases they used con-
tained information on inputs, outputs and costs. However, it has proved difficult to obtain
this firm-level data on costs. Fryges and Wagner (2008) and Newman et al. (2017) instead
used labour productivity as the measure of productivity. This simple measure has limita-
tions as changes in labour productivity may simply reflect the substitution of other factors
for labour (Houseman, 2007)2.
allows them to experience learning-by-doing by specialisation due to trade. Moreover, Bloom et al. (2016)
suggested that productivity can even increase as a result of intensifying competition from foreign producers.
2Theoretically, the level of efficiency or intensity with which inputs are used to produce an output can be
simply measured as the output-input ratio. In this regard, labour productivity, units of output per labour hour,
is one of the most widely used measures of productivity. However, labour productivity has a shortcoming in
that it is also affected by the excluded factors such as capital. For example, even though two firms have exactly
the same technology, they can end up having different labour productivity, when one of them uses more capital
than the other. Then, labour productivity itself is a misleading measure of the firm’s efficiency, “if one happens
to use capital much more intensively, say because they face different factor prices (Syverson, 2011, p.330).”
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Table 2.1: Literature Review (i)
Dataset Self-selection Learning-by-exporting
Clerides et al. (1998) Colombia, Mexico,
Morocco
X ×
Kraay (1999) China X X
Bernard and Jensen
(1999)
U.S. X ×
Aw et al. (2000) Korea, Taiwan X ×
Delgado et al. (2002) Spain X ×
Baldwin and Gu
(2003)
Canada X X
Greenaway and
Kneller (2004)
United Kingdom X ×
Yasar and Rejesus
(2005)
Turkey X X
De Loecker (2007) Slovenia X X
Fryges and Wagner
(2008)
Germany X X
Newman et al. (2017) Vietnam X X
The most frequently used measure in the existing literature is total factor productivity
(TFP). The methods of estimating TFP - index or semi-parametric approach - have been well
established that some authors now disregard the need for describing their methods to esti-
mate it (e.g. Baldwin and Gu, 2003; Greenaway and Kneller, 2004). De Loecker (2007) made
one of the few attempts to modify the established semi-parametric (Olley-Pakes) method to
place the estimation in the context of export markets. However, it still remains true that,
regardless of the methods employed, they all identify residuals with firm-level productivity.
It is argued in this chapter that the use of TFPs, as obtained from the existing methods, can
be problematic. The residual-based TFPs not only portray efficiency, but also measurement
errors or unexpected transitory shocks that are hardly related to the theoretical grounds
provided in the existing literature. Thus, real TFP is suggested in this chapter whose de-
scription will be provided in detail in the next section. In short, the real TFP is a productivity
in which measurement errors or transitory productivity shocks are netted out.
The existing literature has given little attention to the measurement of TFPs, using residu-
als as its measure. A state-space model can be used to separate out real productivity from
“a true measure of our ignorance” (Fuentes and Morales, 2011, p.157). However, its appli-
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Table 2.2: Literature Review (ii)
Productivity Measure
Clerides et al. (1998) Average Variable Costs
Bernard and Jensen (1999) TFP (Olley-Pakes)
Aw et al. (2000) TFP (Index)
Delgado et al. (2002) TFP (Index)
Baldwin and Gu (2003) TFP
Greenaway and Kneller (2004) TFP
Yasar and Rejesus (2005) TFP (Olley-Pakes)
De Loecker (2007) TFP (Olley-Pakes)
De Loecker (2013) TFP (Olley-Pakes)
Fryges and Wagner (2008) Labour Productivity
Newman et al. (2017) Labour Productivity
cation is computationally challenging. This chapter suggests a relatively simpler method to
measure real productivity by using the semi-parametric estimation of production functions.
The present chapter finds evidence for the learning-by-exporting effect in the Korean man-
ufacturing sector. More importantly, it is found that two different measures of productivity
paint starkly different pictures of productivity trajectories before and after the decision to
implement exporting. To my knowledge, this is one of the first attempts to investigate the
link between export and productivity with a suggestion of alternative measures other than
labour productivity or TFP (see Table 2.2).
Moreover, as part of the robustness check, this chapter also investigates the relationship
between markups and exporting. This is to account for the fact that, due to limited data
availability, productivity is measured using sales rather than quantity variable. Therefore,
an increase in productivity is possibly due to either of the two effects : technical efficiency or
demand change. As there is no sufficiently detailed data on firm-level prices and quantity,
it is difficult to isolate one effect from the other. However, the investigation into the link
between markups and exporting helps to indirectly measure the magnitude of the latter
effect. The finding shows no evidence of the link between markups and exporting, thus
lending further weight to the productivity-enhancing effects.
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This is related to the works of De Loecker (2007) or De Loecker (2013) in which modifying the
well-established semi-parametric methods such as the Olley-Pakes and Levinsohn-Petrin
methods were attempted. In the resulting analysis of the effect of export on productivity, De
Loecker paid extra attention on the correct measurement of productivity in the spirit of Olley
and Pakes (1996). Building on De Loecker’s ideas, the measure suggested in this chapter is
a simple derivative from the modified Levinsohn-Petrin estimation algorithm. However, it
is consistent with the notion of productivity according to existing literature on export and
productivity.
The chapter is organised as follows; Section 2.2 introduces the concept and estimation of
real total factor productivity, with section 2.3 providing brief description of the data used
in this chapter. In section 2.4, empirical strategies for this chapter are provided and the
results, with their interpretations introduced in section 2.5. Finally, Section 2.6 provides an
investigation into markups and exporting as part of robustness check and the last section
concludes the chapter.
2.2 On Real Total Factor Productivity
2.2.1 Definition of Real Total Factor Productivity
Obtaining TFP estimates at the micro-level3 is predicated on consistent estimates of the
production function. With firm-level analysis, the major econometric issue regarding the
estimation of the production function is that there is a productivity shock which is observed
by the firm and determines the level of observed inputs, but is unobserved by the econome-
trician (Marschak and Andrews, 1944). To avoid endogeneity arising from the unobserved
productivity shock4, instrumental variables and fixed effects estimation (Mundlak, 1961)
3There has recently been a surge in interest in productivity analysis at the micro-level. There are a couple
of reasons to explain this increased interest in micro-level TFP. Firstly, it is mainly attributable to the grow-
ing availability of the firm or plant level data. Secondly, it is also attributable to the theoretical shift from
competitive to non-competitive models which focus on increasing-returns to scale, non-competitive markets,
externalities and Schumpeterian creative destruction process (Del Gatto et al., 2011). In these models, pro-
ductivity is a micro-level productivity, which in turn is an endogenous response to micro-level policy. The host
of interesting questions arising from the models therefore necessitates micro-level productivity (Bartelsman
and Doms, 2000), which enables the “level of resolution unattainable with aggregated data” (Syverson, 2011,
p.327).
4The bias induced from this unobserved productivity shock has been termed simultaneity bias in the litera-
ture. It is also called “transmission bias” (Griliches and Regev, 1995)
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were suggested early on, but, for one reason or another5, they have not been particularly
successful at overcoming these endogeneity issues (Ackerberg et al., 2006).
In the continued search, proxy-variable approach6 by Olley and Pakes (1996) and Levin-
sohn and Petrin (2003) has since gained popularity in the literature7. Their main contri-
bution was showing that one can invert input demand functions to “ essentially allow an
econometrician to observe unobserved productivity shocks (Ackerberg et al., 2015, p.2412)”
under a certain set of assumptions. Olley and Pakes (1996) suggest using a firm’s invest-
ment function as a proxy for unobserved productivity shocks, whereas Levinsohn and Petrin
(2003) used an intermediate inputs function rather than investment as a proxy due to lumpy
characteristics of investments. Since then, there have been incremental refinements to es-
timation procedures. For example, Ackerberg et al. (2015) extended the aforementioned
semi-parametric methods and solved the identification issue with the labour coefficient due
to multi-collinearity8. Wooldridge (2009) suggested a one-step system GMM approach which
enables the estimation of robust standard errors, delivering higher efficiency compared to
the two-step semiparametric procedures.
Each estimation procedure differs depending on its own valid set of assumptions, however,
they concomitantly share the same threads in that all procedures focus on the identifica-
tion of consistent production function estimates and identify the resulting residuals with
productivity. This, however, may cause problems in the literature in terms of the produc-
5Input prices can be suggested as instrumental variables as long as they are observable and not correlated
with productivity shocks. However, firm-level input prices are not easily obtainable. Moreover, if firms operate
in the same output and input markets, and use the same inputs, then it is hard to expect any cross-sectional
variations in the firm-level input prices. Even if they operate in different input markets, observed cross-
sectional variation can be correlated with the unobserved productivity shocks of a firm, making input prices
invalid instruments (Aguirregabiria, 2009). Moreover, fixed-effects estimators often generate unreasonably
small (or negative) estimates of capital. Firstly, it is a strong assumption that unobserved productivity stays
constant, especially when one deals with long periods of time. Secondly, the bias due to measurement errors
is exacerbated when taking within-estimator transformation, given that input variables, especially capital,
are persistent and measurement error is not serially correlated. The transformation reduces the signal and
increase the noise, hence worsening the signal-noise ratio. As regards this, Collard-Wexler and Loecker (2016)
suggested that the fact that there is no variation left in the time series of capital implies that a change in
capital is contaminated by measurement error.
6Proxy-variable approach represented by the Olley-Pakes or Levinsohn-Petrin method is not the one and
only strand in the estimation of production functions. There is another strand of the dynamic panel approach
of Arellano and Bond (1991), Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (2000). They relax the strong
assumption of fixed unobserved productivity and allow it to vary across time.
7In the footnote of Ackerberg et al. (2006), they noted that there were 598 cites of Olley and Pakes (1996)
and 219 cites of Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) according to their search from Google Scholars. However, as of
March 2018, the corresponding numbers have increased to 5152 and 4137 respectively, demonstrating their
constant, and even growing, popularity in the empirical literature.
8See Appendix A.1 for more detail.
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tivity effects of various policy measures9. There can be a mismatch between the theoretical
grounds the literature puts forth and the actual measure of productivity it employs. Javorcik
(2004) investigated the effects of FDI on productivity, which theoretically is expected to bring
about new technologies and management skills. Amiti and Konings (2007) examined the ef-
fects of imported inputs on productivity via transfer of technology embodied in imported
inputs. Bloom et al. (2016) examined the effects of Chinese import competition on productiv-
ity through adoption of new technologies and innovation. The issue in these studies is that
the measure of TFP that was employed for empirical estimation was a Solow-type residual
from the semi-parametric production function estimation. The resulting residual, however,
has a likelihood of contamination from transitory shocks or measurement errors. This indi-
cates that the positive correlation that the studies find between policy and productivity may
in fact be reflecting the correlation between policy and ‘non-real’ productivity.
From a purely statistical point of view, TFP is nothing but a residual of the production func-
tion estimation. As with all residuals, it is understood as a catch-all for anything that engen-
ders a shift in the production function (Solow, 1957). In some ways, it is merely a measure of
our ignorance (Abramovitz, 1956). Thus, it takes a leap of faith to equate the residual with
the firm’s productivity, which is determined by its efficiency. The level of TFP, measured as
a residual, will contain information on not only the level of technology or managerial ability
that is directly related to the firm’s efficiency or intensity, but also measurement errors or
transitory productivity shocks, which is neither innate nor controlled by the firm’s manage-
ment. When it comes to measuring the growth of productivity, one is interested in tracing
the change in the former, rather than the latter components.
This chapter suggests the econometric derivation of ‘real TFP’. By real TFP, the term refers
to a firm’s productivity that is 1) relevant for firm’s persistent technical efficiency or manage-
rial ability, 2) not influenced by measurement errors or unexpected transitory productivity
shocks. The real TFP thus defined has distinctive features. Firstly, it is observable by the
firm, because it includes innate managerial ability as well as expected downtime, due to ma-
chine breakdowns or planned repairs and estimated defect rates. After having full knowl-
edge on this observable productivity, the firm can decide on the level of inputs to employ.
Secondly, it can be controlled and improved by the firm’s innovation or management policy.
Training of managers, reallocation of firm resources towards more efficient use or technology
diffusion from imported materials will contribute to the improvement of real productivity.
9Offshoring (Amiti and Wei, 2009; Hijzen et al., 2010; ?), exporting (Wagner, 2007), importing (Amiti and
Konings, 2007; Kasahara and Rodrigue, 2008; Halpern et al., 2015), foreign direct investment (Haskel et al.,
2007; Javorcik, 2004), R&D investments (Griliches, 1988). The list is not exhaustive.
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2.2.2 Estimation of Real Total Factor Productivity
Suppose a simple Cobb-Douglas function
Yit = A itKβkit L
βl
it (2.1)
where Yit denotes real10 value-added of firm i at time t and K it and L it denote capital and
labour of firm i at time t respectively. A it denotes the measure of the level of TFP of firm i
at time t, which is unobservable to the econometrician. Taking logs on equation (2.1),
yit =β0+βl l it+βkkit+²it (2.2)
where variables in (natural) logs are written in lower case and ln A it =β0+²it. Subsequently,
the residual (plus constant) is used as the measure of the level of firm-level total factor
productivity (TFPit).
TFPit = ²ˆit+ βˆ0 = yit− βˆl l it− βˆkkit (2.3)
where βˆl and βˆk denote the consistent estimators of βl and βk respectively. In the existing
literature, any shift in TFP has been considered as (Hicks-neutral) technological change or
managerial ability. However, there is reason to doubt that TFP is an exact measure of these.
Basic Setup
The semi-parametric estimation algorithm not only aids to circumvent the econometric is-
sues - simultaneity or selection bias - but also provides a way to purge the productivity mea-
sure of transitory productivity shocks or measurement errors that are likely to be unrelated
to the firm’s long-term underlying productivity. For this purpose, the following specification
is employed
yit =β0+βl l it+βkkit+ωit+ηit (2.4)
10In the theory of production, Yit reflect physical quantities of output. However, in practice, it is hard to avail
oneself of the data on physical quantities. Revenues are observed more often than not. Using revenues as a
measure of firm-level productivity can be problematic because price variations across firms may reflect their
market power, instead of firm’s efficiency. Thus, it is necessary to deflate it using an appropriate price-index
to net out a change in prices. It may be more desirable if the price index also takes quality differences into
account (Syverson, 2011). This issue will be dealt more in detail in the later section.
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where ωit denotes a part of TFP11 observable to the firm prior to making decisions on in-
puts at time t. This captures an innate ability, natural endowment, as well as the level of
technology, including managerial ability, expected downtime due to machine breakdowns or
repairs or estimated defect rates. In other words, ωit constitutes an underlying productiv-
ity of a firm, which can be observed to a certain degree and even be improved upon by an
intentional act by the firm.
On the other hand, ηit denotes an error term unknown to both firm and econometrician prior
to making decisions at time t. Whilst ωit represents the management controlled portion in
the measure of the level of TFP, ηit represents measurement errors in the output variable or
any unpredictable deviation from estimated managerial ability, expected downtime or esti-
mated defect rates. The latter, especially measurement errors, do not necessarily constitute
an underlying productivity of a firm, which will obscure the comparison of productivities of
the firm between two different points in time.
As the identification strategy is mainly based on the Olley-Pakes (OP) and Levinsohn-Petrin
(LP) methods, the following assumptions are assumed to be satisfied (see Appendix B.1 for
the brief description OP method).
Assumption 1 (First Order Markov Process)
ωit+1 =E[ωit+1|ωit]= g(ωit)+ζit+1 (2.5)
The assumption states that ωit+1 evolves according to an exogenous first order Markov pro-
cess. That is, actual productivity ωit+1 consists of expected productivity g(ωit) and a produc-
tivity innovation ζit+112. At time t, firms are assumed to observe ωit, but do not know future
ω’s other than their conditional probability distributions.
The productivity innovation ζit+1, mean independent of ωit by construction, represents the
uncertainties inherently linked to productivity (Doraszelski and Jaumandreu, 2013) and
captures the factors that have a persistent impact on productivity such as improvement in
management or an absorption of new technologies. Such factors can be the outcomes of the
11In the existing literature, ωit is often referred to as TFP (e.g. Aguirregabiria, 2009). However, strictly
speaking, TFPs refers to β0+ωit+ηit in the sense that they increase the marginal productivity of all factors
simultaneously.
12It can be expressed that productivity is governed by a first-order Markov process with transition probabil-
ities P(ωit+1|I it)= P(ωit+1|ωit), where I it is the information set at time t and P(·) is the distribution. The firm
knows about the distribution of the productivity and it stochastically increases in ωit.
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intentional management policy such as exports or imports (Keller, 2004; Amiti and Kon-
ings, 2007; De Loecker, 2013; Halpern et al., 2015), R&D investments (Griliches, 1988) or
offshoring (Amiti and Wei, 2009; Hijzen et al., 2010).
Assumption 2 (Dynamic and Non-dynamic Inputs)
Capital kit is determined according to
kit = f (kit−1, i it−1)
where i it−1 denotes an investment made in period t−1. This renders kit a dynamic input
whereas labour l it is a non-dynamic input chosen at time t. Intuitively, it takes a full pro-
duction period for new capital to be ordered, delivered and installed and the assumption is
necessary for generating the moment conditions for estimation (Ackerberg et al., 2015).
Assumption 3 (Scalar Unobservable)
mit =mt(kit,ωit,EX Pit) (2.6)
where mt(·) is a non-parametric function of two state variables kit and ωit13. The assumption
states that ωit is the only unobservable scalar in the intermediate input function14. This
prevents ωit from following higher than a first order Markov process (Ackerberg et al., 2007).
This assumption is important as it implies that the level of demand for intermediate inputs
contains information on the level of productivity, which is of main interest. This productivity,
which is observable to the firm and not to the econometricians, is based on the plausible
assumption that they have a good knowledge of their productive capacity. Even though
there can be deviation due to unexpected disruptions, breakdowns or simple measurement
errors, these are not part of the productivity that this chapter is interested in.
13It is worth noting that mt is indexed by t that allows intermediate inputs demand function to vary according
to demand conditions or industry structure that are assumed to be constant across firms. This represents
restrictions, for example, that firms operate in the same labour and intermediate input markets and in the
same output market with homogenous goods or completely symmetric product differentiation (Ackerberg et al.,
2015). This implies that two firms with the same kit and mit do not necessarily have the same ωit if they
operate in different time periods.
14This assumption implies that there can be no measurement error in the intermediate inputs function or no
unobserved factors that affect intermediate inputs not production. This is a fairly strong assumption, but it is
crucial to ensure that productivity ωit is expressed in terms of observables.
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EX Pit represents the exporter status variable of firm i at time t. It is assuemd that ex-
porting firms face different market structures and factor prices when they make decisions
regarding intermediate inputs. This assumption is accounted for by including the exporter
status variable in mt(·) as in Van Biesebroeck (2007) and De Loecker (2007).
Assumption 4 (Strict Monotonicity)
mt(kit,ωit,EX Pit) is strictly increasing in ωit
The strict monotonicity assumption states that the demand for intermediate inputs strictly
increases in productivity that is conditional on other state variables. Along with the scalar
unobservable assumption, it ensures the invertibility of the intermediate input function15.
First Stage
In the estimation of equation (2.4), the firm with this prior knowledge regarding ωit will
determine the level of inputs based on its level observable at time t. This renders the input
variables no longer exogenous (Marschak and Andrews, 1944). The resulting OLS coeffi-
cients are likely to be biased as they get to capture the effect of ωit on output. Levinsohn
and Petrin (2003) provided a solution to avoid this so-called simultaneity bias by using in-
termediate inputs16 as a proxy to control for ωit. Consequently, the assumptions of scalar
unobservable and strict monotonicity ensure that equation (2.6) can be expressed as below
15Refer to Pakes (1991) for the proof that investment is monotonic in productivity. As it invovles the firm’s dy-
namic problem, this can be computationally challenging as Pakes demonstrates (Levinsohn and Petrin, 2003).
The main idea is that, if it is assumed that P(ωit+1|ωit) stochastically increases in ωit, an increase in ωit will
positively impact the distribution of all future productivity. Then, the marginal product of capital at period
t+τ will be positively impacted by the level of productivity at t+τ. Thus, there will be an increase in current
investment demand at t.
16Olley and Pakes (1996) use an investment as a proxy, but the use of intermediate inputs has two obvious
benefits as emphasised by Levinsohn and Petrin (2003). Firstly, firms almost always report intermediate inputs
such as materials or electricity. This enables one to avoid truncating firms with zero investment due to non-
invertibility. The microdata confirms that investment is lumpy in the sense that there is zero investment for
most of the periods and sporadic periods of large investments (Petrin et al., 2004). Being explained by the
existence of non-convex adjustment costs (fixed or kinked costs), the ‘lumpiness’ implies that plants’ demand
for investment may not fully respond to productivity shocks. Secondly, because intermediate inputs are not
state variables, it provides a simple link between the economic theory and the estimation strategy. Ackerberg
et al. (2015) note that, as intermediate inputs are non-dynamic inputs, it is easier to verify the assumption
that the intermediate inputs function is strictly increasing in productivity in comparison to another that the
investment function is.
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ωit =m−1t (kit,mit,EX Pit)= jt(kit,mit,EX Pit) (2.7)
Equation (2.7) implies that the productivity ωit is a function of kit, mit and EX Pit whose
exact functional form is unknown. Then, equation (2.4) can be re-expressed as
yit =β0+βl l it+βkkit+βmmit+ jt(kit,mit,EX Pit)+ηit (2.8)
Using Φt(·)≡β0+βkkit+βmmit+ jt(kit,mit,EX Pit),
yit =βl l it+Φt(kit,mit,EX Pit)+ηit (2.9)
Equation (2.9) is the partially linear model where the the parametric part is given by βl ,
whilst the non-parametric part is the unknown function Φt(kit,mit,EX Pit). Consequently,
this partially linear equation can be estimated using Robinson (1988)’s double residual
methodology through which consistent estimators of the coefficient βl and Φt(·), which will
be denoted as βˆl and Φˆt(·) respectively, can be obtained.
ηˆit = yit− βˆl l it− Φˆt(kit,mit,EX Pit) (2.10)
where ηˆit denotes the residual from equation (2.9).
Second Stage
Using the assumption of first-order Markov process, equation (2.4) can be re-expressed as
yit =β0+βl l it+βkkit+ g(ωit−1)+ζit+ηit (2.11)
As capital is dynamic by assumption, kit does not respond to innovation shocks at time t.
This provides the following moment as below
E[ζit+ηit|kit]= 0 (2.12)
which will enable the identification of βk. Given the guesses of βk, which is β∗k, and the
consistent estimator of βl from the first stage, the residual ˆζit+ηit can be obtained as below
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ˆζit+ηit(β∗k)= yit− βˆl l it−β∗kkit− ˆg(ωit−1) (2.13)
where ˆζit+ηit(β∗k) denotes the residual from the estimation of (2.11) given β∗k17. Starting
with the guesses, the task now is to find the estimator βˆk which will make the sample ana-
logue of the population moments approximately equal to zero. ˆg(ωit−1) can be obtained by
non-parametrically estimating the following equation
ωit = g(ωit−1)+ζit (2.14)
To estimate this, with the consistent estimator Φˆt from the first stage, the following implied
productivity is constructed
ωˆit(β∗k)= Φˆt−β∗kkit (2.15)
The implied productivity ωˆit(β∗k) will be consistent if the guesses are also consistent. Sub-
sequently, g(ωit−1) is represented non-parametrically using a polynomial in ωˆit(β∗k). This
establishes ˆζit+ηit(β∗k), which in turn enables the construction of the following GMM crite-
rion
Q(β∗k)=min
β∗k
N∑
i=1
T∑
t=1
( ˆζit+ηit(β∗k)ki,t)2 (2.16)
and the solution to the above minimisation process will provide fa consistent estimate βˆk18.
Third Stage
Suppose the consistent estimators for βl and βk are obtained. Given these consistent esti-
mators, ωˆit is an asymptotically consistent estimator of ωit, which is expressed as
ωˆit = Φˆi(·)− βˆkkit
17The coefficients from the OLS estimation of equation (2.2) were used as the guesses.
18Additional moments such as
E[ζit+ηit|l it−1]= 0 E[ζit+ηit|kit−1]= 0 (2.17)
can be used to improve efficiency (Petrin et al., 2004).
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where βˆk denotes the consistent estimators of βk. As this productivity does not include ηit
any longer, it has been denoted as the real total factor productivity (RTFP) as follows
RTFPit = ωˆit = Φˆt− βˆkkit = y˜it− βˆl l it− βˆkkit (2.18)
where y˜it denotes predicted values from the estimation of equation (2.9). This differs from
the usual TFP which is normally used in the existing literature (e.g. Olley and Pakes, 1996;
Levinsohn and Petrin, 2003) as the latter includes the effects from transitory shocks, ηit as
below
TFPit =áωit+ηit = yit− βˆl l it− βˆkkit (2.19)
However, this chapter argues that the real total factor productivity resonates better with the
concept of productivity, which is essentially about efficiency and technological change.
2.2.3 Comparison of RTFP and TFP
Before moving on, a graphical framework is presented to show the intuition behind the
necessity of RTFP. Figure 2.1 shows the productivity trajectories of firms entering export
markets. The time scale on the horizontal axis denotes zero as the point in time when firms
begin exporting, shown by the vertical reference line. It should be noted that this is not the
comparison of productivity between export starters and non-exporters, which is eventually
needed to examine the learning-by-exporting hypothesis. The figure shows how average
productivity of export starters pans out before and after the decision to export with two
different measures, RTFP and TFP.
Figure 2.1 (a) indicates that there is a sharp increase in productivity after the decision to
export, providing some evidence of the learning-by-exporting in the Basic Metals industry.
An increasing trend is found regardless of the productivity measures, at least during the
first year from the decision to export. The higher productivity is somewhat maintained
once RTFP is employed in later years. However, the learning-by-exporting effect becomes
short-lived and the increasing trend is dramatically reversed in later years when TFP is
employed. The trajectory, shown in solid blue, delivers an impression of random walks,
which constantly shifts up and down, at least during the time period considered.
Similarly, Figure 2.1 (b) also seems to support the presence of learning-by-exporting in the
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Figure 2.1: RTFP and TFP comparison : Basic Metals and Computer and Electronic Products
(a) Basic Metals (b) Computer and Electronic Products
Computer and Electronics Products industry. Subsequent to exporting, firms experience an
increase in productivity. However, the two measures paint somewhat different pictures of
productivity trajectory. When TFP is employed, there is a constant increase in productivity
even before the decision to export. This increasing trend continues, at a similar rate, after
the firms start exporting. However, when RTFP is employed, productivity somewhat flattens
before firms commence exports. Following the decision to export, there is some evidence of
learning-by-exporting in subsequent years, but at a much less dramatic rate.
The comparison is made here to stress the point that RTFP and TFP are intended to portray
different aspects. This chapter does not argue for precedence of one measure over the other.
However, when the aim is to investigate the link between export and productivity, it can be
that that RTFP better suits the purpose as it is more directly related to a firm’s efficiency,
which is often held up as the essence of theoretical link. Moreover, this does not necessarily
constitute the unambiguous evidence of learning-by-exporting as it is no more than visual
inspection that does not establish causal relationship between export and productivity. More
rigorous empirical strategies will be provided in section 2.4.
2.3 Data and Descriptive Statistics
2.3.1 Data: Survey of Business Activities
This chapter is based on a firm-level database, which in turn is based on the annual Sur-
vey of Business Activities (SBA) collected by Statistics Korea (KOSTAT). The dataset is an
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Table 2.3: Summary Statistics (i)
Average (2008 - 2013)
(1) Number of Starters 173
(2) Number of Exporters 3212
(3) Number of Firms 5010
(1)/(2) 5.3%
(2)/(3) 64.1%
unbalanced panel of all enterprises with at least 50 employees or 300 million won capital in
the period of 2006 to 2015. The dataset contains rich information on sales, employees, capi-
tal, intermediate inputs, wages as well as various firm-level characteristics such as foreign
ownership, export or import activity and the number of patents.
The data on firms’ export activity helps to establish the causal relationship by differentiating
between export starters and firms that only serve the domestic market. Export starters are
defined to be firms that export in year t (at least for two consecutive years) and had never
exported in previous years, at least in years t−1 and t−219. Export starters will be compared
with those with no experience of exporting, and which serve the domestic market only. They
are denoted as non-exporters20.
2.3.2 Descriptive Statistics
Table 2.3 summarises the exporting status of the Korean manufacturing firms between the
years of 2008 and 201321. According to the table, the average number of firms is 5010, whilst
the average number of exporting firms is 3212. This represents a significant share of 64.1%,
which indicates a high dependency on exports of the Korean manufacturing firms. The first
row in the table indicates that the average number of export starters is 173, which only
accounts for 5.3% of the exporters22.
19After the entry, one-year exit is allowed, but if the exit lasts for more than one period, then it is considered
to stop exporting.
20Additionally, firms that report a positive amount of exports in year t and in year t−1 and t−2 are defined
as continuers, whereas those with zero export in years t+1 and t and a positive amount of exports in year t−1
as stoppers
21The survey data covers the period from 2006 to 2015, but the summary statistics in Table 2.3 are only
available from 2008 to 2013. This is related to the way the variables are defined. For example, to be classified
as export starters, it was requested that the firms report any amount of exports during the previous two years
and, after the entry, report positive exports at least for two consecutive years.
22During the sample period, 1042 firms have entered the export market at different points in time. These
export starters will be compared with non-exporters to investigate the effects of export decisions on firm-level
productivity
65
Figure 2.2: Share of Exporters over Time
Note : The dotted line represents the share of exporters which is the ratio of the number of exporters to that
of active firms.
Figure 2.2 shows the change in the share of exporters over time between 2006 and 2015. The
share, represented by the dotted line, begins at 57.2% in 2006 and has shown a gradually in-
creasing trend, even showing a marked rise in the share in 2015, amounting to a staggering
84.0%. However, caution needs to be exercised when interpreting the results, as the change
in the share can also be brought about by the change in the number of active firms, which
has continually decreased since 2012.
The annual average of exporter share is relatively high on the whole in Korean manufac-
turing23, but it is worth noting that there is still a wide variation in the shares across the
industries. Table 2.4 demonstrates that the shares are markedly high in medium-high tech-
nology sectors24 such as electrical equipment (79.8%), chemical products (79.1%) and motor
vehicles (75.1%). However, the same figures are somewhat predictably low in low technology
sectors such as paper products (52.1%), wearing apparel (47.0%) and non-metallic mineral
products (42.3%) such as glass, cement or lime. This shows that technology-intensive manu-
facturing firms operating in Korea are relatively more export-intensive than those with less
23The corresponding figure in the Canadian economy was 24% in 1996 (Baldwin and Gu, 2003).
24This is a high-tech classification of manufacturing industries based on the technological intensity and
NACE Rev.2. as published by Eurostat.
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Table 2.4: Summary Statistics (ii) - Annual Average of Exporter Share (2006-2015)
Within Industries
Highest
Electrical Equipment (79.8%)
Chemical Products (79.1%)
Motor Vehicles (75.1%)
Lowest
Paper Products (52.1%)
Wearing Apparel (47.0%)
Non-Metallic Mineral Products (42.3%)
Across Industry
Highest
Electronics Products (14.2%)
Transport Equipment (13.2%)
Motor Vehicles (12.4%)
Lowest
Furniture (2.28%)
Repair and Installation (1.14%)
Other Manufacturing (1.01%)
technological intensity.
Table 2.4 also presents the share of exporters that is accounted for by each and every in-
dustry across the whole manufacturing industry. It indicates that three medium-to-high
technology industries - electronics products (14.2%), transport equipment (13.2%) and motor
vehicles (12.4%) - account for just below 40%. As the matching method will be employed
later, only a subset of the total exporters - export starters - will be employed to be compared
with those with no experience of exporting. A detailed description of the method will be
provided later.
2.3.3 Exporter Premia
Exporter premia has been one of the well established empirical facts in the relevant litera-
ture (e.g. Bernard et al., 1995), having been confirmed for a number of datasets. The same
results can be found in Korean manufacturing as shown in Table 2.5. The table presents the
comparison of simple means between the firms that export and those that do not. According
to the table, the exporting firms are more productive, larger in terms of employee, capital
and intermediate inputs. However, this needs to be cautiously interpreted as it does not
take into account the panel structure. A more pertinent method to investigate the exporter
premia is to run the following regression equation
FIRMit =β1EX Pit+β2LogL it+δ j+δt+²it (2.20)
where FIRMit represents the firm-level characteristics (in logs) such as sales, capital, inter-
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Table 2.5: Summary Statistics (iii) - Simple Comparison
Mean St. Dev. 25th Median 75th Obs
LogYit EX Pit = 1 10.82 1.32 9.94 10.67 11.58 33,029
EX Pit = 0 10.02 1.06 9.49 10.09 10.80 17,583
L it EX Pit = 1 379 2380 83 129 238 33,029
EX Pit = 0 136 289 67 91 140 17,583
LogK it EX Pit = 1 9.602 1.48 8.67 9.49 10.38 33,015
EX Pit = 0 8.91 1.35 8.19 8.93 9.69 17,571
LogMit EX Pit = 1 10.17 1.50 9.17 10.04 11.03 33,029
EX Pit = 0 9.34 1.50 8.56 9.39 10.23 17,583
LogTFPit EX Pit = 1 5.51 0.44 5.21 5.44 5.72 28,471
EX Pit = 0 5.25 0.33 5.04 5.22 5.43 13,584
Note: EX Pit denotes a dummy variable that takes on 1 if the firm i exports at time t and zero
otherwise.
mediate inputs and productivity. EX Pit represents a dummy variable which takes on 1 if a
firm i exports at time t. LogL it is included to control for the size of firms. Industry (δ j) and
time (δt) fixed effects are also included.
Table 2.6 confirms the findings of exporter premia in the existing literature (e.g. Bernard
et al., 1995; De Loecker, 2007). The results clearly show that the exporting firms differ from
non-exporting firms in terms of sales, capital, intermediate inputs and productivity. It is
worth noting that the exporeter premia holds true even when the control variables - size
variables, indusry and time dummies - are included. The coefficient on EX Pit is statistically
significant even under 1% level.
It is clear from the results that the exporting firms are significantly different from non-
exporting firms, especially, in terms of productivity. However, the difference in productivity
can result from two possible reasons; learning by exports and self-selection. Even though
this chapter is interested in the former, the results from the above regression do not distin-
guish one from the other. Before discussing the empirical strategy to identify the learning
by exports effects, it is worth investigating the evidence of self-selection.
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Table 2.6: Fixed-effects Regression of Firm Characteristics on EX Pit Dummy Variable
(1) (2) (3) Obs
LogYit 0.089∗∗∗ 0.062∗∗∗ 0.030∗∗∗ 50,612
(0.007) (0.006) (0.006)
LogK it 0.075∗∗∗ 0.050∗∗∗ 0.025∗∗∗ 50,586
(0.009) (0.008) (0.006)
LogMit 0.100∗∗∗ 0.0734∗∗∗ 0.051∗∗∗ 50,612
(0.009) (0.008) (0.008)
LogTFPit 0.073∗∗∗ 0.068∗∗∗ 0.062∗∗∗ 42,055
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Control
Size No Yes Yes
Industry No No Yes
Time No No Yes
Note: Standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***,** and * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10%
respectively.EX Pit represents a dummy variable which takes on 1 if a firm i exports at time t. Time fixed
effects are included.
2.3.4 Self-Selection
The presence of fixed costs involved in the participation into the export market means that
not all firms can become exporters (Melitz, 2003). There is still a possibility that only pro-
ductive firms can afford to export and it is those productive firms that self-select into the
export activity. Therefore, the natural question to ask is whether productive firms really
self-select into exporting, by using the following regression
P(ST ARTit = 1)= g(X
′
β+δ j+δt+²it) (2.21)
where ST ARTit denotes a dummy variable which takes on unity if the firm is an export
starter (as defined above) and zero for non-exporters25. g(·) denotes the logit function. X
denotes a vector of firm-specific characteristics at t−1 which affects the firm’s decision to
offshore. These include TFP, the number of employees and capital, all of which are expressed
in logs. The dummy variable FORit, which denotes the firm’s status of foreign ownership, is
also included. δ j and δt denote the industry and time dummy variables respectively.
25Export starters are defined to be the firms with no experience of exporting at least during the previous two
years. The same rule applies to those that quit and re-enter after at least two years of exporting activities. The
information gathered during the status as an exporter, is likely to depreciate and the re-entry costs incurred
by the past exporter are likely to be similar to those by the new entrants (Roberts and Tybout, 1997).
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Table 2.7: Logit Regression
Pooled RE FE
LogTFPit−1 0.322∗∗∗ 0.462∗∗∗ 0.842∗∗∗
(0.083) (0.122) (0.223)
LogL it−1 0.123∗∗∗ 0.195∗∗∗ 0.349∗∗∗
(0.039) (0.058) (0.105)
LogK it−1 0.077∗∗∗ 0.110∗∗∗ 0.201∗∗∗
(0.020) (0.030) (0.055)
FORit−1 0.554∗∗∗ 0.703∗∗∗ 1.261∗∗∗
(0.044) (0.065) (0.116)
Observations 8,099 8,099 8,099
Chi2 559.55 320.55 318.63
Prob > chi2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Notes : Standard errors are reported in parentheses. Industry and time dummies are included, but not
reported in this table. * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1% level of significance.
Table 2.7 shows the results of the logit regression. The first column shows the results from
the pooled logit model, correcting for clustering. The coefficients on productivity, employees
and capital are all positive and significant under the 1% level. Also, the coefficient on FOR
suggests that firms under foreign ownership are more likely to start exporting, possibly due
to the ease with which they can engage in transactions with foreign buyers. The second
and third columns show the results from random and fixed effects logit models respectively,
in which unobserved firm-level heterogeneity is taken into account. The results, signs and
levels of significance remain unchanged to those in the first column, only to confirm the
self-selection hypothesis.
These results imply that the self-selection is at play in Korean manufacturing industry by
which more productive and larger firms are becoming exporters. The likelihood becomes
higher if the firm is under the foreign ownership. These findings imply that it is important
to control for self-selection to avoid a potential bias in the estimation of the learning-by-
export effects.
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2.4 Empirical Strategies
As the presence of a self-selection mechanism was confirmed in the previous section, the in-
terest now lies in the estimation of post-entry effects. In this chapter, the DID-PSM method
is employed to control for self-selection bias as it has been found that it is a productive firm
that self-selects into exporting (see Appendix B.2). By combining a PSM technique with
DID estimation, a selection not only on observables but also on time-invariant unobservable
firm-level characteristics can be controlled for.
The notation ωˆit+s is employed to denote RTFP at time t+ s, which was measured using the
method suggested in the previous section following the decision to start exporting at time
s= 0. Consequently, the average effect of exporting on productivity is defined as below
E[ωˆ1it+s− ωˆ0it+s|ST ARTit = 1]=E[ωˆ1it+s|ST ARTit = 1]−E[ωˆ0it+s|ST ARTit = 1] (2.22)
where ωˆ1it+s measures RTFP of the export starter i at time t+s, whereas ωˆ0it+s denotes RTFP
of the same firm at time t+s if it had remained non-exporter at time t. Also, ST ARTit takes
on the value 1 if a firm i begins to export at s= 0 and zero otherwise.
To construct a valid proxy for the unobservable E[ωˆ0it+s|ST ARTit = 1], the PSM technique
provides a criterion - a propensity score - by which the matched treated and control groups
are created26. Based on the estimated propensity scores, a firm i that starts exporting at
time t is paired up with a non-exporter j whose propensity score is closest to the former (i.e.
nearest neighbour matching). Then, the estimation of the post-entry effects, denoted βˆEX P ,
can be expressed as below
βˆEX P = 1Nt+s
∑
i
(ωˆ1it+s−
∑
j∈CM (i)
wi jωˆ0jt+s) (2.23)
where Nt+s denotes the number of firms at time t+ s that decided to start exporting at time
t. Let M denote the number of non-exporters matched with export starters i. In addition,
CM(i) denotes the set of first M non-exporters j matched to the export starters i. Lastly,
wi j = 1M if j ∈CM(i) and wi j = 0 otherwise. To improve the quality of matching, a number of
26Balance between the treatment and control groups is checked to confirm whether the matched treatment
and control groups are observationally identical independently of treatment. Its procedure has been detailed
in the appendix, so its description will be omitted in this chapter (see Appendix B.3).
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restrictions have been placed. Firstly, matching is considered only in the space of common
support. Secondly, an export starter and non-exporter are matched within the same year.
This ensures that economy-wide macroeconomic shocks are controlled for. Thirdly, a caliper
level - the maximum propensity score distance - has been set to as narrow as 0.01 to improve
the performance of propensity score matching.
However, selection into exporting is not only dependent on observable but also on unobserv-
able characteristics. Thus, the PSM approach is combined with a DID technique to control
for unobservable firm-level characteristics as follows
βˆDID−EX P = 1Nt+s
∑
i
(∆ωˆ1it+s−
∑
j∈CM (i)
wi j∆ωˆ0jt+s) (2.24)
where ∆ω1it+s represents firm i’s change in productivity before (in t-1) and after (in t+s, s
= 0,1,2,3) beginning to export. Similarly, ∆ω0it+s denotes firm i’s change in the respective
productivity, had the firm not started exporting. By differencing sequentially, firm-level
time-invariant unobservable characteristics that affect a firm’s decision to export can be
controlled for. The DID-PSM method is known to improve the quality of non-experimental
evaluation results significantly (Blundell and Dias, 2000).
2.5 Results
2.5.1 Learning-by-Exporting Effects
The main results are presented in this section regarding the effects of the decision to start
exporting on the productivity level at time s ∈ [0,3]27.
The results in Table 2.8 show that export has a positive and statistically significant effect
on productivity. Once firms start exporting, they become, on average, 6.8% more productive
(at s=0). The productivity gap remains more or less the same in later years, in the range of
5 to 6 %. At s=3, the productivity gap amounts to 6.1% and remains statistically significant
27As s increases, the number of firms decreases. It is either because the export starters stop exporting or exit
the market or because that the non-exporters exit the market. Also, given that different firms enter the export
market at different stages of time, the whole history cannot be traced for some of the export starters that enter
late in the sample period.
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Table 2.8: Learning-by-Exporting : Real Productivity with PSM
s 0 1 2 3
ωˆit+s
Treatment 5.430 5.433 5.449 5.451
Control 5.361 5.382 5.394 5.390
βˆEX P 0.068∗∗∗ 0.051∗∗∗ 0.050∗∗∗ 0.061∗∗∗
S.E. (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02)
T-stat 4.39 3.22 2.73 2.92
# of treated 1,042 1,035 808 614
# of control 9,559 7,374 5,753 4,394
Notes : Standard errors are reported in parentheses. * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1% level of significance. s denotes the
time between the decision to offshore and when the profit channel effect is estimated.
even under the 1% level. However, it should be reminded that selection on unobservable, but
time-invariant, firm-level characteristics has not been controlled for in the PSM method.
This overall picture does not vary, even when applying the DID-PSM method. The results
still show that exporting has a positive and statistically significant effect on productivity
growth. When firms start exporting, their productivity grows faster than those that only
serve the domestic market. According to Table 2.9, the productivity growth, with reference
to the pre-entry productivity for export starters, was 6.9% higher than the non-exporters.
The higher growth rates have eventually flattened, however even after 4 years of export-
ing, productivity growth of export starters is 3.1% higher than that of non-exporters. The
difference is also statistically significant under the 1% level. This confirms the presence of
learning-by-exporting effect.
2.5.2 Real TFP
The results in Table 2.8 and 2.9 indicate that exporting has a positive effect on productivity.
This confirms the presence of learning-by-exporting effects. It should be reminded that this
chapter focuses on the development of real TFP from the instant that a firm decides to start
exporting. This implies that the positive results found in the previous section are better
related to an improvement in firm-level efficiency relative to the conventional TFP. If the
latter measure, which is likely to be contaminated with transitory shocks or measurement
errors, was employed as in the existing literature, the matching procedures would have
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Table 2.9: Learning-by-Exporting : Real Productivity with DID-PSM
s 0 1 2 3
∆ωˆit+s
Treatment group 0.079 0.082 0.103 0.111
Control group 0.009 0.038 0.054 0.080
βˆDID−EX P 0.069∗∗∗ 0.044∗∗∗ 0.049∗∗∗ 0.031∗∗∗
S.E. (0.004) (0.005) (0.01) (0.01)
T-stat 15.94 7.90 6.44 3.11
# of treated 1,042 1,035 808 614
# of control 9,559 7,374 5,753 4,394
Notes : Standard errors are reported in parentheses. * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1% level of significance. s denotes the
time between the decision to offshore and when the profit channel effect is estimated.
Figure 2.3: Productivity Growth : RTFP vs TFP
produced less clear results on the link between export and productivity.
In Figure 2.3, the learning-by-exporting effects, βˆDID−EX P , are plotted using two different
measures of productivity: RTFP (solid) and TFP (dotted). It shows that there is a marked
difference in the trajectory of productivity growth. According to the figure, at s = 0, export
starters are placed on different TFP growth trajectories (compared to the pre-entry pro-
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ductivity) depending on the measures. When RTFP is employed, at s = 0, export causes
productivity growth to be approximately 7% higher compared to the pre-entry productivity.
The high productivity growth tapers off in the later years, however, remaining positive and
close to 4%.
However, if TFP is employed, at s= 0, export causes productivity growth to be higher, but at a
lower rate than in the case of RTFP. Moreover, from s = 1, the learning-by-exporting effects
quickly become trivial and productivity growth decreases to almost zero. Subsequently, it
shows a gradually increasing trend, but the learning-by-exporting effect, when measured by
TFP, is clearly short-lived.
The findings in Table 2.10 confirm that the learning-by-exporting effect becomes not only
short-lived but also statistically insignificant even under the 10% level. Row (a) in Table
2.10 shows the learning-by-exporting effects when RTFP is employed. As already examined
above, all the coefficients are positive and even highly significant. However, row (b) shows
a contrasting picture. Productivity growth for export starters increases to 4.4% at s=0, but
sharply decreases to 0.4%, which is negligible and even statistically insignificant.
This chapter does not argue that the learning-by-doing effect is better captured with RTFP
than TFP, but argues that they clearly measure different aspects. In section 2.2.1, it was
argued that RTFP is better related to firm’s efficiency than TFP. It, of course, may be a
coincidence that the learning-by-exporting effect is found to be positive and long-lasting
when using RTFP in this chapter. The results would have differed - positive, short-lived,
marginal and not significant - if TFP was employed. RTFP furnishes credibility to the pos-
itive learning-by-exporting effect as it can be said to be the result of improved efficiency
rather than other factors that are not entirely related to the firm’s decision to export.
2.5.3 Industry-level Learning-by-Exporting Effects
In section 2.5.1, the learning-by-exporting effect was investigated using the whole manufac-
turing sector. However, in this section, the same hypothesis is examined within the indus-
tries according to Korean Standard Industrial Classification (KSIC) at the level of 2-digit
sections (see Appendix B.4). By performing matching within industries, industry-specific
characteristics can be controlled for, to better analyse the effects of export on productivity.
The findings in Table 2.11 show that the evidence of learning-by-doing effect is found in al-
most every industry with the exclusion of Rubber and Plastic Products (22), Furniture (31),
Other Manufacturing (32) and Repair and Installation (33).
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Table 2.10: Learning-by-Exporting : RTFP v. TFP
s 0 1 2 3
∆ωˆit+s
(a) βˆDID−EX P 0.069∗∗∗ 0.044∗∗∗ 0.049∗∗∗ 0.031∗∗∗
∆ωit+s
(b) βˆDID−EX P 0.044∗∗ 0.004 0.009 0.020
# of treated 1,042 1,035 808 614
# of control 9,559 7,374 5,753 4,394
Notes : * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1% level of significance. s denotes the time between the decision to export and when
the profit channel effect is estimated.
Table 2.11: Learning-by-Exporting : Industry-Level Learning-by-Exporting Effects
(βˆDID−EX P )
s 0 1 2 3
Code
13 0.035∗∗∗ 0.013 0.059 −0.020
14 0.093∗∗∗ 0.066∗∗∗ 0.089∗∗ 0.066
17 0.049∗∗∗ 0.040 0.046 −0.011
20 0.067∗∗∗ 0.060∗∗ 0.079∗∗ 0.076
22 0.024 0.018 0.027 −0.009
23 0.053∗∗ 0.026 0.060∗ 0.027
24 0.101∗∗∗ 0.103∗∗∗ 0.132∗∗∗ 0.092∗∗∗
25 0.059∗∗∗ 0.044∗∗∗ 0.074∗∗ 0.023
26 0.090∗∗∗ 0.026 0.057∗∗ 0.025
27 0.059∗∗∗ 0.053 0.053 −0.052
28 0.069∗∗∗ 0.046∗∗ 0.024 0.066
29 0.053∗∗∗ 0.036∗∗ 0.020 −0.003
30 0.091∗∗∗ 0.072∗∗∗ 0.024 0.038
31 0.043 0.030 0.021 −0.056
32 0.055 −0.020 −0.022 0.001
33 −0.038 −0.177 −0.113 −0.083
Notes : * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1% level of significance. s denotes the time between the decision to export and when
the profit channel effect is estimated.
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Table 2.12: Learning-by-Exporting : Industry-Level Learning-by-Exporting Effects
(βˆDID−EX P )
s 0 1 2 3
Low Technology
βˆDID−EX P 0.048∗∗ 0.052∗∗∗ 0.083∗∗∗ 0.048∗∗
S.E. (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02)
# of treated 149 148 124 98
# of control 2,016 1,572 1,237 947
Medium-Low
Technology
βˆDID−EX P 0.060∗∗∗ 0.049∗∗∗ 0.056∗∗∗ 0.058∗∗∗
S.E. (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
# of treated 279 278 221 169
# of control 3,092 2,434 1,916 1,491
Medium-High
Technology
βˆDID−EX P 0.062∗∗∗ 0.045∗∗∗ 0.027∗∗ 0.028∗
S.E. (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
# of treated 614 609 463 347
# of control 4,451 3,368 2,600 1,956
Notes : * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1% level of significance. s denotes the time between the decision to export and when
the profit channel effect is estimated.
It is worth noting that there are large differences in the magnitude or durability of the
effects across the industries. For example, in Basic Metals (24), export decision allows the
productivity growth to be 10% higher than non-exporters after a year of exporting. The
difference increases to 13.2% after three years of exporting (s=2). On the contrary, in Textiles
(13), productivity growth for export starters is 3.5% higher compared to non-exporters in the
very first year of exporting. However, the learning-by-exporting effect in the textile industry
is found to be short-lived as the difference between the two groups becomes statistically
insignificant in later years. The results need to be interpreted with caution because industry-
level matching allows only a small number of export starters in each year. This small number
observation provides insufficient power to produce meaningful results.
As aforementioned, the entire manufacturing sector is classified into three different cat-
egories: low technology, medium-low technology and medium-high technology industries.
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According to these classifications, several industries can be grouped together according to
their R&D intensities, defined to be the ratio of R&D expenditures to value-added. Exam-
ples of medium-high technology industries include computers or motor vehicles, whereas
low-technology industries include textiles and wearing apparel (see Appendix A.4). Each in-
dustry differs from one another according to their dependence on technology and it is likely
that there are category-specific factors that are commonly shared by industries in each cate-
gory. This grouping allows to control for such category-specific factors as well as to overcome
the issue of small samples noted in Table 2.11.
According to Table 2.12, the findings show that positive, and statistically significant, learning-
by-exporting effects are found in all three industries. However, the trajectories they are
placed on differ from one industry to another. In low-technology industry, export starters
are placed on an increasing TFP growth trajectory as the difference in productivity growth
compared to non-exporters starts from 4.8% and even increases to 8.3% after three years
of exporting (s = 2). On the contrary, export starters in the medium-low technology sector
start from 6.0%, and somewhat remaining at the similar rate even in later years. In the
medium-high technology sector, export starters start with the highest rate of 6.2%, but the
difference can be seen to plateau in later years down to 2.8% in s=3.
2.6 Effects of Exporting on Markups
The fact that sales variable, not quantity, is used as a proxy for output in the estimation of
production function has implications; a positive effect from exporting which was observed in
the previous section can be possibly attributed to the following two effects: improvement in
technical efficiency or an increase in demand. Due to the data constraints, it is extremely
difficult to isolate one effect from the other. However, with the estimates of markups at hand,
the size of the latter effect can be indirectly estimable.
De Loecker and Warzynski (2012) provided a method to measure the markups with the
usual variables available in the firm panel dataset that are based only on the imposition
of cost-minimising behaviour to a firm. This greatly relaxes the data requirement often as-
sociated with the measurement of markup. Suppose a general production function Q it =
Q it(L it, Mit,K it,ωit) whose only restrictions are to be continuous and twice differentiable
with respect to its arguments. Q it,L it, Mit and K it denote output, labour, intermediate in-
puts and capital stock of a firm i at time t. The first-order condition for a variable input Mit
is given by
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Table 2.13: Simple Regression of Firm-level Markups on Offshoring Decision
(1) (2)
γ1 0.001 −0.006
(0.005) (0.005)
γ2 −0.026∗∗∗ 0.001
(0.002) (0.003)
γ3 −0.052∗∗∗ 0.001
(0.006) (0.006)
Controls
X Yes Yes
Industry-Time No Yes
Obs. 38,936 38,936
Note: Standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***,** and * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10%
respectively. The standard errors for µOFF are obtained from a non-linear combination of the estimated
parameters.
∂Q it(·)
∂Mit
Mit
Q it
= 1
λit
PMit Mit
Q it
(2.25)
where PMit denotes a firm i’s price for a variable input M at time t. λit denotes the La-
grangian multiplier, which is the marginal cost of production at a given level of output.
Equation (2.25) shows that cost-minimising behaviour of a firm leads to the equality of the
output elasticity of any variable input Mit to 1λit
PMit Mit
Q it
. Consequently, by defining the markup
as µit ≡ Pitλit ., equation (2.25) can be re-written as
θMit =µit
PMit Mit
PitQ it
(2.26)
where θMit denotes the output elasticity of an input M. The data on total sales (PitQ it) and
the expenditure on intermediate inputs (PMit Mit) can be easily obtained from the dataset,
whereas the output elasticity θMit was already obtained from the previous section.
Exporting firms can be classified into three different categories: starters, exiters and con-
tinuers. Starters are defined to be firms which did not engage in exporting at least for two
previous periods and have since started exporting. Exiters are the firms who engaged in ex-
porting for at least two consecutive years and stopped exporting. Continuers are ones which
engaged in exporting throughout the sample period. The regression equation is as follows
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lnµit = γ0+γ1ST ARTit+γ2EX ITit+γ3CONTINUE it+X’itσ+δ j+δt+²it (2.27)
where lnµit denotes the logged markups obtained from De Loecker and Warzynski (2012).
ST ARTit is a dummy variable which denotes one if a firm i is a starter at time t and
zero otherwise. In a similar vein, EX ITit (CONTINUE it) is also a dummy variable which
denotes 1 if a firm i is an exiter (continuer) at time t and zero otherwise. γ1 captures the
percentage difference in markups before and after the exporting decision. γ2 also captures
the percentage difference, but when a firm i stops exporting in t. Xit includes usual control
variables for markups such as firm size, market structure (Herfindahl index) and offshoring
status. Industry (δ j) and time (δt) fixed effects are also included.
The coefficient of main interest lies in γ1. Table 2.13 reports that the decision to start ex-
porting has no positive impact on markups. The first row reports the coefficient of 0.001 in
column (1) and -0.006 in (2). They are not only statistically insignificant even under the 10%,
but also small in magnitude. This indicates that the decision to export is not significantly
associated with any increase in markups.
If it is simply assumed that ∆ lnPit ' ∆ lnµit (i.e. constant marginal costs), then the posi-
tive learning-by-exporting effects can be attributed to an increase in productivity. Clerides
et al. (1998) find that firms’ costs are not affected by previous exporting activities. However,
a recent finding suggests that export entrants experience efficiency gains, that is, falling
marginal costs (Garcia-Marin and Voigtländer, 2019). Part of gain in costs will be passed on
to price levels, which may be able to explain non-significant change in markups. If this is the
case, the productivity-enhancing effects, using sales data, are likely to be underestimated.
As the dataset at hand does not include detailed firm-level information, it is difficult to
entirely isolate the productivity effect of exporting. However, under the assumption that
marginal costs remain the same or decrease, this investigation into markups provides an
indirect way of confirming the positive effect of exporting on productivity.
2.7 Conclusion
This chapter attempted to analyse the effect of exports on productivity in the context of
the Korean manufacturing sector. Korea has long been a country whose reliance on trade
is particularly high due to the small domestic market. Thus, the investigation into the
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link between export and firm-level productivity has greater significance than in any other
countries.
The main focus lies in testing the learning-by-exporting hypothesis, that is, the post-entry
effect on productivity. However, as the evidence for self-selection was noted in this chapter,
the possibility of self-selection bias was raised. To control for the self-selection bias, the DID-
PSM method was employed to control for firm-level characteristics that would affect a firm’s
decision to export. The findings show that export starters become 6.9% higher in productivity
growth than those that only serve the domestic market. This confirms the presence of the
learning-by-exporting effect in the Korean manufacturing sector.
The propensity score matching was also performed within each industry to control for industry-
specific characteristics. The results show that the learning-by-exporting effects are found in
almost every industry with the exclusion of only a few. Similar results were also found when
the entire manufacturing sector was classified into three different industries according to the
R&D intensities. These results confirm the support for the learning-by-exporting hypothesis
in the Korean manufacturing sector.
This chapter also accounts for the fact that productivity is measured using sales variable
rather than quantity variable. The resulting productivity measure was found to increase
not only due to technical efficiency, but also to demand change. The current dataset is not
detailed enough to isolate one effect from the other, but an alternative and indirect method
is suggested in this chapter by investigating the link between markups and exporting to
measure the magnitude of the latter effect. The empirical findings show no evidence of the
link between markups and exporting, thus confirming the positive effect of exporting on
productivity.
More importantly, a new measure of productivity is suggested in this chapter, more consis-
tent with the notion used in the existing literature on export and productivity. Being a simple
derivative from the conventional TFP, it was termed real TFP. The new measure is a portion
of the conventional total factor productivity from which transitory shocks or measurement
errors are removed. The latter two elements are part of the conventional TFP, but are not
directly related to a firm’s efficiency or managerial ability as they are often considered - or
hoped - to be.
The positive, significant and long-lasting learning-by-exporting effects become short-lived
and insignificant when the matching procedures are performed again with the conventional
TFPs. This does not necessarily suggest that post-entry effects are better captured with
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the real total factor productivity. However, it is worth noting that, if a different - not even
entirely relevant - productivity measure was used, this chapter would have produced results
that do not support the learning-by-hypothesis.
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Chapter 3
Does Offshoring Increase
Productivity?
3.1 Introduction
Empirical research, based on micro datasets, has documented that firms that engage in in-
ternational activities, such as exporting, importing and foreign direct investments, tend to be
larger and more productive than firms that only serve the domestic market (Bernard et al.,
1995, 2007). Offshoring is no exception. Tomiura (2007) has demonstrated that offshoring
Japanese firms are distinctively more productive than domestic firms. An interesting as-
pect is that such differences between offshoring and non-offshoring firms exist even before
offshoring activities commence.
This suggests that offshoring is positively correlated with firm’s productivity because firms
with high productivity self-select into offshoring activities. This self-selection hypothesis
has not only been theoretically supported (Antràs and Helpman, 2004) but also been empir-
ically confirmed by various authors. However, this is not the only channel relevant for the
positive correlation (De Loecker, 2007). The second mechanism is the post-(offshoring) en-
try1 hypothesis: firms which enter into offshoring markets not only have access to improved
1In the existing literature on exporting or importing, the term ’learning’ has often been used to describe
productivity enhancement which arises after firms enter into the international activities. By ‘learning’, the
emphasis is placed on the fact that firms gain access to new knowledge and expertise. However, the term
‘learning-by-offshoring’ will not capture the entirety of possible mechanisms, many of which do not seem to
be directly related to the term learning. De Loecker (2013) admits that ‘learning’ in learning by exporting
actually refers to a variety of mechanisms that might bring about productivity increases after exporting such
as marketing investments, product or process innovations or dealing with foreign buyers. Thus, this chapter
opts for the term ’post-(offshoring) entry’ rather than ‘learning-by-offshoring’.
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technology and technical expertise, but also an opportunity to reallocate resources in which
they have comparative advantage (Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg, 2008)2. There is evidence
of various research which examine the second channel and, barring minor differences, are
broadly similar in that they find positive effects of offshoring on productivity. Examples in-
clude Görg and Hanley (2005), Hijzen et al. (2010), Jabbour (2010), Wagner (2011), Schwörer
(2013) (See Appendix C.1).
This chapter mainly argues that offshoring has positive effects on productivity. It is found
that firms which decide to start offshoring experience, on average, experience a positive
change in productivity. This change in productivity is not only statistically significant, but
also persistent. Moreover, it is found that the modifications, which will be suggested later on
in addition to the Levinsohn-Petrin method, have brought about significant changes to the
estimation of coefficients.
This paper contributes to the existing literature in a number of aspects. Firstly, the modi-
fied Levinsohn-Petrin (LP) method, which explicitly controls for selection bias in the spirit
of Olley and Pakes (1996), is employed. This is especially relevant in the context of Korean
manufacturing where exit and entry rates are not negligible and firms with lower produc-
tivity exit and become replaced by those with higher productivity (De Loecker, 2007). The
explicit control for selection bias in the context of Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) was first
attempted by Kasahara and Rodrigue (2008). However, it is argued in this chapter that
their approach potentially leads to inconsistent estimation of capital in the second stage and
value-added should be employed in place of gross sales to avoid this issue.
Secondly, offshorer status is included in the estimation procedures as an additional state
variable3. This inclusion controls for differences in market structures and factor prices
facing the firms when they make decisions regarding intermediate inputs and exiting the
market. As Table 3.1 shows, McCann (2011), to my best knowledge, is the only paper which
includes offshorer status in the estimation procedures amongst the related literature. If off-
shorer status is correlated with the inputs, which is likely, then its omission could lead to
inconsistent input coefficients in the first stage.
2It needs to be noted that most of the research, including this one, uses productivity measures which reflect
sales per inputs at the firm level. Therefore, an increase in the productivity measure may not only capture
technological improvements, but also an increase in sales due to sourcing of cheaper intermediate inputs from
abroad.
3Offshorers might choose a different level of intermediate inputs (and also have a different exit rule), con-
trolling for capital and productivity, due to different market prospects (Van Biesebroeck, 2005). Offshorer
status captures differences in domestic and foreign markets, which are assumed to have different input or out-
put prices due to institutional barriers such as imperfect factor mobility or product differentiation depending
on the intended markets of sale.
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Table 3.1: Differences in the Productivity Measures in the Existing Literature
Productivity Measure
Dependent
Variable
OP or LP Offshorer Status Endogenous
Markov Process
Görzig and
Stephan (2002)
Sales per
employee
× × ×
Wagner (2011) Sales per
employee
× × ×
Girma and Gorg
(2004)
TFP × × ×
Schwörer (2013) TFP OLS × ×
Görg et al. (2008) TFP LP × ×
Hijzen et al.
(2010)
TFP OP × ×
Jabbour (2010) TFP OP × ×
McCann (2011) TFP OP X ×
Thirdly, this paper assumes an endogenous Markov process. The original LP method crit-
ically depends on the assumption of an exogenous first-order Markov process. However,
because the main intention of this paper is to examine the role of offshoring in determin-
ing the evolution of firm-level productivity over time, endogenising productivity process is a
necessary step4. If an exogenous Markov process is incorrectly assumed, productivity shock,
which is used for the moment conditions, can contain variations arising from offshorer sta-
tus. This can cause bias if a firm’s capital stocks or intermediate inputs are correlated with
it in the second stage. Table 3.1 shows that there has been no case of assuming an en-
dogenous Markov process in the existing offshoring literature, even when the OP or LP was
employed. This is concerning as there has been abundant theoretical and empirical evidence
that offshorer status is likely to impact the capital.
Fourthly, this chapter also accounts for the fact that productivity is measured using sales
variable rather than quantity variable. The resulting productivity measure can increase not
4This is equivalent to saying that productivity follows a first-order Markov process with transition prob-
abilities P(ωit+1|ωit,OSit), where OSit denote the offshorer status at time t (Doraszelski and Jaumandreu,
2013).
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only due to technical efficiency but also demand change. The current dataset is not suffi-
ciently detailed to isolate one effect from the other, but an alternative and indirect method
is suggested in this chapter by investigating the link between markups and offshoring to
measure the magnitude of the latter effect.
Last but not least, this is, to the best knowledge, the first paper to investigate into the effects
of offshoring on a Korean manufacturing firms’ productivity using firm-level data. The exist-
ing literature looks at various countries and their manufacturing firms. However, it can be
said that the existing literature lacks in diversity, as it is mostly confined to manufacturing
firms in developed countries, which are expected to have had relatively long experiences of
the business practice. The research on Asian manufacturing firms, except for Japan, is es-
pecially scarce because offshoring is a business practice that is not widely accepted amongst
these countries. This is partly attributable to the fact that most have assumed the role of
the offshoring destinations. However, given that the costs of coordinating far-flung opera-
tions may be inversely related to the level of experience, the relatively lower experience in
offshoring may make its effects work out differently at firms in Asian countries. In this re-
gard, the research on Korean manufacturing firms is expected to attenuate bias in the choice
of countries and shed new light on the possibility of generalisation of almost unanimously
positive effects of offshoring in the existing literature.
This chapter is organised as follows. Section 3.2 provides a literature review, with section
3.3 and 3.4 defining offshoring and presenting the data used for this chapter. Section 3.5
illustrates possible theoretical channels through which offshoring can affect firm-level pro-
ductivity. Section 3.6 describes empirical strategies that this chapter has taken for the es-
timation of consistent production function coefficients and the derivation of firm-level pro-
ductivity. Also, this chapter provides an empirical specification for the estimation of the
effects of offshoring on firm-level productivity, with the interpretation of the results being
given in section 3.7. Section 3.8 discusses the link between offshoring and markups as part
of robustness check, with the last section concluding the chapter.
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3.2 Literature Review
No economic issue has received as much media attention as offshoring5. As anxiety over
potential job loss has been instigated by the media, the public have constantly taken to
the streets and protested against a firms’ decision to relocate their jobs abroad6. The size
of job loss was unjustifiably feared to be massive (Amiti and Wei, 2004) and the issue has
grown more and more politically charged (Olsen, 2006). Politicians have tried to appear
sympathetic to the voters, who were fearing the possible loss of jobs due to offshoring.
Much academic research has followed to dismiss such fears among the public as dispropor-
tionately exaggerated. Amiti and Wei (2004) demonstrated that there were no significant
effects on the U.S. manufacturing employment from its service offshoring. Drezner (2004),
Baily and Farrell (2004), Mankiw and Swagel (2006) placed a projection of staggering 3.3
million job displacements by 2015 into perspective recalling that “roughly 2 million Ameri-
cans change jobs” every month (Baily and Farrell, 2004, p.5)7. Harrison and McMillan (2006)
found that offshoring of the U.S. multinational manufacturing firms explains only a quarter
of more than 4 million jobs lost over the period between 1977 and 19998.
Researchers went as far as to argue that there is a productivity-enhancing channel from
offshoring. Initially, the research was based on industry-level data9. Amiti and Wei (2009)
5During the 2004 U.S. presidential election, offshoring was mentioned over 1000 times in four major newspa-
pers (Mankiw and Swagel, 2006). Amiti and Wei (2004) also document that, in the space of five months between
January and May 2004, there were over 2,500 reports in the U.S. newspapers about service offshoring.
6There have been numerous protests against offshoring decisions. In May 2004, members of Lloyds TSB
group union protested and urged shareholders to oppose the firm’s plan to outsource their U.K.-based jobs to
India. On 30th July, 2012, airline pilots from United Airlines gathered in front of the White House to protest
against the potential offshoring of their jobs. On 10th March, 2016, Chicago Nabisco workers protested against
Mondelez International’s plan to move its production work to Mexico.
7This is a convincing comparison, which can allay unjustifiably exaggerated fears of offshoring. However,
utmost caution needs to be taken in this approach of interpreting the figure. 3.3 million over around ten years
may look negligible compared to the monthly labour turnover in the U.S., but it does not necessarily mean that
the suffering of those who may lose jobs is also negligible. The suffering may aggravate further as relations
of power will be tilted in favour of firms which get to have access to new pools of talented workers, reducing
bargaining power of all workers (Levy, 2005). If the labour market is not as flexible as it needs to be, policies
need to be accompanied to smooth the transition period regardless of the size of those affected.
8Private sector think-tank McKinsey Global Institute (MGI) estimate that, by 2030, as many as 375 million
workers globally could switch to new occupational categories and learn new skills as a result of automation
(Mankiya, J and Lund, S and Chui, M and Bughin, J and Woetzel, J and Batra, P and Ko, R and Sanghvi,
2018). This daunting estimate demonstrates that automation could be a real threat to job displacements than
oft-blamed offshoring.
9Early empirical research using a firm-level data started from the early 2000s. Görzig and Stephan (2002)
and Girma and Gorg (2004) investigated an effect of outsourcing on productivity of German and U.K. manu-
facturing firms respectively using a firm-level panel data. However, both of the research do not distinguish
between domestic outsourcing and offshoring.
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used the U.S. industry level input-output tables constructed by the Bureau of Labor Statis-
tics. They particularly focus on the effects of service offshoring10 whose intensity is defined
as the purchases of services relative to the total intermediate input purchases11. ?12 also
measured offshoring intensity of 12 European countries from EU input-output tables (EU-
ROSTAT) to measure its effect on productivity of low-skilled labour in the European coun-
tries. However, the analysis with industry-level data is not sufficient, as acknowledged by
the authors, in understanding the varying effects arising from firm heterogeneity.
As micro-level data on firm offshoring became available, there has been a continuing ex-
pansion in the investigation into the effects of offshoring on firm-level productivity. Using
the Japanese manufacturing firm-level data, Hijzen et al. (2010) found that offshoring from
foreign affiliates is positively correlated with productivity whereas that from a third party is
not. Jabbour (2010) used the French firm-level data based on Service Des Etudes Statistiques
Industrielles, that is exceptionally rich and includes information on the country of origin.
Jabbour found that offshoring to developed countries had no significant effect, whereas that
to developing countries exhibited significant and positive effects. Other examples include
Görg and Hanley (2005), Görg et al. (2008), Wagner (2011) and Schwörer (2013).
The aforementioned papers are unanimously in support of the productivity-enhancing ef-
fect. This chapter examines if the productivity-enhancing effect is also experienced by Ko-
rean manufacturing firms, but relatively more emphasis is placed on the way productivity is
measured. It is worth noting that the relevant literature is different in the way productivity
is defined13. For example, labour productivity can be used a dependent variable, but Syver-
10Amiti and Wei (2009) chose five service industries - telecommunications, insurance, finance, business ser-
vices and computing and information.
11Their measure for offshoring intensity follows Feenstra and Hanson (1996) in that it applies the economy-
wide import ratio of inputs to all industries. As admitted by the authors, this is not an ideal practice. However,
in a case where there is no access to the exact industry-level import data, it may serve as a “reasonable proxy
of the proportion of imported inputs by industry” (Amiti and Wei, 2009, p210).
12The research stands out in that it uses Constant Elasticity of Substitution (CES) framework. Moreover,
following Pirotte (1999), short-run parameter estimates are obtained by the fixed effects models, whereas the
long-run counterparts are obtained by the cross-sectional estimator.
13There are a few differences in the empirical specification amongst the literature depending on
• whether total wage bills (Görg et al., 2008; Jabbour, 2010), intermediate inputs (Feenstra and Hanson,
1996) or gross outputs (Schwörer, 2013) are used as the denominator of the measures of offshoring
intensity
• whether the location of source countries is considered (Jabbour, 2010) or not
• whether the type of offshored tasks is distinguished (Amiti and Wei, 2009) or not
• whether regression (Schwörer, 2013) or propensity score matching (Wagner, 2011) is employed
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son (2011) points out that it is likely to be a misleading measure of firms’ efficiency. Görg
et al. (2008), Jabbour (2010) and Schwörer (2013) used what could be described as a bet-
ter measure such as total factor productivity. However, they simply rely on the established
semi-parametric methods such as Olley and Pakes (1996) or Levinsohn and Petrin (2003),
without necessary modifications in line with the context of offshoring. This chapter aims to
address the lack of due attention, as the inconsistent estimation of productivity may deliver
a misleading indication that offshoring has an impact on productivity despite this not being
the case, or vice versa.
3.3 Definition of Offshoring
Offshoring is fundamentally a relocation of tasks abroad. Although interchangeably used,
offshoring and outsourcing need to be distinguished as one does not necessarily imply the
other (Olsen, 2006). Whilst offshoring focuses more on the fact that the tasks are relocated
abroad than the relocation itself, the opposite is true for outsourcing.
Table 3.2: Insourcing, Vertical FDI and Outsourcing
Within Firms Between Firms
Domestic Domestic Insourcing Domestic Outsourcing
Foreign Vertical FDI Offshore Outsourcing
Outsourcing refers to the relocation of tasks to external providers. This can be divided
into two different types depending on whether they are relocated to domestic or foreign
providers. The former is termed domestic outsourcing and the latter as offshore outsourcing.
Offshoring, on the other hand, places more focus on the fact that the tasks are relocated to
foreign providers. This can be further divided into two different types depending whether
the providers are an affiliate or an unaffiliated firm. The former is termed captive offshoring
(vertical FDI)14 and the latter is named offshore outsourcing15. Thus, offshoring and out-
14FDIs can be classified into two types depending on their original purposes. Horizontal FDI refers to the
undertaking of the same production activities in foreign markets. The main aim of the horizontal FDI is
an entry into other foreign markets. On the other hand, vertical FDI refers to the relocation of the part of
production activities abroad. One of the main reasons for vertical FDI is to make use of cheap resources
abroad.
15There has been some ‘muddles’ over offshoring even amongst scholars. Bhagwati et al. (2004) argued that
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sourcing coincide only when a firm opts to contract out its in-house activities to arm’s length
foreign vendors. Otherwise, the interchangeable use needs to be paid particular attention.
This is illustrated in Table 3.2. Firm-level offshoring intensity is often measured using sur-
vey data. More detail on its construction will be referred to in Appendix C.2.
3.4 Data
3.4.1 Survey of Business Activities
This chapter uses the Survey of Business Activities (SBA) provided by the Statistics Korea
(KOSTAT). This is the annual survey data that covers all enterprises with at least 50 em-
ployees or 300 million won capital and covers the period from 2006 to 2015. An enterprise
can be defined as the minimum institutional unit as a producer of goods and services and
an independent accounting unit in charge of its own profits and losses16. The data provides
information not only on sales, wages, material costs, investments or tangible assets, but also
on enterprise-level activities such as research and development, outsourcing activities and
business strategies. This survey was first conducted in 2006, as the need for enterprise-level
data mounted and has continued since then. Although the survey covers every industry in
Korea, this research is particularly concerned with the manufacturing sector, which is iden-
tified with two-digit Korea Standard Industrial Classification (KSIC) codes (see Appendix
B.4)17.
As the values are recorded in nominal values, they are deflated into real values to be used in
the estimation. This chapter follows the existing literature in using an industry-level price
data to deflate nominal values (e.g. Hijzen et al., 2010; Ahn and Choi, 2016)18. Real sales
only offshore outsourcing should be the subject of discussion over offshoring. However, Trefler et al. (2005)
argued that both have to be considered as offshoring by pointing out that there are the practical difficulties
of refining the definition of offshoring. In this chapter, the principle is that offshoring is defined to be the
relocation of activities to foreign countries, regardless of its form, with the proviso that those were and could
have been made in-house.
16This differs from establishment which is ‘an enterprise, or part of an enterprise, that is situated in a single
location and in which only a single productive activity is carried out or in which the principal productive
activity accounts for most of the value added” (United Nations, 2008, p.87). Establishment is also the smallest
unit capable of providing information on the questionnaire (Girma and Gorg, 2004).
17Two industries are excluded out of 24: Tobacco Products and Printing and Reproduction of Recorded Media.
The former industry was excluded as there are only few observations reported in each period and the latter as
it was not possible to obtain an appropriate price deflator.
18Industry-level deflator is commonly used in the literature due to the absence of information on prices for
each firm. However, De Loecker (2007) pointed out that the use of industry-level price deflator can result in
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are defined as the nominal sales obtained directly from SBA divided by the industry-level
Producer Price Index (PPI), which is provided by Economic Statistics System (ECOS) from
the Bank of Korea (BoK). Nominal capital and investment are deflated by Domestic Supply
Price Indexes19 for capital equipment from the same source. Lastly, the real intermediate in-
puts are defined as nominal intermediate inputs deflated by Domestic Supply Price Indexes
(DSPI) for intermediate materials which are also compiled by the BoK. They also provide
two different types of DSPI for domestic and foreign intermediate inputs, which are then
used to deflate imported materials from domestic and foreign vendors respectively.
3.4.2 Descriptive Evidence
Firm-level variables such as sales, employment, capital and intermediate inputs are re-
ported in Table 3.3. It is observed that offshorers20 are likely to be larger in size, in terms of
both outputs and inputs, and more productive than outsourcers and non-outsourcers. This
shows the existence of offshorer premia, which will be discussed in more detail in the section
3.4.3. It is also worth noting that there is outsourcer premia, to a lesser degree, especially
in terms of capital and productivity.
Table 3.4 shows the average share of offshorer, outsourcer and non-outsourcer between 2006
and 2015. The average share of offshorer stands at 6.3%. This pales in comparison to the
share of outsourcer which amounts to 75.4%. The share of firms that neither offshore nor
outsource is as high as 18.1%. This indicates that the practice of offshoring is a business
practice that is not widely adopted across the industries and implies that the Korean man-
ufacturing firms rely heavily on domestic outsourcing, rather than offshoring. This observa-
tion is consistent with the theoretical prediction that offshoring is a costly process, for which
firms with low productivity cannot afford (Antràs and Helpman, 2004).
Figure 3.1.(a) displays the share of offshorers over the period of 2006 to 2015 and shows that
there is no consistent trend in the share of offshorers. Having peaked at 7% in 2006, it has
a so-called price bias. For example, if an individual firm is able to negotiate a lower price for the purchase
of inputs, then the use of a (higher) industry-level deflator can lead to an under-estimation of inputs and the
resulting over-estimation of TFPs without any real change (Van Beveren, 2012). This issue will be discussed
more in the later section.
19Producer Price Index (PPI) measures the average changes over time in prices received by domestic produc-
ers for their goods and services. Domestic Supply Price Indexes (DSPI) are derived from the PPI and Import
Price Index (IPI). They are calculated by splitting the individual item’s weight from PPI and IPI in accordance
with its proportion in each stage of production and add these items up by raw materials, intermediate materials
and services and final goods and services.
20More detailed description on the terms is given in the note below
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Table 3.3: Summary Statistics
Mean St. Dev. 25th Median 75th Obs
Sales Offshorer 11.28 1.41 10.33 11.15 11.96 3,196
Outsourcer 10.60 1.24 9.74 10.42 11.25 38,211
Non-outsourcer 10.55 1.30 9.67 10.40 11.32 9,205
Employment Offshorer 684 3976 93 160 314 3,196
Outsourcer 268 1487 75 111 198 38,211
Non-outsourcer 271 2414 71 102 178 9,205
Capital Offshorer 9.48 1.74 8.45 9.39 10.35 3,194
Outsourcer 9.37 1.43 8.50 9.30 10.15 38,195
Non-outsourcer 9.25 1.55 8.36 9.23 10.14 9,197
Intermediate Inputs Offshorer 10.46 1.61 9.50 10.34 11.30 3,196
Outsourcer 9.85 1.51 8.92 9.74 10.68 38,211
Non-outsourcer 9.83 1.65 8.91 9.82 10.83 9,205
TFP Offshorer 5.55 1.30 4.57 5.51 6.55 2,580
Outsourcer 5.32 1.12 4.55 5.35 6.02 30,697
Non-outsourcer 5.15 1.25 4.26 5.06 5.94 7,096
Note: Sales, capital and intermediate inputs are expressed in real values and logs. Employment
refers to the number of workers. A firm i is classified as offshorer if it offshores at time t. Similarly,
outsourcer is a firm if it conducts domestic outsourcing, not offshoring, at time t. Finally,
non-outsourcer is a firm which neither offshores nor outsources at time t.
Table 3.4: Average Offshorer/Outsourcer/Non-outsourcer Share
Average (2006 - 2015)
(1) Number of Offshorers 320
(2) Number of Outsourcers 3821
(3) Number of Non-outsourcers 920
(4) Number of Firms 5010
(1)/(4) 6.3%
(2)/(4) 75.4%
(3)/(4) 18.1%
displayed slight fluctuations over the period. It is worth noting that the share ranges from
approximately 6 to 7% and does not deviate too widely from the average share (6.3%). On
the other hand, the share of outsourcers recorded 72.6% in 2011 and has shown a consis-
tently increasing trend since then, reaching 78.4% in 2015. This suggests that there is an
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Figure 3.1: Share of Offshorer/Outsourcer over Time
(a) Share of Offshorer over Time (b) Share of Outsourcer over Time
Note : The share of offshorer/outsourcer at time t is defined as the number of offshorer/outsourcer at time t
divided by the number of active firms at the same time.
increasingly larger share of outsourcers in the Korean manufacturing industry, eclipsing the
share of non-outsourcers.
In Figure 3.2, data for the share of offshorers in each industry is represented by the solid blue
columns. On average, 30 % of the firms in Wearing Apparel (14) offshore each year, followed
by Computer, Electronic and Optical products (26, henceforth, “Computer”) at more than 10
%. The Computer industry is closely followed by Electrical Equipment (27), Machinery and
Equipment (28) and Repair and Installation of Machinery and Equipment (33, henceforth,
“Repair and Installation”). On the other hand, the grey columns represent an industry share
of total offshorers. It is observed that the sum of the shares of three largest industries
amounts to more than half the total share. This demonstrates that these are the industries
where offshoring is active, not just within, but also across the industries. It is also worth
noting that the few industries, such as Repair and Installation, now record a very low share
in the latter statistics.
Figure 3.3 plots the time-series of average offshoring intensity between the years 2006 and
2015. Offshoring intensity is defined as the ratio of real purchases of intermediate inputs
from foreign providers to real sales of the firm 21. In the run-up to the 2008 financial crisis, it
shows a declining trend in the intensity. Since then, the intensity shows a mildly increasing
trend, reaching at the pre-crisis level in 2015. This time trend suggests that, even though
21The relevant issues regarding the measure for offshoring intensity are detailed in Appendix C.2.
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Figure 3.2: Share of Offshorer and Industry Share of Offshorer
Note : The share of offshorer in each industry is an average of the share across time. The industry share of
offshorer is also an average value of each industry’s share of the total offshorers across time.
Figure 3.3: Time Series of Average Offshoring Intensity
offshoring is not widely pursued by a wide range of firms across the industries, the intensity
has gradually deepened since 2008.
This chapter investigates the link between offshoring and productivity. As part of a visual
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Figure 3.4: TFP Comparison Between Offshorers and Non-Outsourcers
inspection, Figure 3.4 plots two different time series of mean TFPs between offshorers and
non-outsourcers. It is clear that the mean TFPs of offshorers have been gradually increasing.
Interestingly, those of non-outsourcers display a similarly increasing trend during the same
period, but at a distinctively lower rate.
Figure 3.5 compares the distributions of TFPs between offshorers and non-outsourcers. It is
interesting to note that the distributions of non-outsourcers have remained more or less the
same over the sample period. However, those of offshorers have steadily shifted rightwards,
implying the overall increase in productivity. This coincides with the increasing trend of
offshoring intensity shown in Figure 3.4. However, caution needs to be exercised as this
does not provide sufficient information on causal direction.
3.4.3 Offshorer Premia
The descriptive evidence in Table 3.3 suggests that offshorers are likely to be larger and
more productive than those that do not offshore (offshorer premia). Following the related
literature (e.g. exporter premia by Wagner, 2007), offshorer premia can be estimated using
the regression equation
FIRMit =β1OSit+β2DSit+αi+γt+²it (3.1)
where FIRMit represents the firm-level characteristics (in logs) such as sales, employment,
95
Figure 3.5: Comparison of Distribution of TFPs Between Offshorers and Non-outsourcers
Note : Top Left (2007), Top Right (2009) , Bottom Left (2012), Bottom Right (2015)
capital, intermediate inputs and productivity. OSit represents a dummy variable which
takes on 1 if a firm i is an offshorer at time t. Moreover, DSit represents a dummy variable
which takes on 1 if a firm i is an outsourcer at time t. Firm and time fixed effects are
included.
Table 3.5 shows the results of a simple regression of firm-level characteristics on both OSit
and DSit using a fixed-effects model for the entire sample of firms. The results suggest
the existence of offshorer (as well as outsourcer) premia. The mean difference between off-
shorers and non-outsourcers is greatest in sales and the difference ranges from 6 to 8 %
for the remaining variables. The mean productivity difference between offshorers and non-
outsourcers is approximately 9.6%.
Aside from the mean productivity premium, quantile regression allows one to estimate off-
shorer productivity premium along the different points of the conditional distribution. In
this paper, quantile regression with firm-level fixed effects has been employed à la Powell
and Wagner (2011). Table 3.6 shows the different results over the different quantiles. The
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Table 3.5: Simple Regression of Firm Characteristics on Offshorer and Outsourcer Dummy
Variables
OSit DSit Obs
Log Yit 0.119∗∗∗ 0.068∗∗∗ 50,612
(0.017) (0.008)
Log L it 0.075∗∗∗ 0.037∗∗∗ 50,612
(0.011) (0.005)
Log K it 0.072∗∗∗ 0.035∗∗∗ 50 ,586
(0.020) (0.010)
Log Mit 0.079∗∗∗ 0.068∗∗∗ 50,612
(0.021) (0.009)
Log TFPit 0.096∗∗∗ 0.034∗∗∗ 40,373
(0.014) (0.008)
Note: Standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***,** and * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10%
respectively. OSit is a dummy variable which takes on 1 if firm i offshores at time t. DSit is a dummy
variable which takes on 1 if firm i conducts domestic outsourcing at time t. Time fixed effects are included.
second column shows the productivity premium of offshorers relative to non-outsourcers.
The magnitudes range approximately from 7 to 16 % across the different quantiles and the
offshorer productivity premium is statistically significant bar at the 90th quantile. This is
broadly consistent with Antràs and Helpman (2004) in that offshorers are more productive
throughout the entire distribution.
Offshorer premia can be interpreted that offshoring has a positive impact on productivity
through post-entry effects. However, it can also be the case that offshorers are more pro-
ductive than those who do not offshore to begin with and self-select into offshoring. Fur-
thermroe, should a fixed cost exists, when firms start offshoring (e.g. search costs for a for-
eign supplier), only the firms with high productivity would be able to engage in offshoring.
This presence of self-selection is examined in section 3.7.1.
3.5 Theoretical Backgrounds
Offshoring can theoretically be productivity-enhancing as firms’ other international activi-
ties such as exporting, importing or foreign direct investment. However, it is distinctively
different in that offshoring does not solely rely on technology diffusion or learning. It is also
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Table 3.6: Fixed Effects Quantile Regression of Firm Productivity on Offshorer and Out-
sourcer Dummy Variables
Quantile OSit DSit
10th 0.101∗∗ 0.050∗∗
20th 0.120∗∗∗ 0.029
30th 0.075∗∗ 0.030∗
40th 0.076∗∗ 0.041∗∗∗
50th 0.089∗∗ 0.038∗∗
60th 0.069∗∗ 0.031∗
70th 0.122∗∗∗ 0.032
80th 0.167∗∗∗ 0.036∗
90th 0.024 −0.010
Note: ***,** and * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. OSit is a dummy variable which
takes on 1 if firm i offshores at time t. DSit is a dummy variable which takes on 1 if firm i conducts domestic
outsourcing at time t. Firm and time fixed effects are included.
expected to enhance productivity by reallocating resources from less productive areas to-
wards more productive ones. This argument becomes more apparent if it is understood that
a manufacturing firm is usually composed of departments that contribute to its overall op-
eration, such as production, quality, sales and marketing, corporate support or accounting.
In other words, offshoring promotes productivity enhancement by increasing each depart-
ment’s productivity via technological diffusion, as well as by efficiently reallocating resources
between them.
To examine the possible theoretical link from offshoring to firm-level productivity, this chap-
ter defines firm i’s productivity at time t as the aggregation of productivity across depart-
ments j, weighted by their output shares. This can be written as
ωit =
∑
j
zi jtκi jt (3.2)
where κi jt denotes department j’s productivity of firm i at time t. Moreover, zi jt denotes the
output shares of department j in firm i at time t and are used as weights in aggregating the
department-level productivities κi jt. The simple manipulation of ∆ωit = ωit−ωit−1 allows
the firm-level productivity growth to be decomposed into the following two components.
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∆ωit =
∑
j
zi jt−1(κi jt−κi jt−1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Within-department Effects
+∑
j
(zi jt− zi jt−1)κi jt︸ ︷︷ ︸
Reallocation Effects
(3.3)
In (3.3), the first term captures the contribution to the firm-level productivity from the pro-
ductivity increase within the departments, whereas the second term captures the contri-
bution from the output-share changes between the departments22. This demonstrates why
offshoring is distinctively different from other international activities such as exporting and
importing. Usually, the researchers focus on learning from the international activities and
the resulting increase in productivity within the departments, hence the firm. However, off-
shoring also entails reallocation effects, whereby resources are allocated from less efficient
to more efficient departments. This chapter examines how these two terms are related to
oft-mentioned mechanisms from offshoring to productivity.
Firstly, there is a productivity gain from compositional effects. Offshoring refers to the re-
location of a component of the departmental activities (or the entire activities) to a foreign
provider. Because the foreign provider specialises in the offshored activities, it is expected
to perform them at a lower cost or with higher efficiency. Offshoring, in this regard, can be
considered as a replacement of the activities within the department with the offshored ones.
The replacement will result in the productivity increase within the department as long as
the foreign provider supplies the same activities, but with higher efficiency.
Even if the foreign provider is as efficient as the offshoring department, offshoring usually
involves the replacement of in-house activities with those provided at a lower cost23. This al-
lows the firm to save on production costs, freeing up resources which were locked in relatively
less efficient departments. The freed-up resources can then be allocated back to departments
in which they have comparative advantages. As a result, more productive departments will
grow in size and the firm-level productivity will increase as a result (reallocation effects).
Secondly, one can anticipate that offshoring gives the same set of productivity-enhancing
effects as that expected from a firm’s importing activities. For example, offshoring allows
firms to have access to a variety of inputs (Broda and Weinstein, 2006). This expanding
22Melitz and Polanec (2009) pointed out that this simple decomposition is not sufficient in various aspects,
but this chapter will not offer the detail of their argument here. However, the simple decomposition is sufficient
to deliver my point.
23Along with the access to skilled and qualified workers abroad, lower labour costs are reported to be one
of the major reasons for offshoring. For this reason, in the theoretical frameworks, offshoring is defined to be
the relocation of activities from North to firms in South where the labour costs are lower (e.g. ?Naghavi and
Ottaviano, 2009; Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg, 2008).
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variety can be productivity-enhancing for reason of better match. As firms access a wide
range of imported intermediate inputs from other countries, markets become “thicker." This
implies that, as long as domestic and imported inputs are imperfect substitutes, firms are
more likely to find inputs that better match their specific needs (McLaren, 2003). Moreover,
offshoring firms can benefit from spillover effects whilst interacting with foreign suppliers.
Therefore, offshoring will open a direct channel through which embodied and disembodied
technologies can continuously flow (within-department effects) (Keller, 2004)24.
Last but not least, offshoring can increase productivity as cost savings can be ploughed back
into innovation activities such as R&D25. The process of Schumpeterian creative destruc-
tion, for example, provides a theoretical basis for understanding the motivation of a firm to
reinvest cost savings into R&D (?). The successful innovator captures the monopoly rents
from its innovation during the time interval until the next innovator replaces the current
one, hence the term creative destruction. The empirical evidence on post-entry into R&D in-
vestment has been well documented. Görg and Hanley (2011) found a positive link between
offshore outsourcing of services and innovation activity manifested in R&D at the plant
level. An increase in R&D expenditures from offshoring activities can lead to an increase in
firm-level productivity (Hall and Mairesse, 1995), which may be through within-department
effects.
3.6 Empirical Strategies
3.6.1 Part I : Productivity Estimation
To measure the effects of offshoring on a firm’s total factor productivity, it is foremost impor-
tant to correctly identify the production function parameters. The first step is to specify the
Cobb-Douglas production function as below
Yit =Kβkit L
βl
it e
ωit+ηit (3.4)
24The former type of technology refers to new technology embodied in new equipment or new personnel. In
contrast, the latter type of technology refers either to codified technology through licensing or offshoring or
uncodified knowledge (De Beule and Nauwelaerts, 2013).
25This dynamic effect of offshoring interestingly appears in the arguments of David Ricardo, the author
often credited with his theory of static comparative advantage. He maintained that increased profits from
the exploitation of free trade can be used to increase productivity-enhancing investment. This again proves
Keynes’ comment that any idea is hardly exempt from any intellectual influences of some old economists.
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where Yit represents value-added - gross output net of intermediate inputs. The reason for
choosing value-added over goes output will be explained later. K it and L it represent capital
and labour of firm i at time t respectively, with βk and βl representing the corresponding
parameters. ωit subsumes the constant term and represents a productivity observable only
to the firm. This may capture “managerial ability or expected down-time of machinery or
changes in the manufacturing environment” (McCann, 2011, p.103). ηit is an i.i.d error term
unknown to both firm and econometrician before a decision on inputs is made. Taking logs
on (3.4),
yit =βkkit+βl l it+ωit+ηit (3.5)
where variables in logs are written in lower case. ωit results not only from pure techno-
logical change, but also from the improvement in the efficiency and intensity in the use of
inputs (Comin and Hobijn, 2010). This is measured by the proportion of output, which is not
explicitly explained by the inputs of production as below
TFPit = ωˆit = yit− βˆkkit− βˆl l it (3.6)
for which unbiased estimation of their coefficients needs to be ensured. However, simply
using OLS in the estimation of (3.5) is likely to produce biased coefficients as a result of
simultaneity and selection issues.
Simultaneity bias is defined as the correlation between input choices and ωit. If input choices
are based on ωit, a firm with a higher productivity shock is likely to hire more inputs. Con-
sequently, the OLS estimates for more responsive variables to a productivity shock will tend
to be overestimated than for other less responsive variables (Levinsohn and Petrin, 2003).
The OP or LP method allows for the correction of simultaneity bias without having recourse
to instruments. This is important as it is difficult to find good instruments in practice (De
Loecker, 2007).
In addition, selection bias can also arise as a firm makes input choices conditional on its
survival (Ackerberg et al., 2007). Intuitively, firms with a small capital stock are unlikely to
survive the realisation of low productivity, whereas those with a large capital stock are likely
to survive even the very low productivity shocks. Unless this selection issue is accounted for,
one may be misled into concluding that low outputs are correlated with a high level of capital,
leading to a downward bias in the coefficient on capital. Selection bias will become more
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Table 3.7: Annual Exit and Entry Rates
Annual
Offshorer Exit Rates 5.75%
Offshorer Entry Rates 3.27%
Outsourcer Exit Rates 6.04%
Outsourcer Entry Rates 5.32%
Non-outsourcer Exit Rates 7.86%
Non-outsourcer Entry Rates 8.76%
Note: The annual exit (entry) rate is defined as the number of firm exits (entries) in a given year
divided by the total number of active firms in the previous year. The reported value is the mean of
the annual exit (entry) rates.
relevant if the process of exits and entries is dynamic within industries. Table 3.7 reports the
annual exit and entry rates for the Korean manufacturing firms during the sample period.
The extended LP method offers to correct for both simultaneity and selection biases. How-
ever, unlike the OP method, the original LP method (Levinsohn and Petrin, 2003) does not
account for selection bias. Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) argued that the use of an unbalanced
panel implicitly accounts for the exit and entry of firms, therefore controlling for the selec-
tion bias, to some extent. However, Van Beveren (2012) pointed out that failure to explicitly
consider the exit decision of a firm can still lead to a selection bias.
In addition, it is explicitly assumed that offshoring (and outsourcing) firms face different
market structures and factor prices when making decisions regarding intermediate inputs,
by including the offshorer status variable in the intermediate inputs as in Van Biesebroeck
(2005) and De Loecker (2007). The inclusion is driven by the observations that offshoring
firms tend to be larger in terms of production inputs (see 3.4.3). Therefore, the following
equation will be employed
mit =mt(kit,ωit,OSit,DSit) (3.7)
where OSit and DSit represent offshorer and outsourcer status variables of firm i at time t
respectively26.
26Griliches and Mairesse (1995) noted that a strong assumption is placed on (3.7) by indexing m by t to allow
for differences in these variables across time, that is, due to macro variables . However, it does not allow for
individual differences across firms as they are not captured by the state variables. If firm-specific variables
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The status variables are also included in the exit rule as additional state variables. This
inclusion is related to the fact that offshorers and outsourcers tend to be more capital in-
tensive. Therefore, the state variables kit, OSit−1 and DSit−1 now become relevant for a
firm’s decision to exit27. It is observed in Table 3.7 that exit rates for non-offshoring firms
are higher than those for offshoring firms on average. The explicit inclusion of a status vari-
able helps to avoid biased estimation of the coefficients on intermediate and capital inputs
in the second stage of the empirical strategy. For example, if it is not accounted for when it
is correlated with intermediate inputs, then the coefficient will be upwardly biased.
First Stage
Olley and Pakes (1996) present a semiparametric method to circumvent these issues in
which a firm’s investment is used as a proxy variable to control for ωit. Levinsohn and
Petrin (2003) suggested using intermediate inputs as a proxy by focusing on the fact that
firms make lumpy investments due to substantial adjustment costs. Ackerberg et al. (2015)
noted that the essence of both methods is that one can invert optimal input decisions to have
a non-parametric function of unobserved productivity shocks, under certain assumptions28.
From (3.7),
ωit =m−1t (kit,mit,OSit,DSit)= jt(kit,mit,OSit,DSit) (3.8)
where m−1t (·) = jt(·) is a function of the observables kit and mit29. The invertibility of the
function is conditional on the fact that intermediate inputs are strictly increasing in produc-
tivity 30. In (3.5), ωit is replaced by jt(·),
such as exogenous intermediate input prices are observed, they can be included. However, Ackerberg et al.
(2015) noted that “the premise of most of this literature is that such variables are either not available or not
believed to be exogenous (p.2418)”.
27The threshold productivity is related to the liquidation value, which in turn depends on the firm’s capital
stock.
28Refer to Pakes (1991) for the investment proxy and Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) for the intermediate input
proxy.
29By allowing the functions to differ only across time t, but not across firms, it implicitly rules out any firm-
level heterogeneity in demand or labour market conditions. Ackerberg et al. (2015) point out that the premise
of the related literature is that one cannot observe exogenous, across-firm, variation in those variables such as
input prices. If they were observable, then they can be included in the variable functions.
30In the original Olley-Pakes method, due to the monotonicity condition, observations with zero investment
are truncated from the estimation. If there are non-negligible zero investment observations, the Olley-Pakes
(OP) method could rather lead to a great efficiency loss (Van Beveren, 2012). In the data obtained from SBA,
a significant number of firms report zero investment, undermining the efficiency of the results from the OP
method. It is found that there are 1385 zero investment observations, which is considered to be non-negligible.
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yit =βkkit+βl l it+ jt(kit,mit,OSit,DSit)+ηit (3.9)
Defining a new function φt(·)=βkkit+ jt(·),
yit =βl l it+φt(kit,mit,OSit,DSit)+ηit (3.10)
This regression can be estimated by approximating φt(·) using a certain high-order polyno-
mial in kit,mit, OSit and DSit. From this, a consistent estimate of the coefficients for a
variable input (labour) can be obtained. However, the coefficients on capital and intermedi-
ate inputs cannot be isolated as ∂yit
∂kit
=βk+ j′t(·) and ∂yit∂mit =βm+ j
′
t(·).
Second Stage
In the second stage, the coefficients on the state variables are estimated. Unlike the LP
method, a firm’s survival is accounted for in the spirit of Olley and Pakes (1996) (see Ap-
pendix C.3). To this end, a few assumptions need to be in place. Firstly, for every period,
after observing the productivity shock ωit, it is assumed that a firm makes an exit decision
depending on the following exit rule
χit =
1 if ωit ≥ωt(kit,OSit−1,DSit−1)0 if otherwise (3.11)
where χit is a survival indicator and ωt(kit,OSit−1,DSit−1) is a cut-off productivity endoge-
nously determined in equilibrium. It can be observed that the three state variables kit,
OSit−1 and DSit−1 are now relevant for a firm’s endogenous exit decision. Intuitively, firms
with larger capital stocks are likely to self-select into offshoring (or domestic outsourcing)
and are likely to continue in operation at even lower realisation of ωit (Olley and Pakes,
1996). As shown in Table 3.7, the lower exit rates of offshorer and outsourcer relative to
non-outsourcer also empirically prove this point.
Secondly, it is also assume that the productivity ωit follows an endogenous Markov process
as below
For some reasons, there were also observations with zero material inputs. This is something unexpected as
Petrin et al. (2004) note that firms ‘almost always report positive use of intermediate inputs’ (p. 114). However,
its number is much less than half that of zero investments. Thus, this chapter alternatively uses intermediate
inputs as a proxy for ωit following the Levinsohn and Petrin method.
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ωit+1 =E[ωit+1|ωit,OSit,DSit,χit+1 = 1]+ζit+1 (3.12)
where ζit+1 is a productivity innovation independent of ωit, OSit and DSit. The inclusion
of lagged offshoring-related variables is based on empirical research in which offshoring or
domestic outsourcing is found to be positively correlated with productivity (e.g. Görg and
Hanley, 2005; Görg et al., 2008; Hijzen et al., 2010; Jabbour, 2010; Wagner, 2011; Schwörer,
2013). De Loecker (2013) suggests that the past experience be included in the Markov pro-
cess, which is often assumed to be exogenous. For example, if the offshoring status at t−1
is correlated with the capital stock at t through investment at t−1, this will lead to biased
estimates of the coefficients. Consider the regression equation (3.5) in the next period,
yit+1 =βkkit+1+βl l it+1+ωit+1+ηit+1
=βkkit+1+βl l it+1+E[ωit+1|ωit,OSit,DSit,χit+1 = 1]+ζit+1+ηit+1
=βkkit+1+βl l it+1+ g(Pit,φit−βkkit,OSit,DSit)+ζit+1+ηit+1
(3.13)
where g(Pit,φit−βkkit,OSit,DSit) = E[ωit+1|ωit,OSit,DSit,χit+1 = 1]31. In the first stage,
the estimates of βl and φit were obtained. Moreover, the probit regression of survival dummy
31
E[ωit+1|ωit,OSit,DSit,χit+1 = 1]=
∫
ωit+1
ωit+1 f (ωit+1|ωit,OSit,DSit)dωit+1
=
∫
ωit+1
ωit+1
f (ωit+1,ωit,OSit,DSit)∫
ωit+1
f (ωit+1,ωit,OSit,DSit)dωit+1
dωit+1
= g(ωit+1,ωit,OSit,DSit)
= g(Pit,φit−βkkit,OSit,DSit)
where ωit+1 denote the exit threshold at t+1. The fourth equality necessitates the definition of Pit, which is
the probability of continuing into time t+1. It is defined as below
Pr(χit+1 = 1)= Pr(ωit+1 ≥ωit+1(kit+1,OSit,DSit)|ωit+1(kit+1,OSit,DSit),ωit,OSit,DSit)
=ϕt(ωit+1(kit+1,OSit,DSit),ωit,OSit,DSit)
=ϕt(kit+1,kit,mit,OSit,DSit)
≡ Pit
, where the third equality follows from (3.10) [i.e. ωit = jt(kit,mit,OSit,DSit)]. A probit regression of the
survival dummy on ϕt(kit+1,kit,mit,OSit,DSit) will result in its estimate Pˆit.
g(ωit+1,ωit,OSit,DSit)= g[ϕ−1t (Pit,φit−βkkit,OSit,DSit),φit−βkkit,OSit,DSit]
≡ g(Pit,φit−βkkit,OSit,DSit)
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on kit+1,kit,mit,OSit and DSit allows the estimation of Pit. By subtracting the known
variation of labour,
yit+1− βˆl l it+1 =βkkit+1+ g(Pˆit, φˆit−βkkit,OSit,DSit)+ζit+1+ηit+1 (3.14)
Equation (3.14) demonstrates the need for the first stage and the use of value-added instead
of gross output. Since capital is assumed to be dynamic, ζit+1 is mean independent of all
variable known at t+1. However, as both labour and intermediate inputs are chosen after
the realisation of productivity, l it+1 and mit+1 are not mean independent of the disturbance
in (3.14). This explains why value-added needs to be used as the dependent variable rather
than gross output.
Because equation (3.14) is non-linear in βk, non-linear least squares regression has been
employed to obtain its consistent estimate. The non-parametric function g(·) is then approx-
imated by higher-order polynomials in Pˆit, φˆit, OSit, DSit to approximate non-parametric
function g(·) by using a higher order series approximation.
The estimation results for labour and capital coefficients using the modified Levinsohn and
Petrin method (henceforth, “LPMOD”) are reported in Appendix C.4. It can be seen that
the coefficients are mostly significant. The results from LPMOD are expected to correct
for any bias arising from omitted offshoring and outsourcing status. This correction is not
expected from the original LP method (henceforth, “LPEXT”) where an exogenous Markov
process is employed. Appendix C.5 demonstrates that the capital coefficients from LPEXT
are generally higher than those from LPMOD. This upward bias in the capital coefficient
was already suspected as the previous status implies a higher investment and, accordingly,
a higher capital in the next period.
Using the coefficients from LPMOD, the resulting TFP estimates are reported in Appendix
C.6. Its mean is reported along with its overall, between and within standard deviation. It
is demonstrated that there is a wide variation in TFP estimates from industry to industry.
Moreover, it is also worth noting that a between-firm standard deviation of TFP estimates is
almost twice as large as a ’within-firm’ standard deviation, suggestive of large heterogeneity
in productivity across firms and a relatively sticky progress in productivity within firms.
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3.6.2 Part II : Post-entry Effects Estimation using Difference-in-differences
Approach
With the consistent estimates of TFPs in the previous section, a propensity score match-
ing (henceforth, ”PSM”) difference-in-differences (henceforth, ”DID”) method is employed to
evaluate the causal impact of offshoring. It has been observed in the previous section that
offshorers tend to be more productive compared to non-outsourcers. Moreover, productive
firms have been shown to be more likely to self-select into offshoring. To control for selec-
tion bias, Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) suggested the PSM approach to alleviate potential
selection bias on observed variables. This chapter also combines the PSM technique with
DID estimation to control for selection on the unobserved, but time-invariant, firm-level
characteristics.
Let ωit+s be defined as the total factor productivity at time t+s measured using the modified
Levinsohn-Petrin method, following the decision to start offshoring at time s = 0. The term
ω1it+s measures the productivity of the firm i at time t+ s, whereas ω0it+s denotes the produc-
tivity of the same firm at time t+ s if it had not begun offshoring at time t. The superscript
denotes its status. The causal effect can be measured by the difference ω1it+s−ω0it+s. However,
as the latter term ω0it+s is not observable, the average effect of offshoring on productivity can
alternatively be defined as below
E[ω1it+s−ω0it+s|ST ARTit = 1]=E[ω1it+s|ST ARTit = 1]−E[ω0it+s|ST ARTit = 1] (3.15)
where ST ARTit takes on the value 1 if a firm i starts to offshore at s= 0 and zero otherwise.
The dummy variable switches to one when a firm did not offshore for at least the previous
two periods and starts to offshore in t. The issue lies in identifying the last term in (3.15),
that is, the average productivity of firms that start offshoring, had they not done so. Instead,
only E[ω0it+s|ST ARTit = 0] can be calculated, which inevitably leads to selection bias as
follows
Bias=E[ω0it+s|ST ARTit = 1]−E[ω0it+s|ST ARTit = 0] (3.16)
If the treatment was randomly assigned, it would suggest that offshoring starters32 and
32Offshoring starters are defined to be firms which did not engage in offshoring at least for two previous
periods and start offshoring.
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purely domestic firms have the same observable and non-observable characteristics, hence
no bias. However, as examined in the previous section, selection into treatment is not
random, but is rather affected by many observable characteristics and, possibly, by non-
observable characteristics. If this issue is not solved, the difference in productivity cannot
be attributable solely to the firm’s decision to offshore.
With matching techniques, a valid proxy for the unobserved E[ω0it+s|OSit = 1] can be con-
structed. The basic idea of matching is to construct a group of offshoring starters whose
characteristics are similar to purely domestic firms in all pre-offshoring observable char-
acteristics. The similarity between the two groups can be measured by propensity score -
predicted probability to start offshoring - as suggested by Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983)33.
The PSM technique rests on the assumption that selection into offshoring is completely con-
ditional on a vector of the observable characteristics34. The inclusion of the pre-entry level
of the outcome variable ωi,t−1 is especially important to control for self-selection bias. This
assumption ensures that the matched firms are observationally identical on average and the
treatment is randomly assigned.
The propensity score is estimated using a probit regression model. As possible determinants
of entry to offshoring, This chapter includes productivity (ω), the number of employees (l)
and capital (k). The variable for innovation intensity (RD), which is measured by the level
of R&D as a fraction of gross sales is also included to control for the self-selection of highly
innovative firms into offshoring. The dummy variables of exporter status (EX P) and foreign
ownership (FOR) are further included as an additional determinant. Time and industry
fixed effects are included as δt and δ j respectively. Subsequently, the following probit re-
gression can be estimated to obtain the propensity score of offshoring starters
P(ST ARTit = 1)=Φ(ωit−1, l it−1,kit−1,RD it−1,EX Pit−1,FORit−1) (3.17)
The propensity score matching is essentially a weighing scheme where the estimated propen-
sity scores are used to determine the weights placed on the comparison units in the control
group (Rajeev and Wahba, 2005). There are various matching methods depending on weigh-
ing schemes. This chapter employs the kernel and radius matching methods. This is because
33It is unlikely to find matches for the treated if matches are attempted on many, especially continuous,
variables. This is known as the curse of dimensionality. However, the propensity score can be used as a
yardstick with which a similarity between the two observations is measured.
34In reality, a comprehensive list of the relevant variables is unlikely to come by. This chapter includes a
range of variables which have been cited as the factors likely to affect a firm’s decision to start offshoring in
the literature.
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the nearest neighbour matching would discard a large number of observations in the control
group that are not matched, which would apparently lead to reduced power (Stuart, 2010).
Consequently, the post-entry effect, denoted βOFF , can be expressed as below
βOFF =
1
Nt+s
∑
i
(ω1it+s−
∑
j∈CM (i)
wi jω0jt+s) (3.18)
where Nt+s denotes the number of firms at time t+ s that have decided to offshore at time t.
Also, CM(i) denotes the set of domestic firms matched to the offshoring starter i. To improve
the quality of matching, further restrictions have been placed. Firstly, matching is restricted
in the space of common support. This restriction ensures that only the observations in the
overlap of the support of the propensity score are considered. Secondly, firms are matched
from the same year, ensuring that the influence of macroeconomic shocks on matching is
minimised.
Since matching is conditioned on the propensity score and not on observable characteris-
tics, it needs to be investigated whether the distribution of observable (and unobservable)
characteristics between the matched treated and control groups is the same independently
of treatment. This can be done by testing the hypothesis that the means of each observable
characteristic do not differ amongst them. Should the hypothesis be rejected, a different
specification needs to be considered and tested again. This procedure ensures that offshoring
and non-offshoring firms are observationally identical on average for a given propensity
score.
The matching procedure so far, however, is not able to deal with the self-selection bias due
to unobservable characteristics. Thus, the PSM approach is combined with a DID technique
to control for unobservable firm-level characteristics. In the DID-PSM method, the differ-
ence in productivity before and after offshoring for the offshoring starter is compared to the
corresponding difference for its counterpart. This is equivalent to estimating a fixed effects
model, in which time-invariant unobservable characteristics are controlled for.
Let ∆ω1it+s represent firm i’s change in productivity before (in t-1) and after (in t+s, s =
0,1,2,3) entering the offshoring arrangements. Similarly, ∆ω0it+s denotes firm i’s change in
the respective productivity, had the firm not entered the offshoring arrangements. Then, the
estimation of the post-entry effect under the DID-PSM method, denoted βDID−OFF , can be
expressed as below
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βDID−OFF =
1
Nt+s
∑
i
(∆ω1it+s−
∑
j∈CM (i)
wi j∆ω0jt+s) (3.19)
where the notations remain consistent as in (3.18). By differencing sequentially, firm-level
time-invariant unobservable characteristics, which also affect the firm’s decision to offshore,
can be controlled for. The DID-PSM method is known to significantly improve the quality of
non-experimental evaluation results (Blundell and Dias, 2000).
3.7 Results
3.7.1 Self-Selection Bias?
To estimate the propensity score, the probit model (3.17) for the selection into offshoring is
estimated based on certain observable characteristics in time t−1. Table 3.8 shows the re-
sults of this probit regression. Column (1) indicates that there is no evidence of self-selection
into offshoring. However, when industry and time dummies are included, it becomes positive
and highly significant under the 1% level, shown in column (2). This finding is consistent
with the theoretical prediction (Melitz, 2003) and the vast literature related to the produc-
tivity and international activities (Bernard and Jensen, 1999; Wagner, 2007; Aw et al., 2007).
The variable for innovation intensity is also included to control for the possibility of highly
innovative firms self-selecting into offshoring. In column (2), the coefficient on the innovation
intensity (in terms of R&D investment) is positive and statistically significant. This is in
line with the empirical findings that more innovative and productive firms have a higher
propensity to self-select into offshoring35.
The coefficient on employment is also positive and statistically significant at the 1 % level in
column (2). This confirms the positive size effect on the probability of offshoring, suggesting
that larger firms are more likely to self-select into offshoring. Similarly, the coefficient on
the lagged dummy variable for foreign ownership is also positive and highly significant at
1 % level. Firms under foreign ownership may have relative strength compared to purely
domestic firms in terms of the ease of engaging in international activities. This positive
link between foreign ownership and a propensity to start offshoring is consistent with the
35The self-selection hypothesis is supported in the majority of the relevant literature, but there are a few
exceptions. For example, Fryges and Wagner (2010) do not find any support for the self-selection hypothesis.
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Table 3.8: Probit Regression : Selection into Offshoring
Variable (1) (2)
ωit−1 −0.002 0.091∗∗∗
(0.015) (0.025)
l it−1 0.176∗∗∗ 0.090∗∗∗
(0.025) (0.027)
kit−1 −0.071∗∗∗ −0.025
(0.015) (0.017)
RD it−1 0.413∗∗ 0.261∗
(0.206) (0.158)
FORit−1 0.477∗∗∗ 0.422∗∗∗
(0.040) (0.040)
EX Pit−1 0.027 0.029
(0.041) (0.043)
Constant −2.584∗∗∗ −3.374∗∗∗
(0.108) (0.178)
Time Dummies No Yes
Industry Dummies No Yes
Observations 33,012 32,677
Pseudo R2 0.0485 0.0761
Prob > chi2 0.0000 0.0000
Notes : Standard errors are reported in parentheses. Industry and time dummies are included, but not
reported in this table. * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1% level of significance.
empirical finding of Aitken et al. (1997). However, the coefficient on the lagged export status
variable is positive but not statistically significant, even under the 10% level.
The results in this section are as follows: larger, more innovative and productive firms under
foreign ownership tend to have a higher propensity to start offshoring. This suggests that,
when measuring the post-entry effect, it is crucial to control for self-selection bias.
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Table 3.9: Offshoring and TFP (i) - ωMODit+s
s 0 1 2
(a) Kernel
βOFF 0.080 0.059 0.032
S.E. (0.05) (0.05) (0.06)
T-stat 1.59 1.08 0.51
(b) Radius
βOFF 0.055 0.027 0.006
S.E. (0.05) (0.05) (0.06)
T-stat 1.09 0.50 0.10
Notes : Standard errors are reported in parentheses. * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1% level of significance.
3.7.2 DID-PSM results
In this section, the results from the the application of the DID-PSM estimators are re-
ported. In Figure 3.4, the average TFP trajectories for the unmatched offshorers and non-
outsourcers can be observed. They show that offshorers are, on average, more productive
than non-outsourcers. This potentially informs us that offshorers were already more pro-
ductive, even before starting offshoring. However, the trajectories may also suggest the
possible post-entry effect of offshoring on productivity.
Table 3.9 shows the estimates obtained using the cross-sectional propensity score matching.
The productivity of a firm which starts offshoring at time t is compared with that of the
matched non-outsourcers. This chapter follows the matched group of offshorering starters
and purely domestic firms by denoting s= 0,1,2 as the time periods after the decision to start
offshoring. Moreover, a further distinction is made by employing two different matching
methods, the kernel and radius matching in rows (a) and (b) respectively. The results are
similar, showing that the they are robust to the change in the matching methods. More
importantly, this chapter deliberately denotes the productivity measured from the modified
LP method as ωMODit+s to distinguish it from ω
LEV
it+s , the productivity measure obtained from
the original LP method.
Row (a) of Table 3.9 indicates that offshoring has a higher positive impact on the level of
productivity in comparison to that of purely domestic firms. However, the result is statis-
tically insignificant, albeit only marginally so in the first year. A similar result is obtained
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Table 3.10: Offshoring and TFP (ii) - ∆ωMODit+s
s 0 1 2
(a) Kernel
βDID−OFF 0.067∗∗∗ 0.042 0.058
S.E. (0.01) (0.03) (0.04)
T-stat 4.39 1.35 1.44
(b) Radius
βDID−OFF 0.066∗∗∗ 0.038 0.046
S.E. (0.01) (0.03) (0.04)
T-stat 4.35 1.23 1.14
#. Treated 583 360 288
#. Non-Treated 31,006 20,525 16,000
Notes : Standard errors are reported in parentheses. * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1% level of significance.
Table 3.11: Offshoring and TFP (iii) - ∆ωMODit+s vs ∆ω
LEV
it+s
s 0 1 2
(a) ∆ωMODit+s
βDID−OFF 0.067∗∗∗ 0.042 0.058
S.E. (0.01) (0.03) (0.04)
T-stat 4.39 1.35 1.44
(b) ∆ωLEVit+s
βDID−OFF 0.108∗∗∗ 0.052∗ 0.056
S.E. (0.02) (0.03) (0.03)
T-stat 4.64 1.73 1.61
#. Treated 583 360 288
#. Non-Treated 31,006 20,525 16,000
Notes : Standard errors are reported in parentheses. * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1% level of significance.
even when the radius matching method is employed, as shown in row (b). The magnitude
of coefficients has marginally decreased, they remain statistically insignificant. The results
seem to suggest that there is no evidence in support of the post-entry effect. However, it
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needs to be noted that, although the PSM method helps to mitigate selection bias, it does
not control for selection-bias arising from unobserved firm-level characteristics. If not prop-
erly controlled for, the results from the PSM method can still suffer from self-selection bias.
Table 3.10 shows the results from the DID-PSM method. Row (a) indicates that offshoring
has a positive and highly significant effect on the growth rate of productivity in the first year
of offshoring (s= 0). The coefficient is reported to be 6.7% and significant even under the 1%
level. This suggests that the average growth rate in productivity of offshorers is higher that
that of non-outsourcers. However, this positive effect is only transient and can no longer be
seen from s= 1, with the coefficients becoming insignificant in the second and third years of
offshoring. The results are robust to the matching method as row (b) shows that there is a
statistically significant productivity-enhancing effect in the first year of offshoring.
The results in rows (a) and (b) indicate that there is a positive instantaneous effect of off-
shoring on productivity. This can be regarded as evidence for the compositional effect, which
results from a replacement of the activities within firms with the offshored ones. Moreover,
as they can reallocate their resources towards the activities in which they have a compar-
ative advantage, offshoring is expected to boost firm-level productivity in a relatively short
space of time. However, the insignificant coefficients in later years do not seem to support
the possibility of productivity enhancement due to technology transfer or R&D investment,
which may take longer to materialise but have more sustainable effects on productivity than
the compositional change36.
The results from the use of the two different measures of productivity are also compared, one
from the modified LP method and the other from the original method. Table 3.11 suggests
that modifications lead to somewhat lower effects on productivity. The results in row (b)
show that the coefficient in s = 1 is statistically significant in contrast to that in row (a).
However, the results are quite similar. This finding can be regarded as a robustness check
which confirms that offshoring has a significantly positive effect on productivity compared
to their matched domestic firms at least during the first year of offshoring.
36The productivity enhancement from technology transfer or inputs of better quality can also be limited
if offshoring is destined for low-income countries whose technology level is not higher or rather lower than
that of the Korean manufacturing industry. Unfortunately, the data does not provide any information on the
destination of offshoring.
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Table 3.12: Offshoring and TFP (iv) - ∆ωMODit+s
s 0 1 2
(a) Low
βDID−OFF 0.006 −0.041 −0.084
S.E. (0.03) (0.06) (0.08)
T-stat 0.22 -0.61 -0.96
#. Treated 90 60 50
#. Non-Treated 4,530 2,977 2,321
(b) Medium-Low
βDID−OFF −0.002 −0.044 −0.049
S.E. (0.03) (0.06) (0.07)
T-stat -0.07 -0.74 -0.68
#. Treated 77 50 43
#. Non-Treated 8,148 5,422 4,280
(c) Medium-High
βDID−OFF 0.087∗∗∗ 0.067∗ 0.107∗∗
S.E. (0.01) (0.03) (0.05)
T-stat 4.53 1.70 2.07
#. Treated 416 250 195
#. Non-Treated 18,388 12,126 9,399
Notes : Standard errors are reported in parentheses. * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1% level of significance.
3.7.3 Technology Intensity and Post-Entry Effects
The entire manufacturing industry can be divided into three different groups of industries
depending on the level of technology intensity that is measured by the ratio of R&D expendi-
ture to value-added. Table 3.12 indicates the effect of offshoring on the rate of productivity in
three different groups of industries. The coefficients in rows (a) and (b) are neither positive
nor statistically significant. This finding suggests that offshoring does not have productivity-
enhancing impacts in the industries of low- and medium-low technology intensities.
However, the post-entry effect is highly significant in the industries of medium-high tech-
nology intensity. In s = 0, the coefficient is reported to be 8.7% and even significant under
the 1% level. The coefficients remain positive and significant in later years, leading to 10.7%
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Table 3.13: Offshoring and TFP (v) - Real TFP ωR
s 0 1 2
βDID−OFF 0.247∗∗∗ 0.116∗∗∗ 0.104∗∗∗
S.E. (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
T-stat 18.35 7.35 6.14
#. Treated 583 360 288
#. Non-Treated 31,006 20,525 16,000
Notes : Standard errors are reported in parentheses. * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1% level of significance.
in the third year of offshoring. As offshoring often involves contracting out of low-skilled
activities, which could have been carried out in-house, the composition/reallocation effect
is expected to be relatively more conspicuous in the technology-intensive industries whose
comparative advantage lies in high-skilled activities.
This finding has implications that, even though offshoring may have productivity-enhancing
effects via composition effect or other channels, it does not uniformly apply to the whole
manufacturing industry. The effect will be most conspicuous in industries with high tech-
nology intensity where the gap between the skill intensity in the offshored and non-offshored
activities is expected to be most noticeable.
3.7.4 Real Total Factor Productivity
In Chapter 2, the distinction between total factor productivity and real total factor produc-
tivity (RTFP) was discussed. It also suggested the use of RTFP, as the measurement errors
or temporary shocks can be removed, providing a clearer picture of a firm’s efficiency. It was
estimated using the following equation
RTFPit = ωˆit = Φˆt− βˆkkit = y˜it− βˆl l it− βˆkkit (3.20)
where y˜it denotes predicted values from the estimation of equation (3.10). This differs from
the usual TFP which is normally used in the existing literature (e.g. Olley and Pakes, 1996;
Levinsohn and Petrin, 2003) as the latter includes the effects from transitory shocks, ηit as
below
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TFPit =áωit+ηit = yit− βˆl l it− βˆkkit (3.21)
Table 3.14: Offshoring and TFP (vi) - Real TFP ωR
s 0 1 2
(a) Low
βDID−OFF 0.266∗∗∗ 0.145∗∗∗ 0.184∗∗∗
S.E. (0.03) (0.05) (0.06)
T-stat 8.73 2.77 2.85
#. Treated 90 60 50
#. Non-Treated 4,530 2,977 2,321
(b) Medium-Low
βDID−OFF 0.223∗∗∗ 0.055 0.004
S.E. (0.02) (0.04) (0.05)
T-stat 10.27 1.25 0.08
#. Treated 77 50 43
#. Non-Treated 8,148 5,422 4,280
(c) Medium-High
βDID−OFF 0.226∗∗∗ 0.117∗∗∗ 0.096∗∗∗
S.E. (0.01) (0.02) (0.02)
T-stat 25.32 4.98 3.26
#. Treated 416 250 195
#. Non-Treated 18,388 12,126 9,399
Notes : Standard errors are reported in parentheses. * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1% level of significance.
Table 3.13 shows the results of offshoring on productivity when productivity is measured
by RTFP denoted by ωR . Compared to the results in Table 3.11, the coefficient has become
not only larger from 0.067 to 0.247 at s= 0 and they all become highly significant under 1%
throughout s= 0 to s= 2. Table 3.14 also shows a marked difference in terms of magnitude as
well as statistical significance, compared to those in Table 3.12. Overall, the positive impact
has become stronger across the industries and remains significant for longer throughout
the periods. As explained in the second chapter, RTFP is better at measuring the trend
of productivity, as it is less disrupted by transitory shocks or measurement errors. Thus,
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the change in results indicates that the productivity-enhancing effect becomes more distinct
when using RTFP, but less so when the conventional measure is employed.
3.8 Markups and Offshoring
Further to the second chapter, the relationship between offshoring and markups are exam-
ined in this section. The markups are estimated from the method suggested by De Loecker
and Warzynski (2012). There are two possibilities that need to be taken into consideration,
the first being that firms with higher markups are likely to self-select into offshoring. The
second possibility is that firms that enter into offshoring benefit from the markup effect and
experience an increase in markup.
3.8.1 Offshorer Premia
To examine the first possibility, firm-level markups are related to the firm’s offshoring status
as in the following regression framework
lnµit =β0+β1OSit+X’itγ+δ j+δt+²it (3.22)
where OSit is an offshoring status dummy which denotes 1 if firm i offshores at time t and
0 otherwise. β1 captures the percentage difference between firms that offshore and those
that do not. Xit includes the usual control variables for markups. Industry (δ j) and time (δt)
fixed effects are included.
In addition, the level markup difference can also be estimated. To this end, De Loecker and
Warzynski (2012) apply the percentage difference to the constant term which captures the
non-offshoring firm’s markup average. This level of markup difference is denoted as µOFF
and is computed by µOFF =β1 exp(β0).
Table 3.15 shows the results of a simple regression of firm-level markups on both OSit using
a fixed-effects model for the entire sample of firms. The results suggest the existence of
markup premium. The mean percentage difference between offshorers and non-outsourcers
is 14.5% when industry and time dummies are not included and 14.6% when included. They
are both highly significant even under the 1% level of significance.
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Table 3.15: Simple Regression of Firm-level Markups on Offshorer Status
(1) (2) Obs
β1 0.145∗∗∗ 0.146∗∗∗ 38,936
(0.011) (0.010)
µOFF 0.059∗∗∗ 0.073∗∗∗ 38,936
(0.005) (0.008)
Controls
X Yes Yes
Industry-Time No Yes
Note: Standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***,** and * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10%
respectively. The standard errors for µOFF are obtained from a non-linear combination of the estimated
parameters.
The level of the markup difference is approximately 0.059 when industry and time dum-
mies are not included and 0.073 when they are. Given the standard errors of a non-linear
combination of the parameters, they are both highly significant even under the 1%. These
results demonstrate that there is an evidence of the offshoring premium amongst the Korean
manufacturers.
This is not so surprising a finding, as is one of the established empirical observations that
offshoring firms are more productive compared to purely domestic firms (e.g Jabbour, 2010;
Hijzen et al., 2010). Therefore, more productive firms are likely to have more capacity to
charge higher markups compared to less productive counterparts.
3.8.2 Effect of Offshoring on Markups
Many empirical studies document that exporting or offshoring firms experience an increase
in productivity (e.g. Bernard and Jensen, 1999; Hijzen et al., 2010). However, it can be also
interesting to investigate whether markups are affected after a firm starts offshoring. This
finding will enable a better interpretation of the almost unanimously positive productivity
enhancement effect of either offshoring or exporting or both. To this end, offshoring firms
are classified into three categories: starters, exiters and continuers37.
lnµit = γ0+γ1ST ARTit+γ2EX ITit+γ3CONTINUE it+X’itσ+δ j+δt+²it (3.23)
37Starters are defined to be firms which did not engage in offshoring at least for two previous periods and
start offshoring. Exiters are the firms which engaged in offshoring for at least two consecutive years and stop
offshoring. Continuers are the ones which engage in offshoring throughout the sample period.
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Table 3.16: Simple Regression of Firm-level Markups on Offshoring Decision
(1) (2)
γ1 0.120∗∗∗ 0.139∗∗∗
(0.011) (0.011)
µST ART 0.049∗∗∗ 0.069∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.008)
γ2 −0.063∗∗∗ −0.022∗∗∗
(0.009) (0.009)
γ3 0.055∗∗∗ 0.089∗∗∗
(0.014) (0.013)
Controls
X Yes Yes
Industry-Time No Yes
Obs. 38,936 38,936
Note: Standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***,** and * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10%
respectively. The standard errors for µST ART are obtained from a non-linear combination of the estimated
parameters.
where ST ARTit denotes 1 if a firm i is a starter at time t and zero otherwise. In a similar
vein, EX ITit (CONTINUE it) denotes 1 if a firm i is an exiter (continuer) at time t and zero
otherwise. γ1 captures the percentage difference in markups before and after an offshoring
decision. γ2 captures the percentage difference when the firm i chooses to stop offshoring in
t. Xit includes the control variables such as labour and capital use, which will represent the
size and factor intensity. Industry (δ j) and time (δt) fixed effects are also included.
The coefficient of main interest lies in γ1. In a similar way, the level markup difference
is defined as µST ART and computed by µST ART = γ1 exp(γ0). Table 3.16 reports that the
decision to start offshoring has a positive impact on higher markups. The first row shows
that the coefficient is 0.120 in column (1) and 0.139 in (2), both being statistically significant
under the 1%. This indicates that the decision to offshore is associated with about 12 to 13 %
increase in markups. The second row reports the level markup differences, which are 0.049
and 0.069 in rows (1) and (2) respectively. These are also highly significant.
The empirical findings show that, as firms start offshoring, markups increase. This is an
important observation as it helps to rethink the fact that the productivity is measured us-
ing sales variable rather than quantity. TFP thus created is therefore denoted as TFPR
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(revenue-based TFP) whereas the quantity-based TFP is denoted TFPQ. This chapter looks
at the link between a firm’s decision to export and TFPR. It implies that a positive effect of
exporting can be attributed to either of the two effects : improvement in technical efficiency
or an increase in demand. The data availability does not allow to isolate one effect from the
other, but, an intuition can be obtained from the following simple equation
TFPRit = PitTFPQ it (3.24)
where TFPR is a product of TFPQ and the firm level price Pit. Then, taking logs of (3.24)
and transforming the variables into the growth form,
∆ lnPit+∆ lnTFPQ it =∆ lnTFPR it (3.25)
Rearranging for
∆ lnTFPQ it =∆ lnTFPR it−∆ lnPit (3.26)
Equation (3.26) suggests that the growth rate in TFPQ consists of a growth rate in TFPR
plus a growth rate in firm-level prices, for the latter of which no data is available. The results
in Table 3.16 only enable one to guess the magnitude of ∆ lnPit. If it is simply assumed that
∆ lnPit ' ∆ lnµit, then TFPQ can be said to be smaller than the estimated TFPR in this
chapter. For example, it can be seen that there is a 24.7 % increase in real total factor
productivity, whilst markups are found to increase by about 14.5%, making the change in
TFP add up to 10.2%.
However, it is doubtful whether ∆ lnPit ' ∆ lnµit would hold in the context of offshoring.
With the current dataset, it is difficult to determine where to attribute the markup effect:
prices or marginal costs. One may need firm-level information on prices to distinguish one
from the other. However, offshoring differs from other international activities, such as ex-
porting or importing, as it typically involves a substitution of foreign inputs, at cheaper
prices. Thus, the markup effect from offshoring is likely to be associated with a reduction
in marginal costs. Then, the resulting estimates for TFPQ would become higher compared
to the assumption of constant marginal costs. This investigation into markups provides an
indirect way of confirming the positive effect of offshoring on productivity.
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3.9 Conclusion
This chapter has attempted to answer the question of whether offshoring enhances pro-
ductivity. There have already been many attempts to measure the effects of offshoring on
productivity, but this chapter places more emphasis on the consistent estimation of produc-
tion function coefficients, which has been given relatively little attention in the offshoring
literature. The importance of consistent estimation of productivity cannot be more empha-
sised, especially when one focuses on the accurate evaluation of a firm’s policy and its effects
on productivity.
To this end, this chapter modified the Levinsohn-Petrin method (i) to control for selection
bias in the spirit of Olley and Pakes (1996) and (ii) to include offshorer status in the estima-
tion procedures as an additional state variable. These modifications are deemed necessary
considering the facts that the Korean manufacturing industry has been dynamic in terms
of entry and exits and that offshoring firms will face different market conditions relative to
purely domestic counterparts. Moreover, an endogenous Markov process is assumed in the
modified Levinsohn-Petrin method. De Loecker (2013) discusses the possibility of inconsis-
tent estimation of the production function coefficients should an exogenous Markov process
be incorrectly assumed. Most importantly, this chapter suggests using value-added as a de-
pendent variable, in place of gross output, to avoid inconsistent estimation of capital in the
second stage of the Levinsohn and Petrin method.
After obtaining the consistent estimates for productivity, the effects of offshoring on pro-
ductivity are estimated using the DID-PSM method. It is established in the literature that
firms with large employment, higher productivity, innovation, exporter status or under for-
eign ownership are likely to self-select into offshoring than those with lower productivity.
To control for the self-selection bias, the instrumental variable method can be employed,
however, it is generally difficult to find a valid instrumental variable. Thus, the DID-PSM
method to control for selection bias on both observable and unobservable firm-level charac-
teristics was employed in this chapter.
The positive correlation between offshoring and productivity begs the question whether it
is the high productivity firms that self-select into offshoring firms or it is the offshoring
firms which experience an increase in productivity after decision to offshore. In this chapter,
evidence is provided in support of the self-selection hypothesis in line with the existing lit-
erature. It is also found that firms that start offshoring experienced a marked experience in
productivity. The results show that offshoring starters experienced a change in productivity
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of 6.7 % at the first period of offshoring. However, the positive and significant effects were
not found in later periods, suggesting the possibility of productivity enhancement through
composition effect.
Moreover, it is found that these positive results become more significant and the magni-
tude becomes larger when productivity measure obtained from the original LP method is
employed. The results show that offshoring starters experienced a change in productivity of
10.8% in the first year of offshoring and the significant effect persists up to the second year.
This suggests that the modifications proposed in this chapter have brought in non-negligible
changes in the results and, in some cases, have the possibility of delivering misleading re-
sults.
This chapter also accounts for the fact that productivity is measured using sales variable
rather than quantity variable. The resulting productivity measure can increase not only due
to technical efficiency but also to demand change. The current dataset is not sufficiently
detailed to isolate one effect from the other. However, an alternative and indirect method
is suggested in this chapter by investigating the link between markups and offshoring to
measure the magnitude of the latter effect. The empirical finding shows a positive effect
of offshoring on firm-level markups. This implies a possibility that part of the resulting
productivity measured from sales data can be attributed to demand-side.
The conclusions that can be drawn from these observations are as follows. Firstly, offshoring
has clear advantages for those firms intended to increase their productivity. Those engaging
in offshoring are likely to experience an increase in productivity, at least during the first
year of offshoring via composition effect. Secondly, the positive post-entry effect is not long-
lasting, suggesting that long-lasting productivity enhancement through knowledge, technol-
ogy transfer or investment in R&D does not materialise. Lastly, it needs to be emphasised
that the choice of right measure of productivity is important. If the inconsistent estimator
is incorrectly employed, then there is a possibility of a misleading evaluation of the firm’s
policy.
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Appendix A
A.1 [Ch 1] Critique of Ackerberg et al. (2015)
Ackerberg et al. (2015) raise the identification issue with labour coefficient. A various data
generating process (DGP) can be assumed for labour demand, but, analogous to mit in Levin-
sohn and Petrin (2003), it is not unnatural to assume that it also depends on kit and ωit as
below
l it = st(kit,ωit) (A.1)
Then, ωit = jt(kit,mit),
l it = st(kit, jt(kit,mit)) (A.2)
which implies that the labour is a deterministic function of kit and mit. This leads to the
identification issue of βl in the first stage because l it is perfectly collinear with Φt(kit,mit).
This implies that, once conditional on kit and mit, there is no variation left in l it to identify
βl . In other words, labour at time t does not have any cross-sectional variability, making it
impossible to identify βl (Aguirregabiria, 2009).
Ackerberg et al. (2015) note that it would be least likely to observe perfect collinearity in
practice in the sense that an estimate is actually produced in the first stage. They argue that
the lack of perfect collinearity comes from misspecification, and not a consistent estimator
of βl (Ackerberg et al., 2007).
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A.2 [Ch 1] Markups and Demand Elasticity
The firm i chooses the quantity qi which maximises its profit as follows
pii = pi(qi)qi−TCi(qi) (A.3)
where pi(·) denotes the price set by the firm i and TCi(qi) total cost function of firm i to
produce qi. Differentiating (A.3) with respect to qi,
p
′
i(qi)qi+ pi(qi)−MCi = 0 (A.4)
Solving for pi,
pi(
p
′
i(qi)qi
pi
+1)=MC (A.5)
where
p
′
i(qi)qi
pi
refers to the reciprocal of the price elasticity of demand. It will be denoted as
η. Then, (A.5) will be expressed as the following
pi = 11+ηMC (A.6)
If η = 0, then a firm i sets its price according to the level of marginal costs. This is the
case of perfect competition in which firms do not have any market power to set their own
prices. They are price-takers in the perfect competition. η< 0 implies that a firm becomes a
price-setter. The lower η is, the lower the price elasticity of demand, the higher markups.
The firm’s price elasticity of demand depends upon its successful differentiation from other
products. If its products have lower substitutability due to its realised unique selling points,
then the price elasticity will decrease, allowing it to set higher price over marginal costs.
Such differentiation results from either product development, quality improvement or effec-
tive marketing, to the first two of which R&D can contribute.
A.3 [Ch 1] System GMM
The regression equation of consideration is as follows
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yit =+β0+λyit−1+β1xit+αi+uit (A.7)
which is dynamic in nature because of the term yit−1. The parameter of interest is β1 and
the long-run multiplier is β11−λ . To get rid of the fixed effect αi, (A.7) is differenced as follows
∆yit =λ∆yit−1+β1∆xit+∆uit, t= 3, · · ·T (A.8)
for observations t = 1,2, · · · ,T. Applying OLS to (A.8) produces inconsistent parameter esti-
mates because ∆uit is correlated with ∆yit−1. For serially uncorrelated uit, ∆uit is uncorre-
lated with ∆yi,t−k for k ≥ 2. This lays out a logical basis for the use of lagged variables as
instruments.
Arellano and Bond (1991) regard the equation (A.8) as a system of T−2 equations, for each of
which a different set of instruments is considered. For example, there are more lagged values
which can be used as instruments in later periods. They argue for using lagged levels as the
instruments for endogenous variables and the strictly exogenous regressors as the instru-
ments of their own. However, it is pointed out that the lagged levels are poor instruments
for first-differenced variables especially if the variables follow, or closely follow, a random
walk (Arellano and Bover, 1995; Blundell and Bond, 1998). They, therefore, maintain the
use of lagged levels as well as lagged differences as instruments. This expanded estimator
is termed system GMM corresponding to the original estimator which is commonly called
difference GMM.
There are a couple of issues to consider when system GMM estimator is employed. There
are one-step and two-step system GMM, both of which produce consistent estimates, but
the latter is asymptotically more efficient. However, unlike one-step GMM, the two-step
GMM estimator produces downwardly biased standard errors. Thus, Windmeijer (2005)’s
finite-sample correction is applied to control for such downward bias.
Moreover, even though this is not much problem for a short panel as the one used in this
dissertation, if T is large, the system GMM produces too many instruments, which could
result in poor performance. Therefore, the number of instruments, that is the maximum lag
of an instruments, may need to be limited in some cases.
There are two necessary specification tests which need to pass for the GMM estimates to
become valid. First, the system GMM requires that the errors are serially uncorrelated. If
they are uncorrelated, ∆uit are correlated with ∆uit−1, but not with ∆uit−k,k ≥ 2. Second,
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the Sargan or Hansen test needs to be performed to test over-identifying restrictions. The
null hypothesis that the instruments are valid instruments is tested. The Sargan test is
sensitive to the assumption of homoskedasitcity and no-serial correlation, thus the Hansen
test is often used for the test. However, even the Hansen test can suffer from the problem
of too many instruments, in which case implausible p-values of 1.000 could be generated
(Roodman, 2009).
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A.4 [Ch 1] Classification of manufacturing industries into
categories based on R&D intensities
Low Technology
Food products and beverages
Textiles, wearing apparel and leather products
Wood and products of wood and cork
Paper and paper products
Furniture; other manufacturing
Medium-Low Technology
Coke and refined petroleum products
Rubber and plastic products
Other non-metallic mineral products
Basic metals
Fabricated metal products
Medium-High Technology
Chemicals and chemical products
Basic pharmaceutical products
Computer, electronic and optical products
Electrical equipment
Machinery and equipment n.e.c.
Motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers
Other transport equipment
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Appendix B
B.1 [Ch 2] Olley-Pakes Method
This paper mainly employs the Levison-Petrin method. However, it should be noted that
it basically builds upon the semi-parametric method suggested by Olley and Pakes (1996).
Thus, this chapter briefly summarises their methods here. In estimating the firm-level pro-
duction function, simply applying OLS can lead to biased estimators for the coefficients of
input variables for two obvious reasons.
Firstly, it is likely to violate the assumption that explanatory variables are uncorrelated
with the error term (endogeneity bias). The variables on the right hand side (variable inputs
such as labour or intermediate inputs) can be correlated with the unobservable productivity
shocks. It is because that ‘unobservable’ is only applied to the econometrician, but not to the
firm. This can be expressed by decomposing ²it into two parts, ωit and ηit, as below
yit =β0+βl l it+βkkit+βmmit+ωit+ηit
where the former is a part of the productivity observable to the firm and the latter is an i.i.d
error term unknown to both firm and econometrician. The firm with this prior knowledge
about ωit will determine the level of inputs, making them no longer an exogenous variable.
The resulting OLS coefficients are likely to be upwardly biased as they get to capture the
effect of TFP on output.
Secondly, an endogenous decision of firms to enter or exit the market is likely to bias the
coefficient of capital stock as the probability of survival depends on the level of capital stock.
Firms with a high level of capital stock can survive a low level of productivity shock whilst
those with a low level of capital stock is likely not to survive it and exit the market. This,
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unless properly accounted for, can cause a downward bias in the coefficient of capital as it
may falsely lead us to conclude that firms with a high level of capital stock are not much
more productive than those with a small level of capital stock (selection bias).
Olley and Pakes (1996) present a semiparametric method to circumvent these issues and
obtain consistent estimators by using an investment (i it) as a proxy variable to control for
unobservable productivity shocks, ωit. This is based on the assumption that an observable
variable i it carries an information on the unobservable ωit. The OP method depends on sev-
eral assumptions
(1) The current productivity, ωit, depends on the previous period’s productivity (a first-order
Markov process)
(2) Investment depends on the state variable kit and productivityωit, such that i it = i t(kit,ωit)
(3) Investment increases monotonically in ωit, conditional on other state variables.
Building upon these assumptions, the OP method is conducted through three stages. In
the first stage, the coefficients on variable inputs (labour and intermediate inputs) are esti-
mated. Investment depends on the state variables such that i it = i t(kit,ωit). The assump-
tion (3) ensures that the investment function is invertible. Thus, it can be expressed as
ωit = i−1t (kit, i it)= ht(kit, i it). Then,
yit =β0+βl l it+βkkit+βmmit+ht(kit, i it)+ηit (A.1)
Using φt(kit, i it)=β0+βkkit+ht(kit, i it),
yit =βl l it+βmmit+φt(kit, i it)+ηit (A.2)
This regression can be estimated by approximating φt(kit, i it) using some high-order poly-
nomial in kit and i it. From this, a consistent estimate of the coefficients for variable inputs
(labour or intermediate inputs) are obtained. However, the coefficient on capital cannot be
isolated as ∂yit
∂kit
=βk+h′t(kit, i it)
In the second stage, the firm’s survival is accounted for and, to this end, a survival indicator
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χit, which takes on 1 if the firm’s productivity ωit exceeds a cut-off productivity ω∗it and 0
otherwise, is employed. The output of a firm i in the next period t+1 is
yit+1 =β0+βl l it+1+βkkit+1+βmmit+1+ωit+1+ηit+1 (A.3)
Using ωit+1 =E[ωit+1|ωit,χit+1 = 1]+ζit+1 from assumption (1),
yit+1 =β0+βl l it+1+βkkit+1+βmmit+1+E[ωit+1|ωit,χit+1 = 1]+ζit+1+ηit+1 (A.4)
Rearranging,
yit+1−βl l it+1−βkkit+1 =β0+βmmit+1+E[ωit+1|ωit,χit+1 = 1]+ζit+1+ηit+1 (A.5)
Using θ(Pit,ht)=β0+E[ωit+1|ωit,χit+1 = 1],
yit+1−βl l it+1−βkkit+1 =βmmit+1+θ(Pt,ht)+ζit+1+ηit+1
=βmmit+1+θ(Pt,φt(kit, i it)−β0−βkkit)+ζit+1+ηit+1
(A.6)
where Pt represents the probability of survival at t+1, that is, p(ωit+1 >ω∗it+1). This can be
estimated using a probit regression. Also, φt =β0+βkkit+ht is already estimated in the first
stage.
In the third stage, the final regression
yit+1− βˆl l it+1− βˆmmit+1 =βkkit+1+θ(Pˆt, φˆt(kit, i it)−β0−βkkit)+ζit+1+ηit+1 (A.7)
is estimated to obtain an estimate of the coefficient on capital. A non-linear least squares
regression is applied to obtain βˆk.
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B.2 [Ch 2] Average Treatment Effect on the Treated and
Difference-in-Differences Propensity Score Match-
ing Approach
The second chapter measures the impact of decision to export on productivity as measured by
the average treatment effect on the treated (ATET). The outcome of the treated i is denoted
as q1i, whereas that of the non-treated i as q0i. D i is a dummy variable which denotes one
if i receive the treatment and zero otherwise. Also, X is a vector of observable variables.
Because it is impossible to directly measure the difference q1i − q0i, the comparison of the
average outcomes of the treated and the non-treated is considered. However, the simple
comparison would not provide a meaningful casual effect because of the selection bias as
below
E[q1i|D i = 1]−E[q0i|D i = 0]=E[q1i|D i = 1]−E[q0i|D i = 1]︸ ︷︷ ︸
ATET
+E[q0i|D i = 1]−E[q0i|D i = 0]︸ ︷︷ ︸
Selection Bias
(A.8)
To have a meaningful comparison, that is, to remove selection bias, Rosenbaum and Rubin
(1983) suggest using the propensity score matching which assumes that the outcome q0i
is independent of treatment if a set of observable characteristics (X) is controlled for. The
assumption is as follows
q0i⊥D i|p(X) (A.9)
where p(X) denotes the propensity score, the estimated probability of participating in ex-
porting given a set of observable characteristics X1. Rather than matching with respect to
all observable and relevant characteristics, the propensity score matching (PSM) method
matches export starters and non exporters based on the propensity score. Then, the ATET
can be obtained by simply comparing the averages of outcome variables between them. If
the assumption (A.9) holds, it follows that
1This is a weaker version of the conditional independence assumption.
q1i, q0i⊥D i|p(X) (A.10)
which states that, if observed X are controlled for, the outcomes are independent of treatment. In other words,
this implies, if individuals are with the same X , that q0i and q1i and D i are independent.
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E[q1i|D i = 1]−E[q0i|D i = 0]=E[q1i|D i = 1]−E[q0i|D i = 1]︸ ︷︷ ︸
ATET
(A.11)
where the selection bias disappears and the ATET remains. However, it is pointed out that X
is a set of observable characteristics. Thus, if self-selection is based on unobservable charac-
teristics, the assumption (A.9) cannot be guaranteed. This is the reason that the difference-
in-differences (DID) method is employed. The effect of time-invariant unobservables can be
removed by taking the difference in outcomes before and after the firm’s decision to start
exporting. Then, DID will control for time-invariant unobservable characteristics such as
firm’s production network, its preference towards risks or manager’s motivation, which are
not captured only by the inclusion of observable control variables. Then,
E[∆q1i|D i = 1]−E[∆q0i|D i = 0]
=E[∆q1i|D i = 1]−E[∆q0i|D i = 1]︸ ︷︷ ︸
ATET
+E[∆q0i|D i = 1]−E[∆q0i|D i = 0]︸ ︷︷ ︸
Selection Bias
(A.12)
The selection bias in (A.12) can be removed by the following assumption corresponding to
(A.9)
∆q0i⊥D i|p(X) (A.13)
B.3 [Ch 2] Procedures for PSM
To construct a valid control group, a propensity score matching approach is employed. The
propensity score matching allows pairing of each exporting starter with a similar firm that
has never exported. This similarity is measured in terms of the likelihood of a firm starting
to offshore based on their pre-offshoring observed characteristics X.
Procedures are intuitive. Firstly, the predicted probability of a firm’s decision to export at
time t (the propensity score) is estimated conditional on a vector of observed variables X
using the following a random-effects probit model
Pr(ST ARTit = 1)=Φ(h(Xit−1),δ j,δt) (A.14)
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where Φ(·) denote the cumulative normal distribution and Xit−1 denote a set of control vari-
ables of a firm i at t−1. h(Xit−1) is a function of observed variables with linear and higher
order terms. The choice of which higher order terms to include is based on the need to satisfy
the balancing hypothesis more in detail later (Becker and Ichino, 2002). The estimation of
(A.14) starts with a parsimonious probit specification.
The probability is estimated as a function of capital, TFP, foreign ownership and the num-
ber of employees in the previous period, which are known to have an impact on a firm’s
decision to export2. Among these, the inclusion of productivity is foremost important, be-
cause it controls for the fact that more productive firms are more likely to self-select into the
international market. Differences in productivity will be conditioned on these pre-exporting
observed variables, thereby reducing self-selection bias. This chapter also includes a full set
of time (δt) and industry (δ j) dummies to control for shocks common to all firms.
Secondly, once the propensity scores are estimated, the next step is to ensure that propensity
scores are balanced between the treated and control groups. In other words, the propensity
score should have a similar distribution between the two groups. The propensity score’s
distribution in each group is roughly estimated by splitting the sample by k equidistant
intervals of the propensity score and test whether the average propensity score of the treated
and the control groups is the same in all k intervals. If it is not equivalent, one or more
intervals can be split into smaller blocks until equality holds in all the intervals.
Thirdly, a t-test is performed to check the mean equality for each characteristics within each
interval. This is the balancing hypothesis test, first introduced by Rosenbaum and Rubin
(1983) and formalised by (Becker and Ichino, 2002). If the hypothesis is rejected, then a
different specification of h(Xit−1) can be considered. The balancing hypothesis ensures that
two observations with the same propensity score are similar in terms of observed variables
X, independently of the treatment3.
Lastly, given the aforementioned hypotheses are all met, the PSM method matches the out-
come of each exporting starter with the weighted outcome of non-exporters in the control
2If the sample size is sufficiently large, it is beneficial to include all variables that are thought to be po-
tentially associated with the outcome, but not the treatment because there is a possibility that they are also
correlated with the treatment. However, with the small sample size, variables with weak association with
the outcome are better to be excluded because they can introduce too much noise in treatment effect and ob-
scure any reduction in bias (Garrido et al., 2014). The variables included in the probit estimation are highly
associated with the firm’s outcome as well as the treatment.
3Exact balance is not easy to achieve. 10 to 25 % are proposed as maximum standardised differences for
specific variables (Austin, 2009). It is more crucial to achieve balance in variables theoretically more important
than those less likely to affect the outcome (Garrido et al., 2014).
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group. There are many available matching techniques such as nearest neighbour matching
(N-N), kernel or radius matching. The most commonly used matching is the N-N matching in
which an observation with the propensity score pi in the treated group is matched with the
other observation in the control group with the propensity score p j closest to pi. However,
this method can perform poorly, because the nearest neighbour has a propensity score which
is widely different. Moreover, if there are many similar neighbours with reasonably close
propensity scores, the N-N matching discards them only because they are not the closest.
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B.4 [Ch 2] Korean Standard Industrial Classification (KSIC)
No. Code Name of Industry
1 10 Food Products
2 11 Beverages
3 12 Tobacco Products
4 13 Textiles
5 14 Wearing Apparel
6 15 Leather and Related Products
7 16 Wood and Products of Wood and Cork, Except Furniture
8 17 Paper and Paper Products
9 18 Printing and Reproduction of Recorded Media
10 19 Coke and Refined Petroleum Products
11 20 Chemicals and Chemical Products
12 21 Basic Pharmaceutical Products and Pharmaceutical Preparations
13 22 Rubber and Plastics Products
14 23 Other Non-Metallic Mineral Products
15 24 Basic Metals
16 25 Fabricated Metal Products, Except Machinery and Equipment
17 26 Computer, Electronic and Optical Products
18 27 Electrical Equipment
19 28 Machinery and Equipment N.E.C.
20 29 Motor Vehicles, Trailers and Semi-Trailers
21 30 Other Transport Equipment
22 31 Furniture
23 32 Other Manufacturing
24 33 Repair and Installation of Machinery and Equipment
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Appendix C
C.1 [Ch 3] Summary of the Existing Literature
Country Data Level Period
Productivity Effects
Material Services M/S
Wagner
(2011)
Germany Firm 2001-2003 +
Görg and
Hanley
(2005)
Ireland Plant 1990-1995 + ns
Schwörer
(2013)
European
Countries
Firm 1995-2008 + +
Görg et al.
(2008)
Ireland Plant 1990-1998 ns +
Hijzen
et al. (2010)
Japan Firm 1994-2000 +
Jabbour
(2010)
France Firm 1990-2001 +
McCann
(2011)
Ireland Firm 2001-2005 +
M/S indicates offshoring intensity in which material offshoring is not distinguished from service
offshoring. ns indicates that the effects are not significant.
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C.2 [Ch 3] Measurement of Offshoring Intensity
To estimate the effects of offshoring on productivity, it is necessary to measure the intensity
of offshoring. When industry-level offshoring intensity is considered, the main source of
data is usually an input-output table and there is a well-established method to construct
offshoring intensity indices. The firm-level measures of offshoring intensity are similar to
industry-level counterparts in their form, but differ in that they are built based on the firm-
level survey data. As there is no unification of survey questions across countries (or even
within the same country), the resulting measures cannot help but differ from one another,
depending on the data availability. Its most basic form is as below
OINTit = IMitYit
(A.1)
where IMit is real imported inputs and Yit is real output for firm i at time t. It may look
overly simple to construct at first glance, but a couple of clarifications needs to be mentioned
on both IMit and Yit. Firstly, it should be made clear as to the range of IMit. If it denotes
inputs imported in the process of contracting out in-house activities to foreign vendors, the
index measures ‘narrow’ offshoring intensity. On the other hand, if it simply denotes any
imported inputs, the index measures ‘broad’ offshoring intensity. As Feenstra (1998) note, a
narrow offshoring index is more appropriate in that it is consistent with the original concept
of offshoring where activities are contracted out to foreign vendors, when they could have
been done in-house. However, as briefly mentioned above, such distinction is often subject to
availability and detail of data.
Secondly, it is worth noting that offshoring is defined as the ratio of imported intermediate
inputs to output as in Geishecker and Görg (2008). This is different from other variables
often used for normalisation such as non-energy total inputs (Feenstra, 1998; Amiti and
Wei, 2009), total wage (Girma and Gorg, 2004), and value-added (Hijzen et al., 2010). How-
ever, following Geishecker and Görg (2008) and Schwörer (2013), this chapter uses output
in the denominator. They point out that using the aforementioned variables - value-added
and total inputs - can be misleading as increasing domestic outsourcing, which will decrease
value-added and increase total inputs, leads to a change in offshoring intensity with no real
change in it.
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C.3 [Ch 3] Selection Bias in Olley-Pakes Model
Firms do exit and enter over period. This process of firm dynamics will be conspicuous
especially if the sample period of interest is not trivial. The ongoing exit and entry of firms
have been dealt with by omitting all firms that enter or exit over the sample period and
constructing a balanced panel dataset (Van Beveren, 2012). However, this can result in a
biased coefficient, because firms with low productivity have a stronger tendency to exit than
those with high productivity. The Olley-Pakes directly controls for this selection bias by
relying on the fact that firms with a higher level of capital are likely to withstand lower
realisation of productivity. Each firm is assumed to follow the following exit rule
χit =
1 if ωit ≥ωt(kit)0 if otherwise (A.2)
where ωt(kit) represent a cut-off productivity, which in turn is a function of capital level. If
a firm’s realised productivity is below the cut-off productivity, they will choose to exit the
market. Given that the productivity follows
ωit =E[ωit|ωit−1,χit = 1]+ζit (A.3)
where the first term of (A.3) denotes that the expected value of productivity is conditional on
the firm’s survival. For simplicity, consider the following regression equation
yit =βkkit+βl l it+ωit+ηit (A.4)
where the all the notations are the same as in the previous chapters. Substituting (A.3) into
(A.4),
yit =βkkit+βl l it+E[ωit|ωit−1,χit = 1]+ζit+ηit (A.5)
from which the omission of E[ωit|ωit−1] can result in omitted variable bias. This is because
the survival of firms with low productivity is correlated with the level of capital stock, hence
the low level of cut-off productivity.
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C.4 [Ch 3] Industry-level Production Function Estima-
tion Results, using extended Levinsohn-Petrin Method
βl βk
Industry OLS LPMOD OLS LPMOD
13 0.926 0.630∗∗∗ 0.166 0.121∗∗∗
(0.026) (0.024)
14 0.813 0.539∗∗∗ 0.216 0.133∗∗∗
(0.026) (0.026)
17 0.831 0.477∗∗∗ 0.342 0.039
(0.029) (0.043)
20 0.803 0.576∗∗∗ 0.365 0.283∗∗∗
(0.020) (0.022)
22 0.839 0.645∗∗∗ 0.249 0.244∗∗∗
(0.019) (0.028)
23 0.698 0.467∗∗∗ 0.371 0.065
(0.021) (0.047)
24 0.888 0.795∗∗∗ 0.260 0.065
(0.019) (0.046)
25 0.860 0.674∗∗∗ 0.268 0.113∗∗∗
(0.017) (0.034)
26 0.896 0.621∗∗∗ 0.201 0.281∗∗∗
(0.017) (0.022)
27 0.871 0.616∗∗∗ 0.210 0.188∗∗∗
(0.025) (0.028)
28 0.973 0.772∗∗∗ 0.186 0.099∗∗∗
(0.020) (0.026)
29 0.905 0.634∗∗∗ 0.220 0.095∗∗∗
(0.014) (0.024)
30 0.796 0.554∗∗∗ 0.313 0.115∗∗∗
(0.013) (0.022)
31 0.794 0.463∗∗∗ 0.305 0.135∗∗∗
(0.035) (0.062)
32 0.765 0.463∗∗∗ 0.309 0.218∗∗∗
(0.061) (0.058)
33 0.892 0.604∗∗∗ 0.220 0.099∗∗
(0.048) (0.051)
***,** and * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively.
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C.5 [Ch 3] Production Function Coefficients Between LP
methods with Exogenous and Endogenous Markov
Process
βk
Industry LPEXT LPMOD Diff.
13 0.119 0.121 1.68%
14 0.136 0.133 -2.20%
17 0.038 0.039 2.63%
20 0.284 0.283 -0.35%
22 0.245 0.244 -0.40%
23 0.075 0.065 -13.33%
24 0.068 0.065 -4.41%
25 0.105 0.113 7.61%
26 0.313 0.281 -10.22%
27 0.186 0.188 1.07%
28 0.097 0.099 2.06%
29 0.094 0.095 1.06%
30 0.118 0.115 -2.54%
31 0.146 0.135 -7.53%
32 0.215 0.218 1.39%
33 0.110 0.099 -1.10%
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C.6 [Ch 3] Industry-level Total Factor Productivity (TFP)
Estimation, using extended Levinsohn-Petrin Method
Code
Mean
(Overall)
S.D.
(Overall)
S.D.
(Between)
S.D.
(Within) Obs. Group T¯
13 5.253 0.546 0.594 0.216 1874 353 5.30
14 6.526 0.887 0.869 0.283 1498 285 5.25
17 7.273 0.802 0.773 0.189 1105 186 5.94
20 4.518 0.727 0.674 0.317 2877 521 5.52
22 4.204 0.516 0.477 0.272 3118 621 5.02
23 7.114 0.834 0.797 0.240 1519 287 5.29
24 5.562 0.635 0.583 0.314 2705 501 5.39
25 5.444 0.622 0.614 0.247 2712 640 4.23
26 3.871 0.749 0.759 0.394 5853 1313 4.45
27 4.841 0.555 0.531 0.274 1535 331 4.63
28 4.940 0.628 0.584 0.332 2747 596 4.60
29 5.825 0.630 0.629 0.295 5259 1093 4.81
30 6.008 0.659 0.643 0.262 5768 1046 5.51
31 6.580 0.992 0.940 0.327 922 216 4.26
32 5.498 0.648 0.599 0.264 418 89 4.69
33 5.565 0.712 0.761 0.241 463 108 4.28
T¯ is the average number of periods for which the panel is observed. Not being an integer, T¯ indicates that the
panel is unbalanced.
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